Conference 7.286::digital

    I LOVED the Rainbow!  Best machine ever built!  I *almost* bought one!
    
    	* Built-in terminal emulation
    	* Expanded diagnostics
    	* Today's processor with tomorrow's inside (1)
    	* Dual OS capability
    	* Over 1000 software products and growing each month
    
    (My armes are crossed over my head for the incoming mudslinging)
    
    (1) From a former television spot just seen in the movie
        "The Philadelphia Experiment"
                             

I disagree with those who say the Rainbow was a failure.  Considering it was
introduced in the early 1980s, before anyone agreed on the standards, it was way
ahead of its time.  It has not been surpassed until recently for its graphics
and all-around wonderfulness.  If the world of software hadn't passed it by, my
Rainbow, still in working condition, would still be in use.

We learned from our mistakes and now, I believe, manufacture PCs of superior
quality that are also industry-standard.

Long live the Rainbow!

Paul

    
    And you only needed a pen to service it...unlike I*M's PC's that
    had over 120 screws in it.  A service engineers *nightmare*!
    
    

RE: .3

	Major rathole, but what else is new?

	We more than made up for the amount of screws with the 
	VAXstation 2000. One always has leftovers after opening up
	one of those monsters..

						mike

    As tech (and primary) editor of the only book ever written on the early
    DEC pc family (Rainbow, PRO and DECmate) DEC Personal Computers
    Expansion & Software Guide, published by QUE Corp, I had several
    opportunities to talk with those who sold both IBM PC & XT and Rainbow.
    There was NEVER anyone I spoke with who felt anything other than that
    Rainbow was superior in every way to it's illustrious competitor - no
    kidding! We were just late - that's it. That is all over now & I am
    excited to see we are making such progress with a great pc! 

re Note 2372.2 by FUNYET::ANDERSON:

> I disagree with those who say the Rainbow was a failure.  

        I believe that Rainbow's failure was actually the tip of the
        iceberg of Digital's failure -- it just took the better part
        of a decade for Digital to understand how unresponsive it was
        to the changes in the computer markets.

 Considering it was
> introduced in the early 1980s, before anyone agreed on the standards, it was way
> ahead of its time.  

        Actually, it implemented the de facto standard of the early
        '80 -- CP/M on the Z80.  However it came out at one of those
        relatively rare points when the standard takes a dramatic
        turn.  We did not respond quickly to that, and when we did
        respond, we responded poorly (e.g., the VAXmate).

        (There is probably a lesson in all this for the introduction
        of the Alpha-based PC.  We often talk as if we hope that the
        Alpha will set a new industry standard, turning the industry
        away from the Intel design center.  However, are we going to
        succeed as IBM/Microsoft did in the early '80s when they
        pulled off the same kind of change?)

        Bob

    Consider this a plug to add historical comments to MR4SRV::DEC_HISTORY.
    
    Discussion of the acceptance of Digital's current products in the
    market probably belongs in ASIMOV::MARKETING.

    Our success in PCs is the single most effective
    and influential bit of corporate self-promotion (one
    might even say inadvertent marketing) ever 
    done by this typically "let-the-product-sell-itself" company.
    Consumers are hearing our name.  That's goodness.
    Thanks to aggressive PC marketing -- for a change.  Just 
    wanted to "note" it for the record.  Hope they keep the
    heat on!

    re: ...only a pen needed to fix...
    
    The same was true for the VAXmate.  To fix mine (as a customer), all I
    had to do was pull out a pen, write a req. for a Dell, and write a
    salvage request for the VAXmate... :)
    
    --- Gavin

RE: .2

It fell drastically short of both sales and revenue expectations.  In business, 
that is the definition of a product failure.

--PSW

    The Rainbow was a extremly well engineered and fantastic product.
    Pricing was adequate etc etc...
    
    What was wrong ? We didn't listen to the customer(s). The major PC
    customer at that time was the PC dealer.
    
    A relative of mine ws working at that time for Computerland
    Headquarters. He told me the following:
    
    The profit for a dealer came from:
    
    +/- 0% on the IBM CPU Box (i.e 32% discount ws passed to the end-user).
    +/- 50% on Disk & Memory which was bought in Taiwan etc.. i.e. the
            End-User was under the impression that he obtained 10 to 20%
            discount on the IBM pricelist but in fact he got 3rd party on
            which the dealer had a margin going up to 80%.
    +/- 50% on Services i.e. training, maintenance.
    
    and what did we do ?
    
    Dealers had to buy <all DEC> and on top of it we bundled 12 months
    warranty. 
    
    rgds
    
    Al
            
    
    
    

	Re .6:

>        Actually, it implemented the de facto standard of the early
>        '80 -- CP/M on the Z80.  However it came out at one of those
>        relatively rare points when the standard takes a dramatic
>        turn.

	Pre-PC desktops made sense mostly to the hacker, hobbyist market, a
	minuscule market with no money.

	The dramatic turn:  The IBM PC ignored that market and sold to the 
	masses, who don't care a whistle what's inside the computer.  They
	don't buy computers; they buy spreadsheet machines, database machines,
	game machines, etc.

	The PC did two things: it grabbed a new market, and it defended its
	market with hardware and operating system different from those used 
	by any attackers.  What's important is that the PC grabbed new ground,
	and held it.


>        (There is probably a lesson in all this for the introduction
>        of the Alpha-based PC.  We often talk as if we hope that the
>        Alpha will set a new industry standard, turning the industry
>        away from the Intel design center.  However, are we going to
>        succeed as IBM/Microsoft did in the early '80s when they
>        pulled off the same kind of change?)


	If we learn a lesson, we'll learn that people don't buy "industry
	standards".  People buy utility, portability, and longevity.  They
	already have these things.

	Who needs a new industry standard?  Buyers already have portability;
	why buy a different kind of tool to provide the same thing?  E.g., why
	does the buyer need Micro Channel to provide module connectivity?
	The buyer already has ISA, and it's good enough...

	I think we are not trying to pull off the same kind of change that
	IBM/Microsoft pulled off in the early 80s.  They didn't change anything;
	they created something new.  They ignored the hobbyist market, and moved
	into a new market; whereas we are trying to move into an entrenched
	market.  Buyers don't like to be isolated.  If our product tries to
	separate its buyer from the mass sources of hardware and software, we
	will fail.  If we provide a better tool that doesn't disrupt the buyer's
	life, we will succeed.

	Regards, Robert.

re Note 2372.12 by ASD::DIGRAZIA:

> 	Pre-PC desktops made sense mostly to the hacker, hobbyist market, a
> 	minuscule market with no money.

        Actually, CP/M on the Z80 was "big" in small business
        computing -- it was not just a hacker and hobbyist market --
        which made it all the more the logical choice for Digital to
        implement.


> 	Who needs a new industry standard?  Buyers already have portability;

        I think that there's a reasonable belief that the industry
        will soon have to move from the Intel design center towards
        the benefits of RISC technology, and that since we have the
        best RISC architecture and implementation, why shouldn't it
        be ours?  In other words, the industry must be headed towards
        another one of those dramatic turning points, and we have the
        right technology at the right time.

        Of course, it will take far more than the "right technology"
        to be the leader when this shift occurs -- and there are
        others with "pretty good technology", good enough to win with
        the right marketing, etc.

        Bob

	Re .13:

>        Actually, CP/M on the Z80 was "big" in small business
>        computing -- it was not just a hacker and hobbyist market --

	Interesting fact.  I wonder, since CP/M was keeping them happy,
	whether it could have ballooned.  If PC/MS-DOS hadn't come along,
	what would've happened?  Would the CP/M world have expanded beyond
	the small business market?  Would applications have become ubiquitous?
	Why didn't small business stick with CP/M?  Was it the IBM imprimatur?
	It's hard to see where the process wasn't circular.

	I think I err when I say the PC grabbed a new market; maybe I mean
	it grabbed the rest of the market, the "rest" being schools and homes,
	and the less sophisticated small business.

>        I think that there's a reasonable belief that the industry
>        will soon have to move from the Intel design center towards
>        the benefits of RISC technology, ...

	If that's true, this must be the core of our future market.
	Why is that belief reasonable?  Are new, demanding applications
	appearing, which will require fast machines?  Are there enough
	buyers for them?  For instance, does a multi-media program overload
	a 486, and do masses of people want multi-media?  Do they want
	Alpha?

	Am I right in thinking that users will insist on running their 
	old programs on new platforms, and does that insistence require
	Intel compatibility at a low level?

	Regards, Robert.

    The way i heard it, IBM attempted to meet with the owner of CP/M,
    and he didn't bother to show up.  So they wrote him off and pursued
    MS/DOS...mwr

    
    I read (sorry, forget where) that Bill Gates' mother sat on the
    executive board of the United Way in NY, along with the CEO
    of IBM; the implication being that he had an inside track.
    
    Glenn