| Following is the final electronic text from the Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report (MMWR), vol. 43, no. 9, dated March 11, 1994. The MMWR is
published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public
Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
Inquiries about the MMWR Series, including material to be considered for
publication, should be directed to: Editor, MMWR Series, Mailstop C-08,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30333; telephone
(404) 332-4555.
All material in the MMWR Series is in the public domain and may be used and
reprinted without special permission; citation as to source, however, is
appreciated.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
David Satcher, M.D., Ph.D.
Deputy Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Walter R. Dowdle, Ph.D.
Acting Director, Epidemiology Program Office
Barbara R. Holloway, M.P.H.
Editor, MMWR Series
Richard A. Goodman, M.D., M.P.H.
Managing Editor, MMWR (weekly)
Karen L. Foster, M.A.
Writers-Editors, MMWR (weekly)
David C. Johnson Darlene D. Rumph-Person
Patricia A. McGee Caran R. Wilbanks
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE:
Pages Title
153-155 Injuries Associated with Soccer Goalposts --
United States, 1979-1993
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Epidemiologic Notes and Reports
Injuries Associated with Soccer Goalposts --
United States, 1979-1993
Injuries associated with sports can be related to a variety of
factors, including participant's level of conditioning or training, failure
to use safety equipment, contact, overexertion, difficulty in conducting
the task required, mismatch in skill or size between players, and adverse
environmental conditions. A rare but often fatal event is a blow caused by
a falling soccer goalpost resulting from improper installation or use. From
1979 through 1993, 27 persons were injured or killed from falling soccer
goalposts. This report describes three (two fatal) injuries associated with
soccer goalposts and summarizes an analysis of all fatal and nonfatal
soccer goalpost-related injuries reported in the United States to the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) during 1979-1993.
Case 1
A 16-year-old boy and two friends at a high school soccer field
without adult supervision climbed the mobile soccer goalpost. As one person
climbed on the horizontal header of the 600-pound steel goalpost, the
goalpost tipped forward and struck the head of the 16-year-old, who was
hanging from the header, and rendered him unconscious. Cardiopulmonary
resuscitation at the scene and at the local emergency department was
unsuccessful. He was pronounced dead 1 hour after the incident. An autopsy
revealed severe blunt head trauma with multiple skull fractures and
cerebral edema. Analysis of blood samples was negative for alcohol and
drugs. The goalpost, which was commercially made and had been in service
without incident for 6 years, was not anchored to the ground at the time
of the incident.
Case 2
A 3-year-old boy was playing in front of a metal goalpost after a
soccer game. As his father and brother were lifting one of the goalpost's
corners to remove the net for storage, the goalpost fell, striking the
boy's head and pinning him to the ground; he was rendered unconscious
immediately. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation was unsuccessful, and the boy
was pronounced dead approximately 1 hour later. The goalpost had not been
anchored.
Case 3
A 9-year-old boy was playing goalie during a team practice when a wind
gust blew over the unstaked steel soccer goalpost. The child tried to stop
the fall of the goalpost when it struck his upper leg and fractured his
femur. He was hospitalized for 6 weeks and disabled for 4 months before
regaining useful leg function. The goalpost had been moved before the
beginning of practice, and the seven steel stakes that secured it to the
ground had been left behind.
Analysis of National Morbidity and Mortality Data
Data about persons injured or killed by falling soccer goalposts in
the United States during 1979-1993 were identified by CPSC from 1) the
National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (1) 2) newspaper clippings,
3) medical examiner reports, and 4) personal contacts made by soccer
coaches or equipment manufacturers to CPSC. Each case was investigated
through site inspections and interviews with the injured patient, a parent
or other family member, a witness, and/or authorities responsible for
purchase or maintenance of the soccer goalposts.
During 1979-1993, 27 injuries related to falling soccer goalposts were
investigated by CPSC, of which 18 were fatal. Most (23) injuries occurred
among males; the mean age of injured persons was 10 years. Head trauma was
the principal cause of death in 14 of the fatal injuries and was diagnosed
in two of the nonfatal ones.
Of the 27 goalposts involved, 26 were made of metal, usually steel or
galvanized pipe; 23 of the goalposts were mobile, one was permanently
installed, and three were of unknown type. Twenty-five injuries occurred
when a goalpost fell forward, with the top crossbar striking the victim.
Eighteen goalposts were not anchored, one was anchored poorly, and three
were anchored properly; for five, the status could not be determined.
Fifteen of the incidents occurred on a school field; 11, at a local or
private field; and one, at an unspecified site. Four events occurred during
a soccer game and four during practice; the remaining events occurred
during times not involving games or practice. All 27 events were witnessed:
in six cases, an adult was directly supervising and in visual contact with
the victim; in eight, an adult supervisor was in the general vicinity,
although not in visual contact. Four injuries were associated with a person
climbing; seven, with a person swinging or doing chin-ups; six, with
lifting the soccer goalpost; and four, with wind gusts. In 12 (nine fatal)
incidents, the injured persons caused the goalposts to fall.
Reported by: J DeMarco, C Reeves, US Consumer Product Safety Commission.
Div of Unintentional Injuries Prevention, National Center for Injury
Prevention and Control, CDC.
Editorial Note: The findings in this report indicate the potential for
serious injuries associated with improperly installed or used soccer
goalposts. Regulation soccer goalposts can be manufactured from steel,
aluminum, or metal pipe; measure approximately 8 feet by 24 feet; and weigh
250-800 pounds. Because the mouth of the goalpost is completely open to the
playing field, only three sides are available for stabilizing the goalpost
from forward falls. The reports to CPSC indicate that injuries typically
result from climbing on goalposts, swinging or hanging from crossbars, or
doing chin-ups on crossbars.
In the United States, soccer goalposts are manufactured by seven
companies, and an undetermined number are produced by local machine shops
without strict specifications. In 1990, CPSC issued a voluntary labeling
standard for use of warning labels on the front and back of the crossbar
and the front of the goalposts. Because of concerns about the inability of
young children to read such warnings and the likelihood that older children
would ignore these warnings, voluntary standards were adopted in 1992 by
manufacturers; these standards specify the need to anchor or counterweight
the goalposts using driving stakes, auger stakes, vertical pipe sleeves,
or sandbags. If stakes are used, four are recommended--two on the rear and
one on either side. Goalposts not in use should be chained to a fence or
other permanent structure, placed goal-face down on the ground, or
disassembled for storage. Additional information concerning these or other
methods of anchoring is available from the Coalition to Promote Soccer Goal
Safety, telephone (800) 527-7510 or (800) 531-4252.
The findings in this report demonstrate the potential benefit of using
a national surveillance system to collect data on rare injury events.
Accurately assessing the extent of such events and targeting prevention
efforts requires calculating an injury rate through improved collection of
numerator and denominator data and collecting exposure risk data (i.e., age
and sex of injured person and level of competition). In addition, schools,
park districts, and soccer associations should report injuries associated
with falling soccer goalposts to the CPSC hotline, telephone (800)
638-2772. For injuries involving goalposts that were properly installed and
used, specific information should be collected about the materials and
method used to anchor these structures and soil and weather conditions on
the day of the incident.
Reference
1. US Consumer Product Safety Commission. The NEISS sample: design and
implementation. Washington, DC: US Consumer Product Safety Commission,
March 1986.
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| Following is the final electronic text from the Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR), vol. 43, no. 13, dated April 8,
1994. The MMWR is published by the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC). Inquiries about the MMWR Series, including
material to be considered for publication, should be directed to:
Editor, MMWR Series, Mailstop C-08, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30333; telephone (404) 332-4555.
All material in the MMWR Series is in the public domain and may be
used and reprinted without special permission; citation as to
source, however, is appreciated.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
David Satcher, M.D., Ph.D.
Acting Deputy Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Claire V. Broome, M.D.
Acting Director, Epidemiology Program Office
Barbara R. Holloway, M.P.H.
Editor, MMWR Series
Richard A. Goodman, M.D., M.P.H.
Managing Editor, MMWR (weekly)
Karen L. Foster, M.A.
Writers-Editors, MMWR (weekly)
David C. Johnson Darlene D. Rumph-Person
Patricia A. McGee Caran R. Wilbanks
----------------------------------------------------------------------
CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE:
Pages Title
235,241-42 Fatalities Associated with Harvesting
of Sea Urchins -- Maine, 1993
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Epidemiologic Notes and Reports
Fatalities Associated with Harvesting
of Sea Urchins -- Maine, 1993
During 1992-1993, six persons died while diving for sea urchins in Maine
waters--two during 1992 and four during August-November 1993. The four 1993
deaths were investigated by the Maine Department of Marine Resources, the
U.S. Coast Guard, the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner in Maine, and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA); each of the deaths was
attributed to drowning. This report describes the results of the
investigations of these cases.
Case 1. On August 19, an experienced 52-year-old diver was harvesting
sea urchins from a vessel anchored in heavy fog. He exhausted his air supply
after 1 hour and, while still in the water, requested another air tank from
a support person (i.e., tender) in a small inflatable boat. The tender and
another diver in a larger boat could not locate the diver in the reduced
visibility. He was found submerged approximately 30 minutes later, and
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) was unsuccessful.
Case 2. On August 31, an experienced 22-year-old diver was attempting
on-board repairs to his urchin-harvesting vessel, which was moored in harbor
during a rainstorm. During the repairs, his skiff broke loose from the
harvesting vessel and began to drift in rough waters. He drowned while
swimming to recover the skiff. His body was recovered 3 weeks later.
Case 3. On September 7, a 24-year-old college student, who had recently
completed a basic scuba diving certification course, was attempting his first
saltwater dive in fair sea and weather conditions. He was harvesting sea
urchins in 30 feet of water when the tender lost sight of his bubbles within
minutes of starting the dive. A diver onboard the boat and another diver in
the water were not in visual contact with the distressed diver. He was found
submerged approximately 20 minutes later, and CPR was unsuccessful. OSHA
subsequently cited the boat owner for violations of commercial diving
standards.
Case 4. On November 3, a 25-year-old man with less than 2 weeks of
diving experience was harvesting sea urchins in open seas with powerful surf.
The diver surfaced and was attempting to untangle his catch-bag recovery line
when he became caught in breaking surf along a nearby rock formation. The
person in the tending vessel was unable to assist him because the vessel was
too large to maneuver in shallow waters. Another diver in the water was
unaware of the situation. The man was found submerged approximately 20
minutes later, and CPR was not attempted. OSHA subsequently cited the boat
owner for violations of commercial diving standards.
Reported by: SC Shannon, DO, Occupational Health Program, Div of Disease
Control; KF Gensheimer, MD, State Epidemiologist, Div of Disease Control, Bur
of Health, Maine Dept of Human Svcs; RH LeHay, Maine Dept of Marine
Resources; J Ciampa, US Coast Guard Marine Safety Office, Portland. Alaska
Activity, Div of Safety Research, National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health; Div of Field Epidemiology, Epidemiology Program Office, CDC.
Editorial Note: The commercial fishing industry has one of the highest
occupational fatality rates in the United States (1). In Alaska, during 1991
and 1992, the average annual occupational fatality rate for the fishing
industry was 200 per 100,000 workers, and the fatality rate for the shellfish
fishery was 530 per 100,000 (1). In comparison, during 1993 in Maine, the
fatality rate for the sea urchin-harvesting industry was 278 per 100,000
workers. During 1980-1989, the average annual rate of traumatic occupational
fatalities in Maine was 7.6 per 100,000 (2). Although sea urchin-harvesting
vessels constitute approximately 10% of commercial fishing vessels, they
account for 25% of all commercial fishing vessels lost in northern New
England (U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office, Portland, Maine, unpublished
data, 1994).
Commercial harvesting of sea urchins in Maine began in 1987, and the
harvest doubled during 1992-1993, primarily because of increased demand for
yellow roe. In 1993, 1439 divers were licensed to harvest sea urchins in
Maine waters, and approximately 30-40 million pounds of roe were harvested.
In general, sea urchins are harvested by hand by divers using scuba
equipment. The most marketable sea urchins are present in the subtidal zone
along rock ledges in less than 30 feet of water. The highest quality roe is
harvested during the winter. Shallow water over ledges and the often adverse
Maine weather require divers and vessels to operate in waters with strong
currents and powerful surf. These conditions pose substantial hazards for the
sea urchin industry in Maine--especially for inexperienced divers and persons
unfamiliar with operating vessels in adverse sea and weather conditions (U.S.
Coast Guard Marine Safety Office, Portland, Maine, unpublished data, 1994).
In addition to the four deaths reported in 1993, the U.S. Coast Guard
reported an estimated five incidents in which deaths were averted only after
extensive search-and-rescue efforts by state and federal agencies. For
example, in one incident, aircraft were used to locate a sea urchin diver who
became separated from the harvesting operation. Many divers work alone, and
one harvest vessel may support several divers in multiple locations along a
productive ledge. Thus, divers may be unable to summon assistance from the
supporting vessel or from other divers.
Basic recreational scuba diving certification may not adequately train
new divers for commercial activities such as sea urchin harvesting.
Legislation has been introduced in Maine that would impose stricter training
and certification requirements for sea urchin divers. The proposal would
require persons to obtain a certificate of commercial diving competency
before being issued a license to hand-harvest sea urchins. OSHA regulations
require that each boat that tends sea urchin divers must have a diver stand
by to provide assistance when another diver is in the water, and support
personnel must be trained in CPR. In addition, each diver must be line-tended
from the surface or in visual contact with another diver. Two of the cases
described in this report (cases 3 and 4) prompted OSHA to apply work-safety
standards for commercial diving to the sea urchin fishery for the first time
by issuing citations to the owners of both boats.
References
1. CDC. Commercial fishing fatalities--Alaska, 1991-1992. MMWR 1993;42:350-
1,357-9.
2. NIOSH. Fatal injuries to workers in the United States, 1980-89: a decade
of surveillance. Cincinnati: US Department of Health and Human Services,
Public Health Sevice, CDC, 1993.
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