Conference smurf::civil_war

    
    	In another note (13.6) it was stated that Pickett thought it
    folly to send his men across that fateful field July 3rd, I disagree.
    I'll enter it here as not to rathole or distract from that note.
    
    From what I've read, General Pickett was upset because his Division
    was bringing up the rear of the Army so to speak on it's march into
    Penn. He was said to have said he was afraid of missing the action.
    
    	His Division being the freshest, so to speak, troops around was 
    chosen to lead the charge. Given his character, ringlets, perfumed,
    glory seeking (to impress his fiancee' 10 to 15 years younger than
    he) I find it hard to believe he would have turned down the 
    opportunity to win such glory for himself, having the chance to break
    the Union center. 
    
    	I do believe Longstreet, that old war horse, saw the folly of the
    charge, but in my opinion, I think all Gen. Pickett saw was his 
    chance for immortality. How else would it be explained then, that he
    actually sought out Longstreet for permission to charge? If I thought
    it folly, I wouldn't certainly go looking for my Corp.'s Commander to
    seek permission to advance?
    
    	Hindsight? Maybe?  But I'm willing to bet, that if it that fateful
    charge had been sucessful, how much glory would have Pickett heaped
    upon himself and forgotten Lee?  Did he try to blame Lee for his own
    incompetency?
    
    	What's your opinion?
    
    					The Alabama Slammer

My current feeling on the issue is that if the charge was succesful in any
way, whether it be complete victory (the North forced to sue for peace or
the South gets recognition from England etal) Pickett wold get glory, but Lee
would even get the greater glory. The attitude would've been "Pickett was
the implement of Lee's brilliant strategy. It was Lee who decided to go north
..."

Now back to the hindsight. Since Lee wants to fight, why not try again
on the flanks? Was the North's position so much stronger after the overnight?

And why did the attack start so late. Why not fight at dawn? Would that've
made a difference?

    
    What about some western theater general's???
    
    What's your opinion of General Cleburne? Was he as good as made out to
    be? Was he wasted on an futile frontal charge at Franklin, Tenn.?
    
    What about General Cheatum (sp?), Polk, etc...
    
    My knowledge on the Western Theater is very limited due to the
    fact of the heavy coverage on the ANV.
    
    					The Alabama Slammer

Mr. A. Slammer :-)

I've been reading a historical analysis on Davis and his generals. I'll
try to remember to put the reference in tonite.

The first part (half?) of the book is dealing with the west. It is pretty good
but does keep to the relationship between Davis and the Generals, and what Davis
did or did not do well when reacting to the actions of the generals.

The following is a brief description of the author's opinion on some
of the southern generals that worked in the western theatre (and I'm doing this
from memory so ...):

Albert S. Johnston - Friend of Davis and Davis thought the world of him. Davis
thought/expected Johnston could handle everything, in effect to work miracles.
After the loss of the forts Davis gave the west more attention and gave
Johnston more resources. The milatary, on both sides, respected Johnston's
ability. Johnston led the battle of Shiloh in the front. He felt that the
army (which was raw) could only be led from the front.

Beauregard - Hero of Sumtner and Manasass. Davis didn't really like him. Davis
decided to move him to the west. This move may have triggered the attacks on
the forts, due to  reputationof Beauregard and the rumor that he was bringing
several divisions. Beauregard overplanned, or planned beyond the capabilities of
the army to execute, on the way to Shiloh and when creating the battle plan.
Stopped the assualt after Johnston falls. Bragg, Polk, and Hardee all say that
"one more assualt" might have don it. Tries to win on the second day at Shiloh
but doesn't get far. Many say it would've been better to retreat then. He does
retreat from Corinth, without a fight, as Halleck approaches. Davis was livid at
this. But the retreat probably was prudent. At this time Davis was looking for
anyway to get him out of the west. Just then Beauregard decided he needed
a rest.

Leonadis Polk - Friend of Davis and political general. Violated the nuetrality
of Kentucky by taking ??? but didn't follow up by taking ??? (which was near
the mouth of the Tennesee). This inaction allowed Grant to take that city and
opened up the river route. Polk didn't like being under the command of other
generals. After Perryville disaster he backbites at Bragg and tries to undermine
Bragg's command. The author feels that Polk was a terrible general/leader and
that Davis, who appeared to be aware of Polk's doings, was too soft on
Generals who were also friends. Author feels that Polk should've been cashiered.

Hardee - Wrote the manual of tactics on the rifled musket. He spent time with the
French army and may have borrowed some of their manual of arms. Author feels
that the manual was not particualry useful anyways. Appears to be a competent
general. Did well in the Mexican war coming up the ranks. But he falls under
Polk's spell and starts to try erode Bragg's base.

Bragg - The author likes him. Feels that Bragg's army were well disciplined and
fought well. Davis felt he was a good general and supported him in all of his
actions, even as Polk was trying to do his stuff. Bragg outraced Buell 
and cut off Buell from Louisville, except that without supplies (Buell
had a wagon train) Bragg couldn't sit forever waiting for fight. The author
feels that Bragg did everything right here. By the book Buell should've tried
to fight or go around Bragg (which would leave Buell's flank exposed). Bragg
wasn't getting support from Smith (see below). Bragg and Smith decide to go into
Kentucky. Everything goes well, at first. Kentucky doesn't "rise" as expected.
Author contends that Smith caused much of the military defeats (or at best
tactical victories) at Perryville.

Smith ??? - This general, who I cna't think of his name at this moment, was
in charge of eastern Tennesee. He too doesn't like to be under the command of
others. He basically did his own thing. It appears to have given Bragg fits.
Author contends that much of the problem was cuased by chain of command. There
was no unified commander, at the time.

... Oh no brain overload ... there are too many generals... 

Van Dorn - While Bragg was away in Tennesse, he and Price?? manage to
screw around.

Price ??- See above.

Pemberton - Takes over Vicksburg defenses. Does ok (I'm just now reaching the
siege of Vicksburg)

Breckinridge - Does ok at Baton Rouge, considering the situation. Has potential.

Joe Johnston - Davis thought he is a good general, but not a good leader at
the tactical level. Davis felt that Johnston would be overall leader and
appointed him to the west. But even there it seems that Johnston doesn't
do as well. At one point Davis had to order some troop movements himself, that
he wanted Johnston to make.

Cleburne - Bragg thought highly of him. At one point Bragg wanted to replace
some generals (read Polk) with some of the younger, promising generals. Cleburne
was one of these. He did have experience in the British army. His troops were
well disciplined, orgainized, and fought well.

And all of this is in 1861-1862 in the west. And I didn't get them all.

>>Leonadis Polk - Friend of Davis and political general. Violated the nuetrality
>>of Kentucky by taking ??? but didn't follow up by taking ??? (which was near
>>the mouth of the Tennesee). This inaction allowed Grant to take that city and

Memory. Grant took Paducah. So my memory access is just terribly slow ...

    Re: .4
    
    > Van Dorn...screw around.
    
    This line had me howling.  Van Dorn was shot dead in his Spring Hill,
    Tennessee, headquarters by a doctor of the town who believed that Buck
    Van Dorn was screwing around with the doctor's attractive wife.
    
    Sorry.  Back to the serious discussion.
    
    -d

Was it Paducah (Polk) and Cairo (Grant) ....? ....

    
    The haze is clearing!?...
    
    Re.-.4
    	I would love the title of the historical analysis on Davis that
    you are currently reading, Sah! Especially who the author is. I would
    love to compare him to some others that I have. I am currently starting
    to read (with about a dozen others!) a two volume series on the Orphan
    Brigade of Tennessee. Thus my interest in the Western theater. The 
    exact title of the series escapes me at the moment???....
    
    A.S. Johnston - I personally believe that Johnston would have been the
    R.E. Lee of the west. I might be going out on a limb here, but,
    hindsight aside, he had the charisma, brains and guts to give U.S.
    Grant a hard enough time to the point of maybe Grant never coming East?
    
    P.G.T. Beauregard - A flash in the pan! How hard is it to hit a fort
    in the middle of a harbor? As far as Mannassas (Bull Run for ya'll
    Yanks) it was the first battle of basically amateurs. If J. Johnston
    hadn't shown up with reinforcements at the critical moment, who knows?
    I believe he never achieved the level of his reputation. Shiloh is a 
    good example.
    
    Leonadis Polk - I don't know to much about him. So I won't offer my 
    opinion on him. I'll have to research him so more. I'll get back to 
    him later.
    
    Hardee - Bless his black little heart! Being an ACW reenactor,
    everybody I know curses him. Especially during drill!! But, I will
    agree, he was a very competent General. He just feel under the mire 
    of politic's that infested the AOT...
    
    Bragg - I don't know to much background on the man. To me he was such
    a complicated man. I'll get back to him later.
    
    Van Dorn - I got a laugh about him also. He had the same reputation
    as J.E.B. Stuart, chasing skirts and stealing kisses so to speak. He
    was a real ladies man, but, unfortunately he got caught kissing the
    wrong man's wife!?
    
    Smith, Price, Breckinridge, Cleburne, and Pemberton are the ones I
    would love to get information on. The unasked questions would be is,
    Why did Cleburne lead such a futile frontal assault at Franklin??
    Why didn't Pemberton attack Grant before he surrounded Vicksburg??
    
    One more question, who was the cavalry leader who was such a thorn
    in Sherman's side? The name escapes me?....
    
    And let us not forget,
    J. Johnston - I feel that he fought a brilliant delaying campaign
    against Sherman. Lets face it, he was outmanned, out supplied, and
    out gunned, but, he always seemed to cause Sherman to go into one of
    his famous flanking manuevers to get around him.
    
    Hood - My personal belief is he destroyed the AOT by useless frontal
    attacks on Sherman. Davis wanted a fighter, he got one, thus also
    losing Atlanta in the bargain.
    
    So many questions, so little time!?
    
    What's ya'll's opinions?
    
    				The Alabama Slammer :^)
    
     
    

Mr. Slammer:

I failed to write down the title of the book. My only excuse was that I was
thouroughly engrossed in reading it. So I called home and here is the title:

Jefferson Davis and His Generals
The Failure of the Confederate Command in the West

Author: Steven E. Woodworth
Year: 1990

To clear up one misconception, the book only deals with Davis and the
relationship with the generals in the West. There is nothing really about the
ANV in the book, except when it relates to the West.

Overall, I liked the book. It gave alot of details of the doings of the armies
of the West. The book appears to be a fair treatment, but I should try to read
more. The book had a good bibliography.

Two, Polk took Columbus and Grant took Paducah.

>>   Leonadis Polk - I don't know to much about him. So I won't offer my 
>>  opinion on him. I'll have to research him so more. I'll get back to 
>>  him later.

The author clearly thought that Polk caused many of the problems in the command
structure of the AoT. Like you, this is the first detailed information I have of
him. So I'll have to temper my judgement based on only 1 sampling.

>>   Hardee - Bless his black little heart! Being an ACW reenactor,
>>  everybody I know curses him. Especially during drill!! But, I will
>>  agree, he was a very competent General. He just feel under the mire 
>>  of politic's that infested the AOT...

The author agrees with you about the mire of the politics.

>>Bragg - I don't know to much background on the man. To me he was such
>>a complicated man. I'll get back to him later.

The author gave, I feel, a fair treatment of Bragg. Bragg, he felt, was a good
tactician, and was undermined by the politics of Polk and Hardee.

>>  Van Dorn - I got a laugh about him also

What a comic I is :-)

>>  Smith, Price, Breckinridge, Cleburne, and Pemberton

The book is full of information on them.

The author feels that Smith was part of the problem and didn't heel to orders
that Bragg gave, that if carried out would've meant success instead of defeat.

Breckinridge - It seems that he did ok, up to Chickamauga. He may have been
under the influence when the battle for Missionary Ridge. Apparently, he
positioned his men at the wrong part of the crest of the ridge. This provided
some breathing room for the advancing Union troops.

Pemberton - Overall, the author gives Pemberton good marks. Maybe Pemberton
shouldn't have backed into Vicksburg, but the author states if Johnston
had helped in trying a breakout in late May/early June, then Pemberton's
army might've survived, even with the postion lost. The author feels that 
Pemberton with Johnston would've had a chance. One thing the author proposes
is that the South's leadership didn't truly understand how Grant was supplied.
There were several attempts to find the non-existant supply line. Davis, who
was ill much of the time during these events, couldn't understand this.
After the fall of Vicksburg, the South villified Pemberton. He was from
Pennsylvania (married a Virginian I believe) and went south. He may have
picked a bad day to actually surrender, July 4th. Some people in the South
that that he was part of an intricate Northern plan.

Cleburne - The author clearly feels that Clebuurne could've and should've
been one of the South's good, if not great, generals. He was passed over for
promotion many times, the author feels. As I mentioned yesterday Bragg
tried (probably) to remove Polk and Cleburne could've been a beneficiary of
this event. His divisions always fought well. His plans were good, and
his organization was good. The author asks what if Cleburne was given command of 
the AoT as it fell back towards Atlanta? Why did he attack at Franklin. The 
author never goes into this aspect. I think Cleburne was given an order and
followed it (BTW, this type of general, in the west, was rare for the south,
after reading this book, I'm surprised anything got done at all. The command
structure was difficult at best)

>>  And let us not forget,
>>  J. Johnston - I feel that he fought a brilliant delaying campaign
>>  against Sherman.

The author doesn't share, with you, this opinion. The author, pretty much, takes
the Jeff Davis view of things. That Johnston was retreating without a fight.
that Johnston would give up Atlanta without a fight. I guess the author feels
that retreating wasn't going to win anything, and the South was in desperate
times, and that required desperate measures. Unfortunately, that led to Hood
and eventually, the disaster at Franklin.

The author thinks Hood did well, tactically, around Atlanta. There was
a missed oppurtunity just before Franklin, where if orders had followed (and
fopllowed up by Hood) then Thomas's army might've been hit bad. But things
got botched up. Hood decided never to flank again. In one of the footnotes
a question was raised if Hood was taking some form of Laudnum for his injuries,
and if that may have affected his judgement. Hood lost a leg and the use of
an arm in previous battles. Hood was not a good organizer (supplies etal),
and at the top, that is a critical skill.

Speaking of time, this has gone on longer than I wanted, and the compiles
are done ...Looks like a late night ...

dave

    RE: 8
    
    I believe you're thinking of Nathen B. Forrest. Had to be the best 
    cavalry tactical officer of the war.
    
    craig
    

 >   One more question, who was the cavalry leader who was such a thorn
 >   in Sherman's side? The name escapes me?....
 

Nathan Bedford Forrest.

Rose from the ranks to Maj. General.  Brilliant tactician.  His campaign
in Western Tennessee during Sherman's advance on Atlanta tied up tens of
thousands of troops.

Shelby Scott, in the Ken Burns' CW film, has glowing things to say about
Forrest - calls him one of the few geniuses to come out of the war.

Ben

That's Shelby Foote, not Shelby Scott.  Shelby Scott is a newsperson in
the Boston area, I think.

-d

>>Shelby Scott, in the Ken Burns' CW film, has glowing things to say about
>>Forrest - calls him one of the few geniuses to come out of the war.

May you be thinking about Shelby Foote?

Shelby FOOTE FOOTE FOOTE FOOTE FOOTE FOOTE.

I guess my face is red.  I hate doing that.
And I'm reading his books right now.  And I saw him in the CW film last night.
Dumb.

Anyway - he (Shelby FOOTE) told a funny story about NBForrest in the CW
film.  He was talking to Forrest's great-niece(?) on the telephone and
told her that he had heard the opinion that Lincoln and Forrest were the
two geniuses to emerge from the Civil War, and what did she think of that.
There was a pause, and then she said "Well, our family never thought much
of Mr. Lincoln".

This was a story told by Shelby FOOTEFOOTEFOOTEFOOTEFOOTEFOOTEFOOTEFOOTEFOOTEFOO


Ben

Re: 14

Bahahahahaha!

I had forgotten that beautiful line from Forrest's descendent.

Made my day, you did.  I *love* humor!

-d

    
    Was he the General that took something like 3-4 hits and was still
    leading his men (one in the face too)

I think that it was Forrest's men who lead the slaughter at Fort Pillow,
where about 400 (?) black prisoners of war were butchered because Forrest
and his men wouldn't recogize their status as soldiers.

This was one motivation for equipping black units with the first of the
repeating rifles: they had *much* more to lose if captured.

				- bruce

Re: .17

Equipping black units with repeaters may have been due to their having
more to lose, as you say, but 13.29 points out another rexplanation at
least as likely, i.e., repeaters were not as easily available in
quantities large enough to supply masses of white solders, repeaters'
ammunition was in equally short supply and hence might be expected to
be unavailable, and repeaters were not yet trusted to be reliable.  If
I were concerned about these three restrictions, I'd give the blacks,
whom I might (as an 1860s man) view as less valuable troops, the arms
most likely to become unusable, saving the best for my good troops.

The 54th Massachusetts, who lost about half their number against Fort
Wagner, were armed with Enfields confiscated from a blockade runner.

-d

Re: .16

Wasn't that General Gordon?

Ben

    
    Re: 9   Thanx for the title of the book. I must add it to my growing
    library, that is, if I can sneak another book by my wife!?
    
    Re: 10  That's the mystery man! Thanx Craig! I've finally collected
    the complete Franklin's Mint 125th Gettysburg's commemorative chess
    set and the two knights for the South are Stuart and Wheeler. I always
    thought Forrest was better than Wheeler, I wonder why they didn't use
    Forrest??? Maybe because of his supposed KKK connection????
    
    Re: 16,19  Yes, it was Nathan Bedford Forrest that was shot 3-4 times
    and in the face. If ya'll noticed in Burn's series while talking to
    Shelby Foote, they show a picture of Forrest. His left cheek is a
    little mangled up. And I don't think it was high cheek bones!?
    
    And yes, General Gordon was also shot in the face. One heck of a way
    to fight a war!
    
    Nit: Wasn't Shelby Scott a distant relative of Shelby Foote!?? :^)
    
    					The Alabama Slammer  
                                                           

    Bedford Forrest certainly ranks as one of the finest fighting generals
    of the war. Though he killed and captured a lot of Federals his
    contribution to the outcome of the war is negligible.  My votes for the
    best fighting generals who did affect the course of the war are
    Winfield Scott Hancock, who, luckily for the Union Army, was present to
    make the first all-important disposition of troops at Gettysburg, and
    "Little Phil" Sheridan, who did nothing but win just about every battle 
    he took part in.
    
    U.S. Grant considered Hancock the best general on either side who did
    not exercise an independent command. He considered Sheridan the best
    who did.
    
    TD

Second the vote for Hancock.  Had he not been there, Howard would have
allowed his troops to waffle as badly as he himself did, and the
federals would doubtless have lost the initial engagement on Cemetery
Ridge.

-d

    My 2nd sergeant and I were discussing the 33rd Alabama last night.
    He is going to an encampment in Alabama next month that is hosted
    by that unit, so he did some research into them.  He found they
    were under Pat Cleburne.
    
    Okay, so how does an Irishman pronounce this fine general's last name?
    
    In the South it is generally pronounced "Clay-brn", with no noticable
    "u" in the second syllable.
    
    
    Wess

    My Rebel Irish lass says, "Clee-boyn", with the appropriate brogue,
    o' course.
    
    						Don

    re: .24   "Clee-boyn"
    
    Well!  I never would'a guessed it that way!  Just to be sure, does
    her "-boyn" rhyme with "coin?"
    
    
    
    Wess

    For a _really_ fun game, try guessing how the Irish pronounce the last
    name of the commander of the famous Irish Brigade, Thomas Meagher.
    
    (I didn't realize for several minutes who my friend was _talking_
    about!  :^} )
    
    MikeR
    

I believe the usual Irish pronunciation of Meagher is May-er.

-dick

    
    	I'll take a stab...  I hear alot of Irish folk pronounce
    McGlaughlin, not mil-lauf-lin, but mig-lahk-lin.
    
    	I'll follow the same rules of pronunciation and say.
    mee-ker... ;)
    
     2
    R

    I've also heard it as "may-her".

    
    Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston:
    	The overall commander in the Confederacy's Department of the West.
    Johnston was considered to be the South's best military officer. At the
    age of 59, he was tall and impressive in appearance, every inch a
    soldier and leader.
    	He had graduated from West Point in 1826 and then served in the 
    Texan revolution and the war with Mexico. After being promoted to
    colonel of the U.S. 2nd Cavarly, he advanced to brevet brigadier
    general and commanded the Utah expedition of 1858 -1860.
    	The outbreak of war in 1861 found him in California as commander
    of the Department of the Pacific. Johnston resigned from the United
    States army after Fort Sumter, but on his return East he was reportedly
    offered a position as second in command to Winfield Scott, commander
    of all Northern armies. Johnston turned this offer down, as did Robert
    E. Lee when he was offered a similiar position.
    	Instead, Johnston accepted a commission as a full general in the
    Confederate army. His rapid advancement and appointment to command of
    the crucial Western department had been due in no small part to his 
    close personal friendship with Confederate President Jefferson Davis.
    The two had been friends ever since they attended Transylvania College
    together in the early 1820's.
    
    						The Alabama Slammer
    	

        	Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk (1806 - 1864)
    	Victor over Grant at Belmont and commander of the Confederate right
    wing at Shiloh, was noted more for his military bearing than for his 
    military ability.
    	He graduated from West Point in 1827, but his true love was for the
    Church - he was ordained Episcopal Bishop of Louisianna in 1840. Polk
    came out of retirement in 1861 at the insistance of his good friend
    Jefferson Davis.
    	He proved to be a better organizer than fighter, though he showed
    great personal courage by leading four charges at Shiloh. His decision
    to return his troops to their previous night's camp after the first day
    of fighting at Shiloh left his wing badly out of position for the
    renewal of combat the next day.
    	Polk later fought at Perryville, Stones River, and Chickamauga.
    Following Chickamauga, he quarreled with his army commander, Braxton
    Bragg. Bragg wanted him court-martialed, but President Davis intervened
    on Polk's behalf to settle the quarrel.
    	Polk was killed on 14 June 1864 by an artillery shell at the battle
    of Pine Mountain in Sherman's Atlanta campaign.
    	He was a distant relative of U.S. President James K. Polk.
    
    						The Alabama Slammer
    
    	

    Albert Sydney Johnston was the Secretary of War for the Republic of
    Texas.  I have a photocopy of the RT uniform regulation, and it
    is signed by A.S. Johnston.  He is buried in Texas.
    
    
    Wess

    I've read that Davis was not actually a friend of Sydney Johnston, but
    was definitely more than an acquaintance.  Apparently, Johnston was
    Davis' hero, and the president of the confederacy idolized him.  For
    Johnston's part, he was friendly with Davis but didn't return the 
    unlimited devotion.  I don't know how much of this is true, but I find
    it interesting.
    
    I've also read that the supposed great friendship between Bragg and
    Davis didn't exist either.  Apparently some of the malcontents in the
    AoT started this rumour which then became widespread.  On hearing this,
    Davis, no stranger to being lampooned himself, felt sorry for Bragg and
    tried to support him in any way he could.  Again, who knows for sure?
    
    Ziff

    
    	Johnston resigned from the U.S. Army in 1834 and went to Texas;
    when he was appointed the brigadier general to command the army of the
    Republic of Texas in 1837, a jealous Felix Huston challenged him to a
    duel and wounded him; Johnston recovered and went on to become the
    secretary of war for the Republic, 1838 - 40.
    	He then returned to Kentucky, and when the Mexican War began he
    accepted a commission in the U.S. Army; he remained in that service
    until April 1861, when he resigned to join the Confederate army.
    	When Jefferson Davis was urged to replace Johnston, he replied,
    'If Johnston is not a general, I have none'.
    	His death came as a great blow to the Confederacy, and he was
    temporarily buried in New Orleans; in 1867 his body was taken to Texas,
    and when General Sheridan forbade any military honors to Johnston, his
    admirers in Texas cities simply walked in silence behind the body.
    
    						The Alabama Slammer 

    
    	Brig. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne (1828 - 1864) was one of several
    Confederate brigade commanders at Shiloh who rose to later high rank
    and fame. A native of Ireland, he had come to America to seek his 
    fortune. When the war began, he cast his lot with the South and soon
    became the colonel of the 1st Arkansas.
    	Later he became a brigadier general and handled his brigade well
    on both days of fighting at Shiloh. Cleburne then went on to fight in
    all the major battles of the western theater, rising to the rank of
    major general in charge of a corps.
    	His skills and reliability earned him the nickname "Stonewall 
    Jackson of the West". Cleburne was the highest ranking of the five
    Confederate generals killed at the battle of Franklin, Tennessee, on
    November 30th, 1864.
    
    						The Alabama Slammer

    What a waste of some obviously marvelous talent.  One can only imagine
    what may have happened had he been allowed to attain a higher rank...
    
    Ziff

    RE 92.2:
    
    	Note 92.2 makes reference to the practice of Civil War commanders
    "not checking" on their orders, but rather just issuing them and
    waiting.  While there are many instances of this kind of behavior, it
    is not necessarily a "fault".
    
    	One of the things which is most difficult for us to comprehend
    today is the difficulty of battlefield communication in the Civil War
    (and prior wars, as well).  An officer could really _control_ only
    those troops who were within sound of his voice, or perhaps within
    sight if no very complex action was called for ("advance" or "retreat"
    could be conveyed by gesture pretty well).  So, a regiment was the
    largest body of troops which one officer could hope to directly and
    reactively influence - partly because a regimental commander could
    _usually_ see most of his troops (later in the war, in trenches, or in
    heavily wooded terrain this was not so, and the difficulties of control
    increased).
    
    	For larger formations, orders had to be transmitted by the physical
    movement of some_body_ - either the officer giving the order or a
    courier.  (There were some instances of the use of signal flags, but
    those took time to transmit any complex message.  Signal guns, or
    flares, might be used to coordinate the _timing_ of actions covered in
    written orders, but also could not be used for "reactive" orders to
    change a previous plan.)  As armies grew large, and battlefields spread
    out over miles of ground, two issues arose:  it took time to transmit
    an order, observe the result, and then send another order; and it often
    became a problem to _find_ the officer who should receive the order.
    
    	As a result of the second problem, commanders of armies, corps, or
    divisions tended to establish a fixed headquarters, so that they could
    be found by messengers from higher or lower commanders.  A large unit
    commander who moved out to some particular unit during a battle risked
    losing touch with the rest of his units, unless everyone knew which
    unit he would be with.
    
    	The combination of the two situations led to large battles being
    _planned_ by the commander in general, planned by subordinates in
    detail, but _fought_ by regimental and brigade commanders.  It was
    extremely difficult for a higher commander to "go and see" what had
    happened to _one_ part of his plan, because that might make him miss a
    crucial message from another part.  Sometimes a series of couriers were
    sent out to prod a subordinate into action, but there was rarely the
    opportunity for a timely flow of status information between parts of an
    army in battle.  As a result, commanders had to depend a great deal on
    their subordinates to "do the right thing".
    
    	Probably one of the worst examples of failure by a subordinate was
    Longstreet's delay in attacking on the second day of Gettysburg.  He
    essentially ignored repeated messages from Lee to attack.  (If he had
    been under Jackson, he would have been court-martialed!)  The delay may
    well have cost the South Little Round Top, and the battle.
    
    	While some commanders did better than others (or maybe just
    differently - Phil Sheridan was all over any battlefield he
    controlled), most commanders operated "at a distance" because there was
    no good way to do anything else.
    
    MikeR
    

    Re .27
    
    The people of Helena, Montana, where Meagher ended his life, pronounce
    his name "Marr."  I'm not surprised, and thinking about it I find that
    it makes more sense than my suggested "May-er."