Conference 7.286::space

Newsgroups: sci.space,sci.space.shuttle
Path: decwrl!decvax!ucbvax!cartan!ucbcad!ames!lll-crg!seismo!mnetor!utzoo!henry
Subject: space news from Oct 20 AW&ST
Posted: 9 Dec 86 02:37:24 GMT
Organization: U of Toronto Zoology
Xref: decwrl sci.space:211 sci.space.shuttle:56
  
[Editorial of the Week:
 
The slow pace of Shuttle recovery continues to be an outrage.  The
Apollo fire is a good example of how it should be done.  Another comes
from the early 1950s:  the early development history of the F-100
supersonic fighter. This was the first US supersonic fighter, and
events were similar in certain ways to the Shuttle.  Tests went pretty
well, with the exception of some warnings from the senior test pilot
about stability problems.  After it was decided not to court-martial
him [!] for this, the conclusion was that the problems were off in
obscure corners of the flight envelope that had no relevance to normal
service use.  The F-100 was officially declared operational.  There
were a few ominous signs, notably some unexplained crashes, but things
mostly seemed okay.  Then a fairly routine high-speed- pullout test
ended abruptly when the aircraft disintegrated, killing the pilot. 
 
Unlike the Shuttle, this was not the result of a relatively minor
design flaw:  the problem was a fundamental rule of aircraft dynamics
that was not understood until this crash was investigated.  That is,
the problem was deeper and scarier. 
 
Determining the cause of the crash took about three months, roughly
the same time it took the Rogers Commission to do the same thing.  So
far so good. 
 
The F-100s then *RESUMED FLYING* immediately, with restrictions on
missions and maneuvers to avoid trouble.  The final fixes to eliminate
the problem took a while longer, since of course they required a
deeper understanding, plus considerable design and development effort,
plus the retrofitting of all existing F-100s.  Elapsed time from crash
to completion of retrofit program:  nine whole months. 
 
					-- HS]
-- 
				Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
				{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry

        <<< COMET2::COMET$DISK1:[NOTES$LIBRARY]DEFENSE_ISSUES.NOTE;2 >>>
                        -< Hawks 'n Doves 'n Everybody >-
================================================================================
Note 115.0             Did "Ivan" blow up Challenger???                7 replies
SOFBAS::MCDONOUGH                                    62 lines   3-FEB-1987 10:45
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

               AMERICA'S SPACE PROGRAM SABOTAGED???
                                            
      Retired Lt. General Daniel Graham charges it is a mathematical
    near-certainty that the Soviets have sabotaged America's space program.
    Graham, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, now directs
    the public interest group High Frontier, which promotes a strong
    defense, including the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
    
      Did the Soviet Union's KGB secretly cause the Challenger Shuttle,
    three other American rockets and a French rocket (all lost last
    year) to "blow-up"?  Government sources say "no." They believe however,
    that the U.S.S.R., which is familiar with launching rockets in cold
    weather, might have predicted that the rubber seals used to connect
    sections of the solid rocket boosters on Challenger would not stand
    the cold weather launch.
    
      The French Government is investigating the possibility of sabotage
    on it's rocket, which failed shortly after the four successive American
    failures. There have been repeate calls from General Graham and
    others for a congressional investigation into the chain of American
    failures.
    
      General Graham outlined several pertinent facts. For instance
    all four American rockets, as well as the French Ariane rocket,
    carried American Reconnaissance satellites. America was left with
    only one "spy-in-the-sky" satellite to monitor Soviet nuclear defense
    deployments and serve as an early warning against Soviet nuclear
    attack.
    
      Also, all four American space rockets had proven reliable in the
    past: Space Shuttle--24 successful missions...
          Nike Orient----120 successful...
          Delta rocket---43 straight successes...
          Titan rocket---95% successful
    The chances of all malfunctioning in succession were an astronomical  
    1 in 250,000,000!!!!!!
    
      Three years ago, Captain William Hughes, a key Air Force officer
    in Space Launch Command, Control and Communications for Space Related
    Weapons, mysteriously disappeared in the Netherlands. He is believed
    to have been captured by Soviet agents or to have defected. Another
    suspicious sign was given by Soviet electronic spy ships, which
    normally loiter off Cape Canaveral for every Shuttle launch. Before
    the Challenger accident, they suddenly left at high speeds four
    hours before launch!!
    
      Sources report that the KGB held a celebration for a "perfect
    active measure" at its headquarters on the night of the Challenger
    explosion. Following the Challenger tragedy, Soviet condolences
    came only two hours after the explosion. In the past the Soviets
    have waited days, even weeks, to respond.
    
      Recently, Soviet-supported German terrorists used a remote controlled
    bomb to kill company executive Karl Beckurts. A note left at the
    scene said Beckurts was killed because he was a collaborator in
    the U.S. SDI or "Star-Wars" program.
    
    
    (Reprinted without permission from the March 1987 issue of
    "International Combat Arms" magazine.)
    JM
    

    Gee, what an interesting scenario, the Russkies managed to sabotage
    our last 5 rocket launches.  Only a magazine with a title of
    International Combat Arms could invent that kind of B.S.  Next
    we'll be told they're behind the AIDS epidemic.
    
    I've heard of Communist Plots, but that's ridiculous!
    

    I particularly liked the part about how the Shuttle (and not just
    that particular shuttle) had 24 successful launches, implying that
    chances for a failure were at worst 1/25, neatly disregarding all
    the other factors that work into the equation (like launching outside
    all known reliability data).
    
    I wonder if the Lt. General making these accusations is familiar
    with all the findings of the Roger's Commission (in the specific
    case of the shuttle), and with any similar data available on the
    other launch devices.
    
    While I could certainly well believe KGB sabotage in some of these
    cases, it's sort of hard to believe that they were behind the whole
    deal.  Even still, to look at it from a more reasonable standpoint:
    Suppose the russkies were responsible for the Challenger failure.
    After all the studies that have been done on that rocket, it's pretty
    clear that sabotage may not have been necessary in the first place.
    Now, we as a nation are aware of a few shortcomings of the shuttle,
    and are seeing to it that at least some of them get fixed asap.
    This in itself doesn't provide a real strong payback for the russians
    to take this sort of risk.
    
    But, it would be refreshing to hear that the KGB is responsible
    for AIDS for a change (I'm getting pretty tired of the CIA story
    that keeps popping up).  Did the guy have anything to say on that
    one? :-)

	as an aside, a former Soviet KGB major will be part of a 
	symposium tonight at Nichols College in Dudley.

	Major Levchenko defected in 1979. he'll be joined by a
	31 year CIA veteran, Thomas Troy, now editor of the
	Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene.

	Who knows, maybe he'll verify a plot to undermind American
	confidence in the space program. just ask him.

	bob 

    	Check out some of the commentary beng made about this report
    in COMET2::DEFENSE_ISSUES Topic 115, where I originally copied the
    note from.
    
    	Larry
    

VNS Letters to the Editor:
==========================

From: Peters J. Vecrumba ..................................... New York, NY, USA

Comments on Harri Pillai's
Re: Rocket engineer sues his employer
-------------------------------------

One possibility for legal grounds is:

>  1. That the defendant was negligent i.e. did not take reasonable care
>     given the circumstances.

This is pretty clear. He warned, they didn't listen.

>  2. That the plaintiff suffered loss as a direct result of the defendants
>     negligence.

This gets a little muddier. Losses here are probably put in terms of
damage to personal and professional life, for example: 

   (a) he may have been ostracized by peers and management, causing
       emotional hardship and damage to both himself and his familty
   (b) he may be blaming himself for not being forceful enough in
       his warning, with the same consequences as in (a)
   (c) his direct association with the failed component may have severely
       damaged his professional reputation and seriously impaired his
       ability to find gainful employment in his field of expertise, both
       in and out of the company

>  3. That the loss suffered is compensateable.

If basis for monetary or other losses can be established in (2.), then
it follows that the engineer (plaintiff) should receive compensation. 

Best regards, Peters J. (NYAREA::)Vecrumba

================================================================================
From: Dick Binder, Stainless Steel Rat ......................... Nashua, NH, USA

Sir,

Hari Pillai asks about certain aspects of lawsuits.  I'm not a
barrister, but I'll take a shot at answering anyway. 

> I've always thought...one had to demonstrate a number of critical points
> including : 
> 
> 1. That the defendant was negligent i.e. did not take reasonable care
>    given the circumstances.

I think that in the Challenger case criminal negligence is easily
proven by transcripts and testimony of conversations the Morton
Thiokol management had with NASA officials.  In approving the launch,
Thiokol officials can be shown to have overruled the engineering
judgment of their best technical people.  It was also known and
documented that the O-ring joints were, due to expected abrasion,
weaker than specified. 

> 2. That the plaintiff suffered loss as a direct result of the defendants
>    negligence.

The engineer in question may have suffered demonstrably irremediable
mental disturbance.  Since the Challenger disaster, Thiokol have
provided full-time counselling for those employees who wished it, and
there have been many.  Some have quit their jobs in anguish.  In this
specific case, it's for a jury to decide based on evidence of
psychological testimony. 

>3. That the loss suffered is compensateable.

The loss is, in certain ways, compensable.  The shuttle itself will
cost more than $4bn to replace.  The economic stability of certain of
Thiokol's people has suffered.  The families of the seven who were
killed have been distressed greatly, both mentally and economically,
by the disaster.  A part of any award in a case like this one will be
punitive damages - not only is the actual loss to be compensated, but
also the miscreant is to be slapped very hard on the wrist for being
naughty. 

> Certainly it is hard to see how the engineer (plaintiff) in the 
> circumstances above could sue his employer as he has not directly suffered 
> as a result of any alleged negligence, or has he? $1bn/$10m worth??

In the US there is the concept of a "class action" suit.  It is
possible that this engineer may file on behalf of all those who were
injured as a result of Thiokol's negligence. 

Yrs, etc.,
Dick Binder

 <><><><><><><>   VNS Edition : 1254     Tuesday 10-Feb-1987   <><><><><><><>

Newsgroups: sci.space,sci.space.shuttle
Path: decwrl!decvax!ucbvax!ucbcad!ames!rutgers!seismo!mnetor!utzoo!henry
Subject: space news from Nov 24 AW&ST
Posted: 4 Mar 87 01:43:13 GMT
Organization: U of Toronto Zoology
Xref: decwrl sci.space:857 sci.space.shuttle:126
 
    The article is the cover article in the February, 1987 issue of
SPECTRUM (which is the all-members magazine of the IEEE).  It is,
surprise surprise, a post-mortem on the CHALLENGER disaster.  The
technical discussion doesn't contain any surprises for those who read
this newsgroup.  However, SPECTRUM has a long-standing editorial
interest in matters of engineering ethics, whistleblowing, etc., and
they went into that side of things somewhat. 
 
    Hans Mark:  "The only cricitism that I have of the [Rogers] report
is that they laid more blame on the lower-level engineers and less
blame on the upper-level management than they should have.  As with
most of those commissions, the guys on the bottom took the rap.  They
quote Moore and Beggs and a few others saying they didn't know about
the O-ring problems, which I find awfully hard to believe.  I mean,
hell, I knew about it two years before the accident and even wrote a
memo about it.  I just find it very hard to believe." 
 
    Roger Boisjoly, Thiokol:  "I had my say... So there was no point
in me doing anything any further."  Ben Powers, NASA:  "You don't
override your chain of command..."  SPECTRUM:  "At least two others,
asked by the Rogers Commission why they did not voice their concerns
to someone other than their immediate superior, replied in virtually
identical language:  'That would not be my reporting channel.'"] 
 
[So...
 
First anniversary editorial:    What Happens Next Time?
 
    Those who were reading this newsgroup shortly after the CHALLENGER
disaster may remember me insisting that regardless of what
organizational flaws were present, specific people were responsible
for the disaster, and that they should be identified and punished. 
This wasn't a real popular viewpoint, especially when I pointed to the
Morton Thiokol engineers as a probable case in point.  I was roundly
criticized for attacking people who were "just following orders" and
covering up dangerous flaws in order to save their own jobs. 
 
    SPECTRUM:  "When no penalty is foreseen for being careless or
doing wrong, the very behavior that should be prevented is actually
enforced.  Thus penalties have to be clarified and exacted, said
attorney Robert Levin. 'One of the things that's clear to me is that
engineers do not speak the same language as managers,' he said, 'and
engineers as a group are not politically savvy.  What I would very
much like to come out of all this -- legislatively or otherwise -- is
that the next time this kind of dispute comes up, one of those
engineers can say "Damn it!  Look what it *cost* Thiokol."  Now you're
talking the language those folks understand'." 
 
    Well, it's a year later.  Have the guilty been punished?  Fat
chance. The good little boys and girls, loyal to their organizations
(instead of their professions, their country, and their species) have
survived and even been rewarded.  Myron Peretz Glazer, Smith College: 
"If one looks at the costs involved and the risks people took, it was
the most disastrous thing that could have happened, yet they walked
away okay."  The most that has happened to the top people at NASA was
slightly early retirement -- at full pension, naturally, since there
was nothing wrong with *their* performance. 
 
    By contrast, the people who made attempts -- however feeble -- to
speak out have generally been punished for it.  Boisjoly, the man who
objected (at least, until he did as he was told and "put on his
management hat") to the launch, is on "permanent leave" from his job
at Morton Thiokol. Allan McDonald, the man at the Cape who tried to
get the launch postponed, just missed losing his job with M-T, and his
career prospects are doubtful at best. 
 
    And Morton Thiokol, whose management deliberately overruled the
judgement of its engineers that the launch was not safe, apparently
mostly because they wanted to safeguard their position as the SRB
supplier? 
 
    They are fighting the payment of a $10M penalty required by their
NASA contract.  They are *receiving* million after million for the
redesign and testing work to fix the problem.  And to put the icing on
the cake, the issue of alternate suppliers for the SRBs is now on
hold, probably for five years or more.  "Look what it *cost*
Thiokol."???  Morton Thiokol is *PROFITING* *HEAVILY* from gross and
willful negligence that killed seven astronauts, destroyed billions of
dollars worth of equipment, and endangered the entire manned space
program! 
 
    What happens *next* time?  When another engineer is asked to
decide whether he should keep quiet when his management is making a
terrible mistake? When another non-technical manager has to decide
between backing his engineers and keeping his customer happy? 
 
    I can't predict it for sure, of course.  Courage and honor turn up
in the most surprising places.  Maybe even inside Morton Thiokol.  But
that's not the way it happened last January, and that's not the way to
bet. 
 
    The way to bet is that when -- not if -- such a decision comes up
again, it will be made the same way.  The engineer will shut up when
his management tells him to shut up.  The manager will keep the
customer happy and to hell with whether he's doing the right thing.
Both will cross their fingers and pray that what they know to be a
wrong decision won't be a disaster.  And if the praying and
finger-crossing don't work, and the sh*t hits the fan, more astronauts
will die -- and maybe the American manned space program with them. 
 
    Why?
 
    Because when CHALLENGER and its crew disappeared into a ball of
fire, nobody was to blame. 
 
						-- HS]
-- 
"We must choose: the stars or	 Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
the dust.  Which shall it be?"	 {allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry

    [as a point of correction to that sci.space.shuttle article, my
    reading of the Roger's Commission Report seemed to leave me with
    the memory that it was Lund and not Boisjoly who was asked to put
    on the management hat.  The latter was just shouted down by all
    the management hats.]
    
    Beyond that, .-1 is pretty refreshing reading, even if it isn't
    going to make any difference.  It's a perfect reflection of how
    entire companies are selling themselves down the river just because
    they don't hear what they don't want to.
    
    As an example:  Some guy gets put in charge of a department, and
    screws up bad enough to result in a few hundred people getting laid
    off.  In many organizations, it's entirely possible that the person
    at fault may never even be identified as the reason why the
    department's business is going down the tubes.  Later on, with a
    loud popping sound, the guy pulls his head out and straightens things
    out.
    
    What's the result of this?  First, that the manager who just recently
    got his act together is now a big hero, and may well get written
    up in Fortune Top 40 as a business/management wizard, because he
    was able to pull the department or business out of its slump.  If
    things got even better enough, they might be able to hire back half
    of the people that got laid off a year ago.
    
    All of this, because this sort of management believes what they
    want to.  If one of them goes to a meeting, and has prepared a
    transparency that states that June 21st will be the winter solstice
    for the North American Headquarters, as long as it's what everyone
    wanted to hear, and as long as it took 60 minutes and 58 slides
    to explain, everyone will believe it.  Shoot, they might even get
    a bunch of lapel pins and buttons made for the occasion, and put
    up a few posters.  When June 21st comes along, and the sun is out
    past 8, they'll have such a temper tantrum, that they'll fire the
    whole group of engineers that were trying to set them straight from
    the outset, and then, to show who's really in charge, move the whole
    operation to Austrailia.  The next order of business will be to
    have meetings to discuss the origin of all the dirt in everyone's
    ears, the sound of which will be muffled because everyone's got their
    head stuck in the sand.
    
    May be real humorous to watch from the outside, particularly if it's
    a pedestrian widget factory, but it starts losing its humorous appeal
    when it's a fireball in the sky containing seven people and a few
    billion dollars worth of the country's hopes and dreams.

    [excuse me, but I've been in one too many meetings wherein a manager
    has decided that some future event or sales figure just forcasted is 
    a fact, just because he said so.]

I think that paying Thiokol to put things right stinks.  NASA should be
making Thiokol do all the redesign and testing of the modified SRB 100% at
Thiokol's own expense.  NASA shouldn't have to pay a cent for anything 
beyond the original contract.

Hell, they designed that faulty thing in the first place, now they are
getting rewarded for fixing the bug.  An alternative would be to cancel the 
contract with Thiokol and select some other contractor to do the work.

Several years ago I was involved in an electronics project that the
contractor screwed up.  After a couple of months of them trying to fix it 
at our expense they were fired and another contractor hired to sort out the 
mess.  That way the thing was actually fixed.

Jeremy Barker - Reading, England

    Read in Aviation Leak that Thiokol is being paid $400 Million to
    fix the SRBs, but that they aren't allowed to make any profit off
    it.  May sound like punishment not to make any profit, but I bet
    that all the incompetents that allowed the launch will still be
    taking home the same amount of money every night, due in no small
    part to this "profit free" contract.  Certainly no motivation for
    those people to do anything different there.
    
    And this is to fix something that (according to the Rogers Commission)
    NASA had been demanding Thiokol to fix for years preceeding the
    accident.
    
    Well, if the management wanted proof that 51L was unsafe to launch,
    I guess they got it.  Trouble is, that they still haven't been provided
    with enough proof that their management methods stink.

    			*** Flame on Very High ***
    
    
    		Let us not forget the name of *Larawence Malloy*. I
    	watch the Rogers commision telecasts and for my money *My opinion*
    	is that hanging is to good for the man!!!!!!
    
    
    				Michael Gallant
    
    

    My memory may be faulty but my recollection was that Morton Thiokol
    did not do the complete design of the booster joints.
    
    I recall reading last year that during the bidding for boosters
    Morton Thiokol was chosen over the other bidder, General Dynamics
    possibly.  The other bidder had the better joint and experience
    with it but good old Thiokol had the lower price.  NASA picked Thiokol
    and paid the other bidder to give their joint design to Morton Thiokol.
    
    The original joint design was for a booster of half the diameter
    of the shuttle boosters and Thiokol had problems with it all along.
    
    Certainly doesn't give you a good feeling about whether they will
    EVER get it right,
    
    Don

    	Alan Shepherd, America's first man in space, was asked how he
    felt about flying in the Mercury capsule, and he answered "How would
    you feel if you knew you were riding in a ship that was built by
    the lowest bidder?"
    
    	I guess things don't change....
    
    	Larry