[Search for users] [Overall Top Noters] [List of all Conferences] [Download this site]

Conference 7.286::digital

Title:The Digital way of working
Moderator:QUARK::LIONELON
Created:Fri Feb 14 1986
Last Modified:Fri Jun 06 1997
Last Successful Update:Fri Jun 06 1997
Number of topics:5321
Total number of notes:139771

1492.0. "11-June WSJ Article about VAX 9000" by SFCPMO::KING (Colorado..Ski Country U.S.A) Tue Jun 11 1991 14:03

    
  

             Digital Stubs Its Toe Kicking IBM
                 The Wall Street Journal
                 Tuesday, June 11, 1991
                   by John R. Wilke
    

    CAMBRIDGE, Mass. - Digital Equipment Corp. last week gave one of
    its powerful new mainframe computers to the Massachusetts
    Institute of Technology, alma mater of the company's president,
    Kenneth H. Olsen.

    Selling them has proved more difficult.

    Digital invested its pride, years of work by its best engineers
    and more than $1 billion to build its new line of mainframes, the
    most complex and powerful machines the company has ever built. 
    Analysts said the line would generate revenue of as much as $1
    billion in its first year, poaching sales from industry leader
    International Business Machines Corp., in its most lucrative
    market.

    But the clash of the titans hasn't happened.  Digital executives
    now predict they'll ship 325 mainframes by June 30, well short of
    their original business plan.  At an average $1.4 million apiece,
    the line will yield less than half the revenue analysts had
    forecast for its first year.

    Digital's problems so far underscore the difficulty of attacking
    an entrenched competitor, event with a less costly product that
    analysts say is at least equal in quality.  And it shows that in
    mainframes, as in everything else, timing is critical.

    While largely invisible to most people, mainframes hum behind
    glass walls at the heart of every major corporation, juggling
    accounting, billing, inventory and more.  And while smaller,
    nimbler machines have slowed annual growth in the mainframe market
    to single digits, it's still a profitable, $40 billion business -
    and still dominated by IBM.

    Other companies have tried and failed to make a run at IBM.  NCR
    Corp., Honeywell Inc., Control Data Corp., and others got burned,
    while successful Amdahl Corp., Fujitsu Ltd., and Hitachi Ltd. -
    all compete on IBM's terms, with IBM compatible machines, unlike
    Digital.

    So this latest assault on IBM by its largest U.S. competitor had
    been closely watched.  But Digital's efforts have been met "with a
    great big Bronx cheer," says Barry Bosak, an analyst at Smith
    Barney, Harris Upham & Co.  He says the VAX 9000 has had little
    effect yet on IBM, which shipped 2,263 of its flagship 3090 line
    last year, according to market researcher International Data Corp.

    The slow start has hurt Digital, which has been counting on the
    high-margin line to ignite new profit.  In the nine months ended
    March 30, earnings fell 23% to $253.9 million, while revenues hurt
    by declining minicomputer sales, rose just 4% to $9.97 billion.

    More than anything else, Digital's timing was bad - perhaps
    fatally so.  Digital was hot in 1988, and its big customers were
    clamoring for a more powerful machine.  But the company decided to
    cancel a water-cooled mainframe design - all of IBM's are
    water-cooled - and concentrate on advanced technology that
    required no plumbing, a key competitive advantage.  That cost
    perhaps a year.

    When the new design was unveiled in the fall of 1989, setbacks in
    manufacturing pushed back volume shipments another year.  By then,
    recession was looming and capital spending by big companies was
    slowing.  At the same time, an industry-wide trend toward smaller,
    faster machines using standard software was sapping mainframe
    sales.  

    "Digital probably missed the window that would have made this
    machine a big success," says Marc Schulman, a UBS Securities Inc.
    analyst.

    Digital says it isn't backing off.  "We're in this for the long
    haul," says product manager William Askins.  And he points out
    that Digital's expected shipments of 325 units the first year
    actually surpassed IBM's first year with the 3090, when it shipped
    302 units.

    Customers so far seem pleased with the product.  At U S West Inc.,
    the Colorado-based telephone company, "we liked outs so much we're
    getting a bigger one," says Peggy Kaye, technology director for
    the company's law group.  She says the machine has been "much
    easier to install and operate than an IBM mainframe."

    But some buyers worry about Digital's slow start.  "If they don't
    meet their business plan, are we going to be left owning a
    mainframe without a real future?" asks George Kerns, a vice
    president of GTE Corp.'s cellular telephone unit in Atlanta.  He
    also says the company found unexpected software bugs when its
    machine arrived last year.  "I guess a few glitches are the price
    of admission with new technology - but we didn't volunteer to be a
    test site," Mr. Kerns says.  "The delays hurt our business."

    Still, "we're impressed with the machine's performance, which is
    truly mainframe-class, and with Digital's responsiveness," he
    says.  Digital has assigned three people to work full-time at GTE,
    borrowing a page from IBM, which wrote the book on customer
    support.

    Early buyers were rattled by a glitch that caused some systems to
    crash when used in certain applications.  Digital quickly fixed
    the problem, but it was yet another setback:  The complex circuit
    modules coming off already problem-plagued production lines had to
    be used to fix the affected computers, rather than build new ones.

    Digital's share of the market - measuring only the 180 units
    shipped during 1990 - stands at 4%, making it fifth largest after
    just six months, estimates International Data, the market
    researcher.  IBM and IBM-compatible makers, including Fujitsu,
    Hitachi and Amdahl, account for more than 80% of shipments, while
    Unisys Corp.'s share is 9%.

    Despite its slow start, analysts say Digital's mainframe gives it
    a breadth of products shared only by IBM and one or two other
    companies.  Digital also attracts a new class of computer user: 
    At MIT, scientists are using their new Digital mainframe to create
    hull designs for a sailboat that will compete in next year's
    America's Cup race in San Diego.
    
                                    
T.RTitleUserPersonal
Name
DateLines
1492.1If we'd only learn to get it right the first timeCVG::THOMPSONSemper GumbyTue Jun 11 1991 14:2510
>    Early buyers were rattled by a glitch that caused some systems to
>    crash when used in certain applications.  Digital quickly fixed
>    the problem, but it was yet another setback:  The complex circuit
>    modules coming off already problem-plagued production lines had to
>    be used to fix the affected computers, rather than build new ones.

	Someone explain again to me why a product that is out early sells
	better then one that works. Thanks.

			Alfred
1492.2seems like it was LATESYSTMX::BEANAttila the Hun was a LIBERAL!Tue Jun 11 1991 15:2730
re .1
    
    ?  Seems to me the product was LATE!  
    
    ... also from the article:
    
    
<    The slow start has hurt Digital, which has been counting on the
... 
<    More than anything else, Digital's timing was bad - perhaps
<    fatally so.  Digital was hot in 1988, and its big customers were
<    clamoring for a more powerful machine.  But the company decided to
<    cancel a water-cooled mainframe design - all of IBM's are
<    water-cooled - and concentrate on advanced technology that
<    required no plumbing, a key competitive advantage.  That cost
<    perhaps a year.

<    When the new design was unveiled in the fall of 1989, setbacks in
<    manufacturing pushed back volume shipments another year.  By then,
<    recession was looming and capital spending by big companies was
<    slowing.  At the same time, an industry-wide trend toward smaller,
<    faster machines using standard software was sapping mainframe
<    sales.  

 <   "Digital probably missed the window that would have made this
<    machine a big success," says Marc Schulman, a UBS Securities Inc.
<    analyst.

 
    
1492.3So late and broken is better still??CVG::THOMPSONSemper GumbyTue Jun 11 1991 16:177
    RE: .2 Yes it was late. So it was late AND didn't work. That was
    apparently someones idea of a good thing. A few more units of time
    and it might have shipped in working condition but that was not
    concidered to be importent enough to delay any longer. It was still
    shipper earlier then a stable product was.
    
    			Alfred
1492.4Engineering Wins AgainCOOKIE::LENNARDRush Limbaugh, I Luv Ya GuyTue Jun 11 1991 16:4410
    Re .1, that's easy, Alfred.  For EVERY product there is a market
    window.  We blew it again.  Dave Stone is making a big deal these
    days about the devastating impact on profitability when you miss
    the market window for software.  Same is true for hardware.
    
    The only hopeful sign is that after 30-some years, we are finally
    beginning to recognize this......but I fear it may be too late again.
    
    We've got to stop building machines that don't make money.  I
    honestly don't think we'll ever learn.
1492.5SAHQ::LUBERI'm schizophrenic and I am tooTue Jun 11 1991 18:591
    How about:  we've got to stop giving our products and services away.  
1492.6gotta use the right wordsSMOOT::ROTHFrom little acorns mighty oaks grow.Tue Jun 11 1991 19:458
re: <<< Note 1492.5 by SAHQ::LUBER "I'm schizophrenic and I am too" >>>

>How about:  we've got to stop giving our products and services away.  

The current euphamisim is "business decision". It still hurts the pocket
book but reads better in memos and meetings.

Lee
1492.7Controversy brewing...BRULE::MICKOLIf you think of losing, you've lostWed Jun 12 1991 02:0211
Sorry, I think we should give our services away (at least from our 
customer's perspective). The perception that we are doing that and not 
"nickel-and-diming" the customer is causing us to make great strides with a 
major corporate account.

The perceived 'price gouging' by our service organizations is what's going 
to kill us. I speak from experience.

Regards,

Jim
1492.8Brilliant, just brilliant, the profit margin on products is approaching ...YUPPIE::COLEProposal:Getting an edge in word-wise!Wed Jun 12 1991 11:0910
	... the low single digits, and now you say we should GIVE AWAY
the most profitable business we have?  Services are the "added value"
everyone keeps alluding to when saying how we distinguish ourselves in
the "commodity" market of hardware these days.  What we need are more
people in the field wgho have the guts to sell the added value and not
the "allowance kings" we have now!

	Rethink what you said, and think about this:  Let's sell TOTAL
packages of products and services for ONE price.  Let the bookkeepers sort
out who gets credit for what!
1492.9One price per solution.ODIXIE::SILVERSSales Support Ninja...Wed Jun 12 1991 12:116
    Exactly, Jack - we need to get away from detailed, line-item (this
    connector costs 3.95, this cable 14.40, this service 150.00/hr) to a 
    single undiscounted price line followed by the discounted one (for
    those accounts with DBA's)  - we've got to get better at 'bundling'
    service in with hw/sw/service solutions. Then let the 'bean counters'
    sort and count the beans....
1492.10WHOS01::BOWERSDave Bowers @WHOWed Jun 12 1991 13:3122
    re .6;
    
    There's a world of difference between making sure that your
    relationship with a customer is profitable, and the dogged
    determination to wring every last cent out of every last transaction. 
    
    Yes, in the past, we've tried to "buy" business with allowances and
    free service (usually provideed by sales support folks).  We've also
    (as noted) created a reputation for "nickel & diming" the customer to
    death on services and gouging the customer unmercifully on software
    license fees.
    
    To be even-handed, one must also recognize that service managers
    operate under almost impossible metrics (my unit currently has revenue
    goals that couldn't be met if everyone was 100% billable at $150/hr.). 
    They really can't afford to let a penny get away.  I'm sure other
    groups are under similar pressure.  It is my hope that NMS will solve
    some of these problems by putting P&L resposibility where it belongs,
    and letting the service groups concentrate on delivering quality
    service.
    
    -dave
1492.11we need predictabilityRICKS::SHERMANECADSR::SHERMAN 225-5487, 223-3326Wed Jun 12 1991 13:3316
    I suspect our customers don't mind what it costs so long as it is
    predictable.  They have budgets to make, too.  If we tell them this is
    a $5K computer and then later tell them they need to buy an unexpected
    $1K service contract for each machine (I'm making up these numbers)
    the customer has every reason to be upset.  We are "nickel and diming"
    him to death because every time he turns around we ask for money he
    wasn't planning to give us.  His budget gets shot and he wonders if we
    have been less than honest.  After all, by saying that it would cost
    only $5K we may have underbid someone.  Then, by tacking on other costs
    that were unexpected we may have gone over competitive bids.  Better to
    be up front about it and say that this is what you pay, this is what
    you get, this is why what we offer is better than what you'll get from
    our competitors.  Predictability is one of the values we should be
    adding and charging for.
    
    Steve
1492.12KYOA::MIANOJohn - NY Retail Banking Resource CntrWed Jun 12 1991 15:153
You'll know when Digital really gets into the integration business
when we start giving away hardware to leverage service sales
(Rather than the other way around).
1492.13RIP DECCOOKIE::LENNARDRush Limbaugh, I Luv Ya GuyWed Jun 12 1991 15:4730
    We "give away" incredible amounts of free services at CSC's because
    our admin systems are so bad that we don't even know who has a support
    contract and who doesn't.  In FY89, at CSC Colorado, we had 72,000
    referrals to local offices of people who called without a contract.
    
    They are trying to fix that now through a service "entitlement" program
    which is also floundering from a lack of resources.....not to mention
    it has been going on for about a year.
    
    At the risk of repeating myself, our admin systems are so bad that it
    is only our size that keeps us afloat...and STILL management is not
    willing to make the massive investment necessary to clean it up.  For
    NMS to be truly effective we need incredibly better business
    information, and we ain't gonna get it.  Allocations will take over again,
    management will find out how to work the "system", and we'll be right
    back where we started with everybody looking good, but no cash in the
    drawer.  If L.L. Bean operated like we do, they would have been out
    of business ten years ago.
    
    We used to laugh ten years ago at how "someday, even DEC will learn how
    to use computers...ha-ha."  The chickens have come home to roost.  The
    problem is, they are also crapping.
    
    I am a service product manager.  I should be able to pull up a report
    on service contract margins, cut anyway I want it, reflecting
    worldwide business, and NEVER over 24 hours old.  I have nothing now.
    My gut tells me some of my products are losing money, badly, but I
    can't prove it.  To be honest, I don't even care anymore.  I'm tired
    of complaining about it...and I'm equally tired of hearing about 
    "next year".
1492.14Backroom politics, canceled projects...PEACHS::BELDINWed Jun 12 1991 16:4014
>    RE: .2 Yes it was late. So it was late AND didn't work. That was
>    apparently someones idea of a good thing. A few more units of time

	Gee! I remember working on a project named Argonaut that was
	real close to completion when this thing was LATE! I even heard
	that a year or two after Argonaut was CANCELED, Jack Smith
	went to Spitbrook and said, in essence, "we goofed. Had we not
	canceled Argonaut, we would have had shippable product by now."
	Sigh... Also heard rumors from 9000-land that managers were
	changing jobs faster than you could keep track...

	Oh... Digital keeps changing! :-(


1492.15COOKIE::LENNARDRush Limbaugh, I Luv Ya GuyWed Jun 12 1991 16:5412
    re -1, yep, I heard Ole Jack say that with my own personal ears.  At
    the same meeting he also implied that he was there to pick our minds
    for ideas, inasmuch as "senior management" hadn't made a correct
    decision in the last two years.
    
    I have a relative in 9000-land, he (a manager) says he has never seen
    such turmoil and craziness.  He's bailing out, as is almost everyone
    else.
    
    A previous entry here talked about a manager so-and-so stating "we're
    in this for the long haul".  Translation?  "We're in deep trouble,
    everything is turning to crap, and we don't know what to do."
1492.16RICKS::SHERMANECADSR::SHERMAN 225-5487, 223-3326Wed Jun 12 1991 19:466
    Oh, no.  In the past I have been witness to "long haul" commitments for
    other machines.  Like, the Adam computer, the IBM PC Jr., the TI/4 Home
    Computer.  Also, the Amiga though evidently folks in Europe bought off
    on the "long haul" story and saved the product.  Come on Alpha!
    
    Steve
1492.17Starting to smell bad....COOKIE::LENNARDRush Limbaugh, I Luv Ya GuyThu Jun 13 1991 14:1410
    Very interesting article on the 9000 in the June 10 issue of DIGITAL
    NEWS.  With tongue-only-slightly-in-cheek (I think) John Gantz makes
    a point that IBM is behind our misery.  He says they deliberately
    suckered us into a niche market that was already in it's "twilight",
    knowing full well that we would shoot our corporate wad in the effort.
    He holds out the possibility of a "total market defeat" if we don't
    do something quickly to redefine our market thrust.
    
    Personally, I think the 9000 is emitting early gangrenous fumes, and 
    the bailout of critical personnel is already starting.
1492.18Has the race really started ?BAGELS::RIOPELLEThu Jun 13 1991 18:0230
     
          
     I'm really saddened to hear the news in here about the 9000. If we
    cant keep our attitude straight internally, then its very hard for 
    the sales folk to keep a smile as the customer signs the dotted line
    for one. Coming from a strong IBM background into DEC to work with DEC
    based IBM customers, and help develope DEC IBM based products, has been
    rewarding. With the announcement of the 9000, I personally had many
    hopes for a NEW generation of mainframe computers that would
    be less cumbersome, easier to use, low overhead, and FAST. So far its
    been impressive, and its seems like the customers still don't realize
    what it is we created, maybe we don't either. 
    
      One note on the donation to MIT to work on the next America Cup Boat.
    
    If they win and our 9000" DEC Flagship Computer" was used to aid in the
    design. Then the marketing possibilities are enormous.
    
      DIGITAL WINS THE AMERICAS CUP WITH THE VAX 9000. Sounds great an 
    AMERCIAN company, with a MADE in USA Box, with a MADE in USA Boat.
    Can you just picture the TV spot Boat-digital-MIT-USA.
    
      So maybe all those people are jumping ship a little too early, its
    seems like the race hasn't really started yet. 
    
      Hey ! You over there get those sails up higher. We've got a race
    to win.
            
 
    
1492.19And another thing!HERCUL::MOSERIt's a Girl! Anne Marie Moser 7May91Fri Jun 14 1991 10:5720
The thing I don't understand is this:

With a machine that has a multi-million dollar price tag and a 1-2 year 
selling cycle, why do we expect it to have taken the world by storm already.

People don't drop 1-2 mill on a whim, it takes hard work and it takes *time*.

I have personally been involved in two of these sales (successful) and am 
involved in new opportunities that could net several more.  I am not a VAX 9000
driver or in any other way focused on these machines, they just happen to be
very kick-butt machines and in the right applications, there is none better.

Let's stop whining and get out and sell, and let's hope this corporation does
not orphan this machine before it's had a chance to establish a track record.
Give me a family of machines, let's get out the next generation of this thing
and lets show the world what desktop to glass-house computing is all about!

rah-rah!


1492.20RICKS::SHERMANECADSR::SHERMAN 225-5487, 223-3326Fri Jun 14 1991 13:218
    I note that this article only really has one tidbit of real news. 
    That's that Digital gave away a VAX 9000.  The rest of the article is
    an observation by a reporter who feels that the sales of the 9000 do
    not meet expectations.  What is of most concern to me are the notes
    indicating that we are losing talented people from the 9000 project.
    Now, THAT'S news, if true.
    
    Steve
1492.21BUNYIP::QUODLINGCooooiiiieee, cobber...Fri Jun 14 1991 14:2120
re .19

Amen...!!!

Far too many short sighted people in this corporation touted the 9000 as the
3090-killer (which it is, too most extents). What they forgot, however, is
that the average 3090 site probably has probably a $20M+ investment in
Hardware and a $10M+ investment in Software (not to mention the people
training etc...)

We may have a better mousetrap but does in run CICS? Can you plug and play a
VM application to it. If we were that serious about that market place, we
should have considered a 370 based INstruction set emulator or the like.

Now what we should be doing with it is going out and selling it to replace all
of those aging CDC, Honeywell, NCR, BUrroughs etc mainframes, Most of whom
aren't even seriously in the mainframe market anymore.

q

1492.22COOKIE::LENNARDRush Limbaugh, I Luv Ya GuyFri Jun 14 1991 16:084
    re .21 ..... that's really great, and I couldn't agree more.  Let's
    start this new thrust by getting a list of the DM's who are willing
    to agree to a 24+ month sales cycle, with a probably 30-40% penetration
    rate.  Man, that was easy!
1492.23on no bundling again...;^)TRLIAN::GORDONTue Jun 18 1991 11:506
    re: .9
    
    as I recall, it took the justice dept about 12 years to break up
    the "bundling" practices of IBM...since the final court decision
    around 1964-68(?) the practice has been very carefully avoided
    in the industry.....
1492.24SICVAX::SWEENEYPatrick Sweeney in New YorkTue Jun 18 1991 13:152
    Another article with more fact and opinion on the VAX 9000 has appeared
    in the current issue of Business Week.
1492.25RE: .23 - The "bundling" refered to in .9 is not the same "bundling" as ...YUPPIE::COLEProposal:Getting an edge in word-wise!Tue Jun 18 1991 14:398
	... IBM was slapped for.  IBM gave no choice in that you had to
use certain of THEIR software on THEIR processors, and "Chinese Menu"
picking wasn't allowed.  This locked out the PCM's for a while.

	The "package" pricing David and I refer to is more of a business
decision in a particular sales environment.  The services bundling is
our focus, in .8 and .9.  But nothing is "locked", just making the smartest
business decision
1492.2622-Aug Press Release re: Info. Sys. BusinessSWAM2::MCCARTHY_LANow, don't get me wrong, but...Mon Aug 26 1991 19:0144
----------------------------PRESS RELEASE-----------------------------

MARLBORO, Mass. -- August 22, 1991 -- Digital Equipment Corporation 
announced today that it would reorganize its Information Systems Business 
(ISB) unit.  ISB includes VAX 9000, fault-tolerant, VAXcluster and 
production systems. 

During the past ten years, under the direction of Vice President 
Robert M. Glorioso, ISB launched Digital into the high-end, scientific and 
fault-tolerant marketplaces.  One year ago, the engineering 
responsibilities for Digital's high-end VAX 9000 series of mainframes and 
supercomputers were transitioned to the VAX VMS Systems and Servers (VSS) 
group, under VSS Vice President William R. Demmer.  Today, Digital
transitioned marketing responsibilities for ISB to William Johnson, vice 
president of Corporate Marketing Planning.  

"Our progress in the mainframe business continues, and our investments
in these markets are considerable and well aligned within the VAX/VMS
business," said Digital President Kenneth H. Olsen.  "Digital's 
commitment to our high-end information systems business increases as we 
continue to focus significant resources on each of these markets."

"Bob Glorioso has made a significant contribution to the company's 
growing presence in the mainframe information systems business, first as
the leader of technology and engineering efforts, and most recently by
providing its business management," said Olsen.

For the next month, Glorioso will attend to pressing family concerns.
He has decided to relinquish his leadership of ISB while retaining the 
position of vice president.  He also plans to use this time to explore
new career opportunities at Digital.

Richard Whitman has been named acting manager for ISB, reporting to
Johnson.  Whitman, who has worked for Digital for the past 17 years, 
has participated in Digital's high-end marketing efforts for almost six 
years.  Most recently, Whitman was Production Systems marketing manager.

Digital Equipment Corporation, headquartered in Maynard, Massachusetts,
is the leading worldwide supplier of networked computer systems, software,
and services.  Digital pioneered and leads the industry in interactive,
distributed and multivendor computing.  Digital and its partners deliver
the power to use the best integrated solutions -- from desktop to data
center -- in open information environments.