Conference taveng::bagels

    One thing that really surprised me when I was watching David Brinkley's
    program Sunday, was that Peres seemed to start to say that a
    "democratic" state with both Israelis and Arabs in it was a possible
    solution.  I'm not sure if he was actually trying to say that, because
    someone interrupted him.  I had assumed that that was unacceptable
    to Israelis, because the Palestinians would shortly be able to out
    vote them.  Does anyone know Peres actual position on this?  Is
    something else involved?  Is there some form of this that is
    acceptable?
    

re: Note 422.1

>                          ...Peres seemed to start to say that a
>    "democratic" state with both Israelis and Arabs in it was a possible
>    solution...          ...I had assumed that that was unacceptable
>    to Israelis, because the Palestinians would shortly be able to out
>    vote them...
    
	I did not see the show, but I suspect that Peres was referring to
    Israel as it is now, not to what has been called a "binational" state.
    I have never seen any evidence that any responsible (i.e. someone who
    is representative of any significant numbers of people) spokesman would
    be willing to accept anything that threatens the Jewish character of
    Israel.  That is why I said (.0)

>     2...   Israel is a Jewish state, and no Israeli government will sacrifice
>    that status,...
    
    What I was trying to do was to think of things that
     
    [1.]  a) would prevent an agreement if they were missing, 
       or b) lead to a breakdown of an agreement if they were missing,
    
    and
    
    [2.]  c) were not inherently incompatible.*
    
    You may have noticed that I said nothing about Jerusalem.  That is because,
    so far I have been unable to formulate a statement that satisfies both
    [1] and [2].  Can you help?
    
    					Aaron

    * Some things may be practically very difficult, but not theoretically
      incompatible.

    I went back and listened to my tape of Brinkley's show.  Peres
    mentioned things like a "confederation", for example, but there
    wasn't enough detail to tell what he actually meant.  Too bad, because
    it sounded very interesting.  I will extract what he actually said
    and type it in verbatim as soon as I get a chance.
    

>    I went back and listened to my tape of Brinkley's show.  Peres
>    mentioned things like a "confederation", for example, but there

Foreign Minister Shimon Peres mentioned the idea of a 'confederation';
but it was not in the context of a Jewish-Palestinian binational state.
He was, rather, expounding the theory of a confederation of the West Bank
and Gaza with Jordan.
	The idea of a confederation has its pros and cons.
Pros: (from varying viewpoints)
1. The Palestinians will have the right to self-government after a long time.
2. Since the confederate state (I shall call it Trans-Jordan, though 
	Trans-Jordan is probably a name no one likes!) will be of significant
  	size, it will be a geo-politically viable state. Even if WB and Gaza
	were set up as a separate Palestinian land, it is too small for the
	Palestinian population.
3. Because of 2., the demands for territorial concessions from Israel will
	be minimised (THAT is a loaded word, I know!); this should make it
	less unacceptable to the Israelis.
4. Since Jordan is already about 80% Palestinian (correct me if I am wrong),
	the integration would not pose too many difficulties - I mean
	w.r.t. culture, linguistics, etc.

Cons: 
1. Palestinians are bound to view this as a sell-out; after all these years
	of fighting/oppression/terrorism, I wonder if they would give
	up their right to the land that forms Israel just like that. I know
	I wouldn't if I were a Palestinian. Whether one likes it or not,
	Palestinians whose families lived in the said areas right at the time
	of formation of Israel have as much, if not more, rights than a Jewish
	person whose link to the land has to be traced several centuries ago.
	PS: I am not implying that Jews don't have a right to Israel. Don't
	    start 'flaming' me, please!
2. To form a confederation, King Hussein has to agree to share power; I am sure
	that he will not accept anything that will not leave him in total 
	control. Similarly, the Palestinians (most probably led by the PLO)
	will not accept total control of their lives by a Hashemite King.
3. My personal view (and this is my view alone!) is that King Hussein is a
	creation of the former powers that ruled Trans-Jordan/Palestine.
	He is the leader of a small minority and I am sure that he is staying
	in power only by weight of his military. Does anyone know of any polls
	elections, etc in Jordan to test his power? And the Palestinians
	remember the purge in 1970 too well.
4. Should Trans-Jordan (my definition) become a Palestinian dominated state,
	assuming that Israel concedes territory to form it and King Hussein
	accepts some form of Magna-Carta, what surety is there that it will 
	not be hostile nation - for Israel. Maybe the PLO will now form a
	bigger and better army/air force and what then? What form of
	assurances will Israel require to concede territory?

Two things seem certain:
1. The Jewish population will not 'pack up and go off' as the Arabs demand;
	hence Israel will exist.
2. The Palestinian population will not 'vanish into the Arab hinterland' as
	the Israelis hope; hence it will pose a major threat to the security
	and advancement of Israel.
And finally, what strikes me in all this is that two of the brightest groups
of people (Jews and Palestinians) have failed to recognise their mutual
dependance and have let themselves be exploited by others.

-parthi

    Re: .4
    
    Oh, too bad.  There wasn't enough context present for me to
    tell that was what he meant.  And I thought it was going to be some
    wonderful new idea involving coexistence of the Israelis and
    Palestinians.                                   
                        

      Here's the brief synopsis I promised from Heller's book "A
      Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel" about Jerusalem.
      Reproduced without permission, as usual.

      A mutually acceptable solution is therefore possible, if at all,
      only if the question of sovereignty is deliberately obfuscated to
      the point where all parties can credibly claim that they have
      secured their essential objectives.  Such an approach is difficult,
      perhpas unprecedented, and likely to result in an inelegant and
      organizationally cumbersome entity, but the complexity of the issue
      and the depth of the emotions almost certainly render a more
      conventional approach self-defeating.

      In the case of Israel, essential objectives would appear to be the
      following:

      (1) the physical and administrative unity of the city;
      (2) free and secure access to any part of the city and control of
      those sites of particular religious, historical, or cultural value
      to jews;
      (3) its retention as a strategic bulwark on top of the central
      mountain ridge;
      (4) the legitimation of its status as Israel's capital.
      [Ed: hang in there, he says later that it gets to be the capital of
      Palestine as well.]

      These objectives can be achieved by a peace settlement that leaves
      Jerusalem intact as a single municipal entity.  Physical division of
      the city is impossible...

      The basis of the formula would be a provision allowing residents of
      Jerusalem to opt for either Israeli or Palestinian citizenship and
      to participate simultaneously in the national politics of their
      state and in the administration of the city.  Jerusalem itself could
      be governed by a Jewish mayor and a Palestinian deputy mayor [Ed:
      why not alternate, one term that way and the next term a Palestinian
      mayor and an Israeli deputy-mayor]...and a municipal council
      consisting of neighborhood representatives chosen thru direct
      elections.

      The municipal government would bear city-wide responsibility for
      those services which are least culture-specific...(fire-fighting,
      electricity.....)... also some of the functions currently borne by
      the central government..(..postal services...) both to desensitize
      the issue of sovereignty symbols and to provide a source of revenue.
      Finally, the municipal administration would oversee a separate
      Jerusalem police force, formally subordinate to neither the Israeli
      nor Palestinian governments....This would be a mixed force, but its
      high command, along with the command of its most critical branches
      (intelligence....) would be in the hands of officers seconded from
      the Israeli police.  [Ed: well, I'm not crazy about that -- how
      about equal representation in the higher ranks, enforced by a quota
      system?]

      Any immigration, customs, or security procedures applying to
      movement between the two states could be implemented at the
      northern, eastern, southern, and western exits by the appropriate
      national authorities, thus ensuring free movement into and within
      Jerusalem itself.  The activities of the municipal government could
      be financed by property and sales taxes and ..income taxes...

      Although the municipal government itself would be fully bicultural,
      services more subject to cultural-identity sensitivities, especially
      public education, could fall within the purview of lower-level
      structures - boroughs or neighborhood councils - corresponding to
      religioethnic residence patterns.  Private educational facilities,
      of course, would continue to operate....

      Insofar as the properties, holy places, and special interests of the
      different religions are concerned, these should also be removed from
      the formal jurisdiction of any national authority and placed under
      the supervision of the municipal government, with the clear
      intention of maintaining the present system of self-administration
      by the different religions.  In practice, the closest possible
      coordination could be maintained... between the Chief Rabbinate of
      Israel and the Chief Rabbinate of Jerusalem, with the Muslim......

      Only on the question of military deployments in the Jerusalem region
      would  there be any departure from the prinicple of apparent
      equality.  If Israeli forces were withdrawn from the West Bank,
      Jerusalem would constitute the only remaining Israeli military
      foothold on top of the central mountain ridge.  Maintaining this
      foothold would be essential....might not require the stationing of
      forces inside the city itself, except perhaps for electronic
      observation posts on its eastern edge.  But the emplacement of
      Israeli bases, equipment, stores...up to the western municipal
      boundary would be a necessary exception to the general provision
      that the whole region, within a ten kilkometer radius of the Temple
      Mount, would be completely demilitarized.

      ....there is no reason why Jerusalem could not then serve as the
      capital of a Palestinian state....
    
    

    
    re: .6
    
    ....sounds like a plan for the Lebanon-ization of Jerusalem.

    re:.6
    sounds reasonable to me.
    
    There is an island in the Pacific that is jointly ruled by British
    and French colonial authority.  It's called a "condominium"
    arrangement, and there are no divisions of the island, but citizens
    are individually either French or British.  It's strange but it
    works.  Something along those lines seems like the only way out
    for Jerusalem:  Israel maintains military presence (since it's a
    border area) but the Arab population is not generally subject to
    Israeli rule, instead belonging to a different state.
    
    Lebanon itself might have worked without so much foreign meddling...
    (can you spell Hafez Assad?  Ariel Sharon?  US Marines?  Hashish
    warlords?  Phalange, in Italian?)
         fred

    This all sounds very similar to the idea that 'west bank/ gaza' citizens
    should have the choice over nationality. Either Israeli of Jordanian
    (the two countries that that were setup within 'Palestine').
    
    In the plan local communities would have elected boroughs which
    would have responsibility for matters such as housing, education
    and refuse collection. Israel would retain security rights. 

    Lets look at the problem of political entities in the area from
    a wider perspective:
    
    As you might remember, the idea of a Jewish National State came
    in order to solve the so called Jewish problem: A nation, a "folk",
    a people, that would not assimilate within its environment, that
    had to expres its national aspirations and all this under the constant
    persecutions and segregation that were common all around the world. 
    
    In the second half of the previous Century, during the same time as 
    many other nationalities looked forward to express their own national 
    aspirations - as the German states and Italy, for instance - also
    the Jews begun to strugle for a land of their own, a country of
    their own. By the begining of this Century, similar trends begun
    also to rise within the Arab world.
    
    The tragedy of WWII convinced everybody that the only viable solution
    for the Jewish People was the establishment of a country of their
    own. Any solution to the present riots should not jeopardize, by
    any means, the existance and/or the viability of the Jewish State.
    
    In the period between the two World Wars, the colonial powers that
    were involved in the Middle East (i.e.: England and France) took
    over the different provinces that they dismemebered from Turkey
    and made them as political entities. In this way Syria, Lebanon,
    Egipt and Palestine were born. The original mandate of England over
    the province of Palestina covered the territories of both todays
    Jordan and Israel. The above divison in "different" countries or
    entities was sometimes quitte artificial: There are lots of families
    with close relatives in Lebanon, Syria and Israel. The ethnic
    background, language and cultural traditions of most arab peoples
    in the area are common, if we look for differentiation, they can be 
    grouped according mostly to religion (Suni, Shiite, Druze, Christian) 
    and not by ethnic differentiation. The two different ethnic groups
    in the area are the Arab and the Jewish Nations.
    
    The colonial powers were more anctious at that time - as ever - to
    grab areas of influence; so, instead of helping the rise of a strong
    unified Arab country, tryed to divide it in several mini-states.
    
    Also the Arabs recognized that this division in different countries
    is artificial and so tryed to implement the United Arab Republic
    when Syria and Egypt were united. Political and personal problems
    prevented this experiment to succeed.
    
    Regarding the present situation a serious solution should be tryed.
    
    Taking as guides the viability of any political entity emerging
    from any possible settlement, and as well - looking at the History
    of wars and tensions in the last 40 years - the need for secure
    and defendible borders my proposal is like this: The entity that
    was the British Mandate of Palestina is to be divided between the
    Arab and the Jewish Nations in two viable and defendible countries:
    One should include the Eastern Banks of the Jordan and areas of
    high density of arab population: the Hebron area, Shechem or Nablus,
    Ram'Allah. Areas in the West Bank with low density Arab population
    should be integrated with Israel. As for 'Aza, the "Gaza strip"
    is a corridor under 10 Km wide (some 7 mi) and is phisically separated
    from Jordan. Such an island would always be a problem between Jordan
    and Israel; a better solution - to my opinion - would be to integrate
    'Aza with Egypt; this would give to the Gazan people the possibility
    to grow into the northern Sinai and be integrated in a biger economy.
    
    In order to keep the security of both Israel and Jordan some a full 
    disarmament of the Cis-Jordan Areas should be implemented; in
    addition perhaps a sanitary zone of 2-5 Km shoul be implemented and 
    manned by either U.N. or U.S. observers - as in the Israel/Egypt
    border.
    
    Jerusalem is quite a delicate subject. Since I see the West Bank
    integrated with Jordan, the Jordan capital is and was since its
    inception the city of Amman. I believe no change is needed in this
    subject. On the contrary, Jerusalem is and was, even before 1967,
    the capital of Israel and I wouldn't think of changing this. In
    any case, I believe that at the end - and no matter through which
    way we reach it - both parties should negotiate/bargain at the
    negotiation table and find the best compromise.
    
    My idea is that it should be possible to reach an agreement if the
    parties seat together with a sincere interst in finding a solution
    and a serious respect for the needs and aspirations of the other
    side. This would be the win-win solution that is the ideal end for
    any negotiation.
    
    Juan-Carlos Kiel.
                                                                       

< Note 422.10 by TAVSWS::JUAN >
                           -< My personal opinion. >-
>    The colonial powers were more anctious at that time - as ever - to
>    grab areas of influence; so, instead of helping the rise of a strong
>    unified Arab country, tryed to divide it in several mini-states.
How true; not only in the mid-east but also (and more callously) in Africa.
    
>    from Jordan. Such an island would always be a problem between Jordan
>    and Israel; a better solution - to my opinion - would be to integrate
>    'Aza with Egypt; this would give to the Gazan people the possibility
>    to grow into the northern Sinai and be integrated in a biger economy.
My personal opinion is that, even if a separate Palestine - not a confederation
with Jordan - is created, Gaza should be 'traded' for an equivalent piece
of land near the West Bank. I understand that this will mean the uprooting of
a large number of people but to retain Gaza as an island surrounded by Israel
is a security threat to Israel and a nightmare for Palestine and/or Jordanian
confederation. Look at what happened to East Pakisthan.
    
>    addition perhaps a sanitary zone of 2-5 Km shoul be implemented and 
>    manned by either U.N. or U.S. observers - as in the Israel/Egypt
>    border.
I respectfully submit that neither the UN nor the US have the political will
power to stop a conflict; as Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu pointed out, the UN troops
cleared out in a hurry when Nasser attacked Israel in 1967 and (Mr. Netanyahu
did not mention this) when Israel invaded Lebanon. The DMZ may work provided it
is made clear that any encroachment by either side would provide a legal
sanction for the other to launch a strike.
    
>    way we reach it - both parties should negotiate/bargain at the
>    negotiation table and find the best compromise.
Hope responsible people hear this.
    
-parthi

The excerpts below are from the June 8th Wall Street Journal.  It's
interesting that neither the New York Times (nor any other newspaper that
I get) reported this.  The NY Times even has an
editorial this morning bashing the PLO for not being willing to
recognize Israel.

"The statement...is an explicit declaration of the PLO's
willingness to recognize Israel and accept a two-state
solution....'We believe that all peoples -- the Jewish and the
Palestinians included -- have the right to run their own affairs,
expecting from their neighbors not only non-belligerence but the
kind of political and economic cooperation without which no state
can be truly secure...The Palestinians want that kind of lasting
peace and security for themselves and the Israelis because no one
can build his own future on the ruins of anothers....[the PLO's]
reason for being is not the undoing of Israel but the salvation of
the Palestinian people and their rights....our ultimate aim being a
free, dignified and secure life not only for our children but also
for the children of the Israelis.'"
    

    RE: -1

>> "The statement...is an explicit declaration of the PLO's
>> willingness to recognize Israel and accept a two-state
>> solution....'We believe that all peoples -- the Jewish and the
 
    What statement ??
    
    By whom ???

    Will he/she repeat it again ??
    
    Is it vapourware or did some important PLO functionary actually look at
    the camera and say in a loud voice (without crossing fingers behind
    back). "The PLO recognize ISRAEL as a legitimate state with secure
    defined borders etc ..... " 
    
    Or are we to read between the lines ????? 
    

    Sorry, I forgot to include the context.  It was a printed statement
    distributed by the PLO at the start of the Arab states conference that
    just took place in Algiers.  Wish I had the whole statement, but only
    the WSJ saw fit to print even this much.  Maybe it will show up
    in Al Fajr, in which case I will type it in.
    
         

    Did PLO change the Charter that states that the armed struggle is
    the only way for the Palestinians?  Yesterday on PBS Mubarak Awad
    said that PLO has many groups, some of them are against violence,
    some for...  Which one voiced the opinion quoted in -.1?  My view
    is that if I am to trust PLO, I should at least read about the
    PLO's intentions in an official document, not just in somebody's 
    opinion.
    
    Leo
    
                        
    

    Sigh.  I match the PLO Charter with the platform of the Likud, which
    calls for occupation forever.  I'd bring up Israel's constitution, if
    it had one.  It's fundamental laws discriminating against Palestinians
    are bad enough.  I don't think it's reasonable to expect unilateral
    concessions from the party in a position of weakness, when it has
    already said it would make those concessions in a fair exchange
    in a treaty.
    
    I assume the statement was an official PLO one, since it was released
    at the conference that the PLO delegation attended.  I will type
    it in with associated details once I get a copy of it.  By coincidence,
    today I ran across this tidbit in a copy of a speech by Noam Chomsky at
    the last ADC convention: "For example, when Yassir Arafat called
    for negotiations leading to mutual recognition in April-May 1984,
    the New York Times refused -- not failed, but refused -- to report
    the fact.  The Times again refused to report Arafat's statement
    of January 14, 1988 that the PLO would 'recognize Israel's right
    to exist if it and the United States accept PLO participation in
    an international Middle East peace conference'."  I recollect that
    the Times did report similar Arafat statements within the past few
    months;  I wonder if this was just because Anthony Lewis was present
    at the interview?
    
    When Awad talks about different groups, he might be talking about
    anything from differences among the military factions to the fact
    that the PLO contains groups like the Organization for the Preservation
    of the Family, cultural organizations, etc.  I don't think any
    Palestinians doubt that it's Arafat who speaks for the PLO, which
    is not to say that he, any more than any leader, can control extremist
    elements in his society.
    
    
                  

    It's possible that the New York Times, wishing to be seen as a
    respected paper, wasn't willing to publish something that it 
    couldn't substantiate. 
    
    The problem still seems to exist.
    
    Malcolm

    Re: -.2
        
    >Sigh.  I match the PLO Charter with the platform of the Likud,which 
    >calls for occupation forever.  
    
    Non-sequetur.  When I favorably compared Israel actions with those
    of Siria (e.g. at Hama) or Jordan (e.g killing thousands of
    Palestinians in September 1970) I heard that actions of bad guys
    did not justify the other side.  Karen, I remember you said this 
    herself on talk.politics.mideast.  Also, are you talking of the
    government's position on the occupation or the party's?  How come
    that the armed struggle clause got into the Charter BEFORE the
    occupation? So my question about the PLO Charter, which recognizes 
    the armed struggle as the only way for the Palestinians, stands.
                
                
    >				I'd bring up Israel's constitution, if
    >it had one.  It's fundamental laws discriminating against Palestinians
    >are bad enough.  
                
    What "fundamental" law are you talking about if a constitution 
    doesn't exist?
                
    >I ran across this tidbit in a copy of a speech by Noam Chomsky
    >at the last ADC convention: 
                
    I have to plead ignorance here.  Many times I heard the name but
    I still do not know who the person is.  Information will be
    appreciated. 
                 
    >When Awad talks about different groups, he might be talking about
    >anything from differences among the military factions to the fact
    >that the PLO contains groups like the Organization for the Preservation
    >of the Family, cultural organizations, etc.  
                
    Sorry for the ambiguity in my posting.  Mr. Awad was talking about
    political factions within PLO.
                                  
    >					I don't think any             
    >Palestinians doubt that it's Arafat who speaks for the PLO, which
    >is not to say that he, any more than any leader, can control extremist
    >elements in his society.      
                
    Exactly the case.  That's why I asked what PLO presented its position.
    It is still not clear to me.  Did they consult Aby Nidal?
                
    Leo Simon   
                                      
                                  
                                  
                                  

    Re: .17  couldn't substantiate...
    
    A statement from the PLO is a statement from the PLO.  The Times may
    not believe it,  but that doesn't alter what it is.
    

    
    >Non-sequetur.  When I favorably compared Israel actions with those
    >of Siria (e.g. at Hama) or Jordan (e.g killing thousands of
    >Palestinians in September 1970) I heard that actions of bad guys
    >did not justify the other side.  Karen, I remember you said this 
    >herself on talk.politics.mideast.  Also, are you talking of the
    >government's position on the occupation or the party's?  How come
    >that the armed struggle clause got into the Charter BEFORE the
    >occupation? So my question about the PLO Charter, which recognizes 
    >the armed struggle as the only way for the Palestinians, stands.
                
    I am saying, as I said before, that a unilateral concession from
    the weaker party doesn't make sense, esp. when they have offered
    mutual concessions in the context of a treaty.  At the moment, the
    Israeli government position seems to be the Likud's position.  The
    PLO charter dates from after the establishment of Israel on Palestinian
    land.
    
    >>I'd bring up Israel's constitution, if
    >>it had one.  It's fundamental laws discriminating against Palestinians
    >>are bad enough.  
    >            
    >What "fundamental" law are you talking about if a constitution 
    >doesn't exist?
     
    There are a set of laws in Israel called something like "fundamental
    laws".  I've forgotten the exact name for them.  These are the little
    numbers that include restrictions of the sale of land to non-Jews,
    etc.
    
    >>I ran across this tidbit in a copy of a speech by Noam Chomsky
    >>at the last ADC convention: 
    >            
    >I have to plead ignorance here.  Many times I heard the name but
    >I still do not know who the person is.  Information will be
    >appreciated. 
    
    Professor of Linguistics at MIT, author of numerous books on U.S.
    foreign policy, etc. 
    
    >>					I don't think any             
    >>Palestinians doubt that it's Arafat who speaks for the PLO, which
    >>is not to say that he, any more than any leader, can control extremist
    >>elements in his society.      
    >            
    >Exactly the case.  That's why I asked what PLO presented its position.
    >It is still not clear to me.  Did they consult Abu Nidal?
     
    As I said before, there is one PLO.  Are the statements of the Israeli
    government not valid because Kahane might not like them?  (Actually,
    he probably loves them, but that's beside the point.)
                                      
    
    

Path: jumbo!decwrl!ucbvax!agate!violet.berkeley.edu!youssef
From: youssef@violet.berkeley.edu
Newsgroups: talk.politics.mideast
Subject: Peace opportunity?
Message-ID: <11329@agate.BERKELEY.EDU>
Date: 24 Jun 88 11:33:46 PDT
Sender: usenet@agate.BERKELEY.EDU
Reply-To: youssef@violet.berkeley.edu ()
Organization: University of California, Berkeley
Lines: 109

During the  recent Arab summit in Algiers (June 6-9, 1988)
a statement written by Bassam Abu Sharif (Arafat's spokesman)
was circulated.  It is understood to reflect the current position
of the PLO.  The following is a copy of excerpts as they were 
reproduced in the NY Times Op-Ed page on Wed. June 22 1988.
May be it will be of interest to some of the readers.


***********

   Everything that has been said about the Middle East conflict has 
focused on the differences between Palestinians and Israelis and
ignored the points on which they are in almost total agreement.

   Israel's objectives are lasting peace and security.  Lasting peace
and security are also objectives of the Palestinian people.  No one
can understand the Jewish people's centuries of suffering more than
the Palestinians.  We know what it means to be stateless and the object
of fear and prejudice of the nations.  Thanks to the various Israeli
and other governments that have had the power to determine the course
of our lives, we know what it feels like when human beings are considered
somehow less human than others and denied basic rights that most people
take for granted.

   The Palestinians want that kind of lasting peace and security for 
themselves and the Israelis because no one can build his own future
on the ruins of another's.  We are confident that this desire and
this realization are shared by all but an insignificant minority
in Israel.

   The means by which the Israelis want to achieve lasting peace and
security is is direct talks, with no attempt by any outside party
to impose or veto a settlement.  The Palestinians agree.  We see no 
way for any dispute to be settled without direct talks between the 
parties to that dispute, and we feel that anuy settlement imposed by
an outside power will not stand the test of time.

   The key to a settlement lies in talks between the Palestinians and 
the Israelis.  The Palestinians would be deluding themselves if they 
thought their problems with the Israelis could be solved in negotiations 
with non-Israelis, including the United States.  By the same token,
the Israelis -and US secretary of State George Schultz- would be
deluding themselves if they thought that Israel's problems could be
solved in negotiations with non-Palestinians, including Jordan.

   The Palestinians would like to choose their Israeli interlocutor.
We have little doubt that we could reach a satisfactory settlement
with the Peace Now movement in a month.  We know, however, that an
agreement with Peace Now would not be an agreement with Israel, and
since an agreement with Israel is what we are after, we are ready to 
talk to Shimon Peres's Labor Alignement, or to Yitzhak Shamir's
Likud Bloc or anyone else the Israelis choose.

   The Israelis and Mr. Shultz would also prefer to deal with 
Palestinians of their own choosing.  But it would be as futile for 
them as for us to talk to people who have no mandate to negotiate.
If it is a settlement with the Palestinians that they seek, as we 
presume it is, then it is with the representatives of these people
that they must negotiate, and the Palestinian people, by the only
means that they have at their disposal have chosen their
representatives.  Every Palestinian questionned by diplomats and
newsmen of the international community has stated unequivocally
that this representative is the PLO.

   If that is regarded as an unreliable expression of the Palestinian
free will, then give the Palestinians the chance to express their
free will in a manner that will convince all doubters:  Arrange
for an internationally supervised referendum in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip and allow the population to choose between the 
PLO and any other group of Palestinians that Israel or the US or
the international community wishes to nominate.  The PLO is ready 
to abide by the outcome and step aside for an alternative
leadership, should the people choose one.

   The PLO raison d'etre is not the undoing of ISrael but the 
salvation of the Palestinian people and their rights to democratic
self expression and national self-determination.

   The PLO accepts [UN] Resolutions 242 and 338.  What prevents it
from saying so unonditionally is not what is in the resolutions
but what is not in them: Neither resolution says anything about
the national rights of the Palestinian people, including their
democratic right to self -expression and national right to self-
determination.  For that reaason alone we have said that we accept
Resolutions 242 and 338 in the context of the other UN resolutions,
which do recognize the national rights of the Palestinian people.

   As for the fear that a Palestinian state would threaten its 
neighbor, the Palestinians would be open to the idea of a brief
mutually acceptable transitional period during which an
international mandate would guide the occupied territories to 
democratic Palestinian statehood.

   Beyond that, the Palestinians would accept -indeed, insist on-
international guarantees for the security of all states in the
region.

   The Palestinians feel that they have much more to fear from 
Israel, with its mighty war machine and its nuclear arsenal, than
Israel has to fear from them.  They would therefore welcome any
reasonable measure that would promote the security of their state
and its neighbors, including the deployment of a UN buffer force
on the Palestinian side of the Israeli-Palestinian border.

   Time, sometimes the great healer, is often the great spoiler.
Many Israelis no doubt realize this and are trying to communicate
it to the rest of their people.  As for us we are ready for peace
now, and we can deliver it. It is our hope that the opportunity
that presents itself today will not be missed.
    

re: < Note 422.21 by CIRCUS::KOLLING "Karen, Sweetie, & Holly; in Calif." >

I love the content of that statement. But I have one beef: "circulating" a
statement by Arafat's spokesman is not Arafat making a statement - just as
Larry Speakes speaking for the President is not the President making a 
statement.

I hope Arafat has the guts to make that statement in public. Whether or not
Shamir and Co. listen to it is another story, but, at least, there's hope.

--eric--

    re:.22,.21
    Quibbling over whether Arafat's spokesman is really speaking for
    Arafat doesn't really solve much.  True, the PLO may be equivocating
    by speaking in such an indirect route -- they may fear political
    repurcussions of being too forward with a position that amounts
    to backing off their historic claims.
    
    It really does look too as if many Israelis are afraid to negotiate
    (i.e., they want a total military victory over all the territory),
    and are looking for an excuse not to, while others are interested
    in negotiating but (from good experience) don't really trust the
    PLO.
    
    I'd prefer to see Israel ask the PLO to put (my Yiddish isn't
    very good) "tuches aufen tisch" (? - derriere on the table) on some
    neutral ground, with no preconditions, and no public statements
    unless and until some agreement can be reached.  Both sides appear
    to be afraid.  
         fred

	RE: .21

    I had heard this reported on NPR, and I saw the New York Times excerpt
    from which this was taken.  The fact that it is in writing and is
    explicitly attributed to Arafat's press secretary is significant. 

    The Times noted that some Palestinian groups have denounced  Abu Sharif
    as a traitor; it is also important to see how well the PLO can protect
    him.  That is not a way of dismissing the statement, but an
    observation. The nature of this conflict is such that extremists have
    influence out of proportion to their numbers.  On the Arab side (with
    respect to both Palestinian and other Arabs) this has been especially
    true because the extremists have frequently used assassination to
    silence moderation.  _One_ of the reasons the Israelis are hesitant to
    deal with the PLO is the feeling that if it cannot protect people who
    _speak_ about peaceful settlement, it is not likely to be able to
    enforce the _actions_ required to achieve a settlement. 
    
    Nevertheless, this is the first thing I have seen that gives me
    hope.

    BTW, according to the Times this was not the complete text circulated
    in Algiers.  Does anyone have a copy of the complete text? 

    						Aaron
    
    p.s.  Nit-pick:  I would appreciate it if people would put titles
    on replies.  When I'm looking through a note, trying to remember
    which reply I want to check out, it's really helpful to have
    even the slightest hint of what was in it.  Thanks.

    Re: .24
    
    About the complete text:  I wrote to the U.N. PLO office asking
    for it a couple of days ago.  I will post the omitted parts if I
    get them.
    

>    About the complete text:  I wrote to the U.N. PLO office asking

Incidentally, the Court ruled that the new law passed by Congress that forced
the Sec of State to issue an order closing the PLo and PLO affiliated
offices in the US to  be closed was invalid. The court stated that this law
cannot supersede the 1947 UN-USA agreement.

-parthi    

    Re: .26
    
    Not quite -- I think the court decided that the U.N. office is
    protected by the U.S./U.N. treaty, but other offices were not.
                                           

	According the a story in the Boston Globe (Wed, 29 June), Abu
Sharif wrote up his proposal in Middle East Mirror magazine, which
is published in London.  Can any of our British noters get a copy?

					Aaron

    In the June 19th issue of Al Fajr, which I have just gotten, there
    is a copy of the complete proposal.  It looks like the "incompleteness"
    of the previously posted copy was just due to editorial cleaning
    up by the NY Times;  I didn't see anything of substance deleted.
    If anyone wants a Xerox copy, send me email, I don't have the moral
    fiber to type it in.  According to the leadin, it was published
    "in part" in the Middle East Monitor (not Mirror), and was originally
    written for the Washington Post, which is "still considering" the
    possibility of publishing it.
                   
    Besides Habash, etc. going into a snit, Shamir and Rabin have also
    turned in down.  The U.S. and the Israeli Foreign Ministry are still
    "studying" it.
    
    

Courtesy of Steve Goldfield, who did all the typing:


"Of Spots and Leopards"
By George Giacaman   Al-Fajr  January 23, 1989
(George Giacaman is associate professor of philosophy at Bir Zeit
University in the West Bank)

It is true that faint signs of incipient political moderation in
Israel are being detected by Palestinians. Note has been taken
that Peace Now has on more than one occasion called for direct
talks with the PLO according to a poll conducted recently.

Still, many Palestinians remain skeptical of the true intentions
lurking behind this unfolding peace offensive. Therefore, to use
the daunting words uttered in relation to recent Palestinian
peace moves by Morris Abrams, among other Zionist leaders, this
Israeli moderation should be *put to the test*.

True wisdom worthy of emulation lies behind the careful and
adroit scholasticism of various Israeli and Zionist leaders. To
this day they continue to devise concrete tests to measure the
true extent of Palestinian moderation, just in case it turns out
to be possible for the leopard to change its spots. In the spirit
of this healthy skepticism, the following modest but concrete
proposals are offered. If adopted, they are bound to change the
widespread Palestinian belief that this developing moderation is
essentially a hasbara effort directed toward Western public
opinion and not toward Palestinians.

1. Amendment of the Biltmore Program

Palestinians have long suspected that the Zionist movement aimed
at establishing a Jewish state in *all* of mandatory Palestine.
these suspicions were not the product of fanciful fears and
hypothetical possibilities. Indeed, when in 1919 the World
Zionist Organization submitted a map to the Paris Peace
Conference showing its intended "homeland," the borders extended
to Amman, even beyond today's Greater Israel. Palestinians were
later to witness Israel expand twice: once beyond the borders
allotted to it in the Partition Plan thus taking control of 77
percent of the land, and once again in 1967 when Israel was left
in possession of all of mandatory Palestine and the Golan Heights
as well.

But most important is the fact that the doctrine of Greater
Israel was enshrined in the Biltmore Program of May 1942. The
program was announced at the end of the conference held in the
Biltmore Hotel in New York City. The conference was convened at
the behest of David Ben-Gurion, and the Biltmore Program became
the official policy of the world Zionist movement and remains
unamended to this day.

In its resolutions, specifically in paragraph no. eight of the
program, the conference urges "that Palestine be established as a
Jewish Commonwealth." Upon his return from the conference,
Ben-Gurion was clear in his emphasis that the Biltmore Program
referred to a Jewish state in the *whole* of Palestine.
Commenting on the language of the text at a meeting of the
Histadrut Council at Kfar Vitkin, Ben-Gurion emphasized that
"this is why we formulated our demand not as a Jewish state in
Palestine, but Palestine as a Jewish state." Ben-Gurion was also
emphatic in his warning at the same meeting "not to identify the
Biltmore Program with a Jewish state in part of Palestine."

In view of this, it is incumbent on all peace-loving groups and
individuals in Israel to work expeditiously for a clear amendment
of paragraph no. eight of the program. Such a step, if
accomplished, should give considerable weight and credence to
their peace overtures toward the PLO.

2. Binding Acceptance of the Principle of Partition

Palestinians have long held that the acceptance of the Partition
Resolution of the General Assembly of the UN of November 29,
1947, by Zionist leaders was partial and tactical. Neither has
there been an authoritative acceptance of the principle of
partition that is *binding* for all leaders and public officials
in Israel.

In view of the fact that Mr. Shamir is at present the prime
minister of Israel, the issue acquires even greater significance.
It will be recalled that LEHI (the Stern group), commanded by Mr.
Shamir, explicitly rejected Partition Resolution 181. So did
Begin's Irgun Tsvai Leumi. Indeed, Begin himself declared that
"the bisection of our homeland is illegal. It will never be
recognized." When he became prime minister in 1977, Begin took
the step of abolishing the prime minister's annual press luncheon
traditionally held on November 29, in a demonstrative gesture to
indicate his opposition to the UN Partition Resolution.

No confusion should be made between Ben-Gurion's acceptance of a
Jewish state in part of Palestine and the acceptance of the
principle of partition, to which Ben-Gurion was *not* committed.
Indeed, Israel's declaration of independence is completely silent
on the issue of the borders of the state. This is no accident.

According to Ben-Gurion's political biographer, Michael
Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion told his colleagues from MAPAI on May 12,
1948, that he did not want to be bound by any declaration of the
boundaries of the state. Ben-Gurion proceeded to change the text
of the draft declaration prepared by Moshe Sharett which had
"made mention of the United Nations' partition plan." Ben-Gurion
"deleted any reference to the partition plan." To this day,
Israel remains uncommitted to any official and final boundaries.

It is therefore of the utmost urgency that Palestinians be
assured that Israeli leaders are not intent on destroying their
independent communal existence in stages. Signs of moderation in
Israel will of necessity remain stunted without a binding and
authoritative acceptance of the principle of partition on the
part of Israel.

3. Terrorism

In view of the fact that Mr. Shamir is the incumbent prime
minister, it is opportune that this sensitive and difficult
subject be addressed frankly and directly. In order to set the
stage for quick progress toward peace, it is of crucial
importance that the prime minister renounce his views on the
subject. This, moreover, should be done in Hebrew, not only in
English, and directly before the constituency to which he is
accountable.

Writing in LEHI's journal Hehazit, in the summer of 1943
(reprinted in Al-Hamishmar, December 24, 1987), Mr. Shamir had
this to say on the question of terrorism: "Neither Jewish ethics
nor Jewish tradition can disqualify terrorism as a means of
combat. We are very far from having any moral qualms as far as
our national war goes.... But first and foremost, terrorism is
for us a part of the political battle being conducted under the
present circumstances, and it has a great part to play."

Mr. Shamir reaffirmed his views on terrorism in 1977 in an
interview with The Times of London, arguing this time that there
were several cases where terrorism is justified, giving as an
example the Stern Group's attacks against the British which aimed
at drawing international attention to its political demands.

Moreover, in order to convince the Palestinian community of the
genuineness of the desire for peace on the part of Israeli
leaders, it is of crucial importance that the renunciation of
terrorism not remain a mere verbal exercise. Actions indeed, very
often speak louder than words.

Still, after all is said and done, it remains true that nations
at war but longing for peace will eventually have to circumscribe
and isolate the past for the sake of the fiture. At present,
during the current uprising, concrete gestures need to be made to
give credence to Israeli claims that they wish to make peace with
the Palestinians. As examples of steps that can be taken, Israel
can free all Palestinians imprisoned without trial for short of
long periods. Military authorities can also desist from blowing
up the houses of the innocent, houses belonging to *relatives* of
"suspects" who are not brought to trial let alone convicted and
sentenced. Progress in this direction will no doubt be understood
by Palestinians as indicative of a genuine desire for peace.


    
    

    The motivation behind the article entered in note .30 is quite
    transparent, in spite of the fact that it was typed by Steve Goldfield
    (why do we need this latter information, by the way?)
    
    It is simply to demonstrate that if the Israelis have reason to distrust
    PLO intentions, well, the Palestinians have reason to distrust
    Israeli intentions.  And so a call is issued for Shamir to renounce
    a statement made regarding the use of terror *before* statehood
    was achieved in response for Israel's requirement that the PLO 
    to give such similar assurances.  The mirror being held up is,
    however, distorted.
    
    It does not reflect the fact that since the establishment of the
    state, Israel has tried to talk peace and borders with any state
    that would listen.  But except for Egypt, which has recently 
    renounced its agreement to the Camp David accords, there has been no 
    response.  There is no reason to believe that the PLO can promote
    peace in the middle east.  It has admitted that it cannot control
    the stone throwers.
    
    The reference made in .30 to two Israeli exapansions is laughable
    considering the conditions under which those "expansions" were 
    effected.

    I thought .30 was rather funny myself.  But I get the joke perhaps
    a bit more the way it was inteded, since it does draw the analogy
    between the two sides.
    
    And while .31 is correct in noting that Israel has been willing
    to talk peace to any _state_ in the region, the Palestinians are
    nominally stateless, no state claims to talk for them (Israel may
    insist that Jordan does, but Jordan now disagrees and won't), so
    Israel in effect is refusing to talk to the major party in the dispute.
    The analogy in .30 thus works, since it refers to statements made
    before Israel was a state which frankly are today irrelevant.  Even
    though they haven't been formally disclaimed.
    
    But .31 is right about the circumstances of Israel's expansion;
    the Partition plan map was doomed from its cartographic conception.

    I dont not agree that the PLO is "the major party to the dispute."
    If Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan would establish a durable
    peace with Israel, there would be no problem regarding a Palestinian
    state.

    RE: 422.30

    I find both negative and positive things in the Giacaman piece.

    The negative is that I think it would have been much more constructive
    if Karen had simply drawn attention to the fact that there is fear and
    mistrust on the side of the Palestinian Arabs as well as on the Jewish
    side.  The sources of this mistrust are legitimate issues for
    discussion, and it is unfortunate that all too often there seems
    to be more concern with scoring points than with conducting a dialogue.

    On the positive side, the fact that at least one Palestinian seems
    to be trying to be responsive to recent developments is cause for
    some optimism.  Realistically, I do not expect rapid resolution
    of problems that have been festering for decades.  It takes time
    to build enough mutual understanding just to enable real negotiations
    to take place.

    Part of this process is getting things out in the open.  Giacaman
    may or may not have intended this article to express real concerns
    (as opposed to winning some debating points), but my reaction is
    to respond by saying I am willing to talk about these things.  In
    return, I expect him (or Karen, in this case) to talk about those
    things that concern me.  One of my tests of sincerity is whether
    the person with whom I am talking is willing to address my concerns
    as well as to tell me about the concerns of his/her side.  I do
    not ask that the other side agree with me, but I do need to know
    whether that the people on the other side are talking WITH me, not
    AT me (or PAST me to others).

    There are only three ways of reaching a solution to the present
    crisis:

    1.  A war in which Israel is destroyed.

    2.  A war in which the Arabs are destroyed.

    3.  An arrangement in which both Israel and the Arabs get enough
        that both have more to lose through continued hostility than
        through peace.

    I am adamantly opposed to both 1. and 2.  I hope that enough other
    people feel that way, that neither will occur, but I am don't know
    if that is the case.

                                        Aaron

>Courtesy of Steve Goldfield, who did all the typing:

	Who is Steve Goldfield?

>According to Ben-Gurion's political biographer, Michael
>Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion told his colleagues from MAPAI on May 12,
>1948, that he did not want to be bound by any declaration of the
>boundaries of the state. Ben-Gurion proceeded to change the text
>of the draft declaration prepared by Moshe Sharett which had
>"made mention of the United Nations' partition plan." Ben-Gurion
>"deleted any reference to the partition plan." To this day,
>Israel remains uncommitted to any official and final boundaries.

	I don't have time to do a lot of typing, but this is too
	delicious not to respond to.  Unfortunately, however, the
	reality is always a lot more prosaic and boring that such
	a tidbit as this...

	Karen, I wish you had read the transcript of that Mapai meeting,
	or supplied some of the context.  The result that you've given is
	one of the best cases of half-truths inverting a meeting that
	I've seen in a long time.

	I've done a little reading of Ben-Gurion; I happen to own a
	partial transcript of the meeting you're referring to (among 
	many other of his documents).

	Unfortunately, I have to do this by memory.  I don't have the time
	this week to look this up in detail.

	So: how is this a half truth?

	First, have a look at the date.  That meeting was held during the
	1948 war of independence.  The background of this situation is:
	Israel was openly being invaded daily, by Arab forces, from 
	November 1947 onward, in their anticipation of the British pull-out.
	In April, 1948, when the British actually began to seriously pull
	out, armies of six Arab countries invaded Israel.

	Ben-Gurion was serving as acting Minister of Defense during the
	period that followed.  He was responsible for pulling 
	together Israel's defenses. In terms of deployed soldiers at that
	time, Israel was outnumbered at least 10 to 1.  In terms of 
	equipment, the deficit was even greater.

	For most of this time, the very existence of the State of Israel
	was open to daily (or hourly) question.

	About two weeks after the invasion, representatives from the US and
	the UN began putting pressure on Israel and the Arab states for
	a cease fire.  These negotiations took place over, if I recall
	properly, a two-to-three week period.  The meeting you cite 
	happened during that period.

	Ben-Gurion had repeatedly called together members of all the
	Israeli political factions to try to get a unified position together
	on how and what to negotiate, assuming that they could hold things
	together until "when and if" the cease-fire was 
	successfully negotiated.  One thing that was an object of much
	contention, and which was discussed repeatedly in these meetings
	was the issue of post-cease-fire borders, since the UN had not 
	actually set any fixed borders.  

	Ben-Gurion deleted Sharret's reference to the UN plan for at least
	three reasons:

		a) There was much difference of opinion in the Cabinet --
		   in both directions! -- which simply could not be resolved at 
		   that time, under that much pressure.

		b) The actual extent of "who controlled what" was changing
		   hourly, back anb forth, up to the time of the cease-fire.

	and     c) Leaving the issue out of Sharret's document would leave
		   a little negotiating space, in the talks they expected
		   post the cease-fire.

	Here's where your "twist" comes in:  Ben-Gurion's own personal 
	opinion at that meeting was for borders actually somewhat SMALLER
	than what resulted afterwards. But, he did not want to get "locked
	in". The decision was to make the "border" position openly
	unspecified, and then to negotiate firm boundaries during the
	"permanent" peace negotiations, which he (B-G) expected would be 
	supervised by the US, the UN, and the USSR(!). This would
	result in mutual Arab and Israeli recognition of firm borders.  
	That was supposed to occur by the summer of 1948, B-G believed --
	and tested with UN and US officials.

	Of course, that never happened.  The Arab states refused repeatedly to
	participate in any such negotiation. Their response was, instead,
	five more invasions of Israel. And the state of war technically 
	still exists (except with Egypt).

	Sorry to bore you, Karen.  It IS less dramatic, isn't it?

/don feinberg

    Re: -.1
    
    Steve Goldfield is somebody who writes a lot of fantasies on almost
    all non-technical usenet newsgroups.  He tried to explain to me
    how much freedom I lost when I left the USSR.  He writes a lot of
    left-wing stuff, not supported by any references, or the referemces
    like the one above.  My impression is that very few people bother
    to reply to his postings.  I read only the quotations from him used
    by other people.
    
    The article in -.2 is a good example.  It is simptomatic that  The
    Voice of Oppressed Palestinians Karen resorts to his postings.
    
    Leo

    re: .36
    
    Leo, why didn't you advise Steve to try living as a Jew in the USSR
    and see just how much "freedom" he would have?
    
    David

    Re: -.1
    
    David,
    
    I did.  But in his usual manner when he is beaten he just says "End
    of discussion".  Since then I hit "n" as soon as I see his address
    on the line "From:".
    
    Regards,
    Leo

    Re: .35 Ben-Gurion, 1948, etc.
    
    Nice try at re-writing history.  In fact, the Arabs were largely in the
    Arab section of the partition, drawn there in an attempt to protect the
    Palestinians from the Jewish terrorist organizations, forced
    deportations, etc.  See, "The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities".
    However, let's say for the sake of argument that you're correct.  If
    it's okay for Ben-Gurion to advocate and commit "terrorist" acts when
    Arab armies are glomping thru Israel, why is it not okay for Arafat
    to do the same when the Israeli army is glomping thru Palestine?
    
    I'm amazed that no one recognized that the article was a satire on the
    demands made by Israel/the U.S. on the Palestinians.  I suspect
    there's some significance to that, but I don't know what it is.
    
    

    Re:.39,.30
39>    I'm amazed that no one recognized that the article was a satire on the
39>    demands made by Israel/the U.S. on the Palestinians.  I suspect
39>    there's some significance to that, but I don't know what it is.

    Uh, Karen, didn't you read .32?  Perhaps you didn't _expect_ any
    of us to get the joke, so missed my reference to getting it.