Conference smurf::civil_war

The attack started late because, as in virtually every other engagement,
it took longer than anticipated to marshal the troops and get everything
sorted out.

Pickett would almost certainly have been viewed as Lee's implement if
the battle had gone to the South.  You have only to look at the cheer
raised for Lee on the grounds of the Chancellor mansion 2 months before
to see that it was Lee the troops loved and revered, not his lieutenant
generals, who were in fact doing no more nor elss than he demanded of
them.

-d

Hi Ben,

What I meant to ask: Why not try the flanks again? What was the tatical 
situation/information that made Lee "go up the middle"? Was it stubborness on
Lee's part?

Hibackatcha,

I really don't know.  My guess is that Lee figured that Meade had shifted
forces to the two ends of the line to repel the attacks of July 2nd, and
that the center was weakened as a result.

It is true that Meade had shifted forces left and right, but he had plenty
left for the center, and some in reserve, without repositioning troops
overnight (July 2-3).  The story goes that Meade met with his corps
commanders on the night of July 2nd and resolved neither to leave the
field nor to attack the next day, but to await Lee's move.  As the meeting
broke up he took Hancock(?) aside and said that the Confederate attack 
would fall on his troops in the center on the morrow.

Ben

    What ever happened to the Maine unit which saved the little roundtop?
    What happened to the comander of that unit Chapman??? From what
    I saw in the CW TV series he was quite a leader. He was ordered
    to hold and when he could nolonger hold due to lack of amunition,
    rather than giving up this key position he turned his flank around
    to sweep the hill before his force. This act not only held this
    key position but defeated one of the better southern units in the
    ANV killing or taking prisiner almoust the whole unit. (which greatly)
    outnumbered his own!)
    Jeff Filer

Jeff,

I believe you are refering to Joshua Chamberlain and the 20th Maine against
the ?? Alabama. They were were given much credit in the Civil War series.
As that is my only source for that part of the battle I won't be too
exuberent in my praise :-). To me, his actions, as described in that documentary,
showed great leadership and courage.

Anyways, Chamberlain went on to become a general, promoted on the field
at Petersburg. He was severely wounded there (I'm not sure when), but he kept
at his post, moving his men. Grant gave him the promotion. "They" thought
Chamberlain was going to die. He survived. 
 

Also became Governor of Maine and president of Bowdoin College (in some
order).


Ben

    If your interested, Chamberlains leadership actions on Little Roundtop
    are used as an example in a US Army Leadership manual (FM 20-100?).  
    As I remember, it is one of very few historical examples dealt with in 
    depth by the manual.  According to the manual (as I remember it 5 years 
    latter), Chamberlain was praised for remaining cool and in control of his 
    unit, using an extrodinary amount of initiative, and exellent deployment -
    before the charge down the hill.  The successful counter attack was
    iceing on the cake.
    
    tom

    
    re.-.4  The 20th Maine with Chamberlain, as you asked what happened
    to unit, served with distinction till Appomattox. Chamberlain wrote
    a tear-jerking poem or sonnet about the surrendering ANV. There was 
    a story at Appomattox about Chamberlain saluting a certain group of
    Rebels as they passed bye, with the Reb's returning the salute. I
    can look it up if need be?
    
    re.-.5  The mysterious Alabama outfit you referred to is the 
    15th Alabama. Up to that point, the 15th Ala. had never been defeated
    upon the field of battle. They had reached the top of Big Round Top,
    noticed that Little Round Top was deserted at that point in time, the
    Commander was noted as saying, if he got his troops over to Little
    Round Top, he would have been able hold that position against the
    whole Union Army.
    
    In the race for Little Round Top, the 20th Maine was the winner with
    some other Nothern units dispatched by General Warren. General Warren
    had some moments before recon'ed the mountain top, noticed the 15th
    Ala. a'coming and skeddadled for help. Just in the nick of time, the
    Union forces got there first, with the 20th Maine holding the outmost
    flank position. The rest is so to speak, history.
    
    One survivor of the 15th Ala. was quoted as saying, the 15th Ala. was
    never defeated up till today. But they was in no hurry to meet those
    men from Maine again in a hurry. After fierce hand to hand the 20th
    Maine totally threw off guard and demoralized the 15th Ala. by the
    bayonet charge. They were also helped in the rout by (I forget the Reg.
    number?) some Vermont boys firing a volley from the flank into the
    Rebs.
    
    If ya'll want I could look up the facts a little better, and also dig
    up the sonnet Chamberlain wrote at Appomattox?
    
    					The Alabama Slammer 

    
    From an Union observer;
    
    	"More than half a mile their front extends....man touching man, rank,
    	pressing rank....The red flags wave, their horsemen gallop up and
    	down, the arms of [thirteen]thousand men, barrel and bayonet, gleam
    	in the sun, a sloping forest of flashing steel. Right on they move,
    	as with one soul, in perfect order without impediment of ditch,
    	or wall, or stream, over ridge and slope, through orchard and
    	meadow, and cornfield, magnificent, grim, irresistible."
    
    
    					The Alabama Slammer
    	

    
    Irresistable ?
    
    Across a killing-ground?
    
    Magnificent..but not the way to wage war..
    (who said that originally ?)
    
    Aidan
    

    Regarding Chamberlain of the 20th Maine.
    I'm recalling from hazy memory so please corre t me if I am wrong.
    
    At Appamattox (sp) after Lee surrendered, General Gordon of the ANV
    was leading the Confederate army to stack its arms I believe. General
    Chamberlain was the Union officer responsible for accepting the
    surrender. AS Gordon led his Confederates past Chamberlain's troops,
    there was no cheering or cat-calling from the Union side. Suddenly,
    there was a distinct,universal snapping noise as the Union troops
    all presented arms (or was it order arms) by Chamberlain's order as
    the Confederates marched by. Startled, Gordon wheeled his horse towards
    Chamberlain, bowed his head and directed his horse likewise, as he
    pointed his sword down towards his boot. Gordon said that he had 
    tremendous respect for Chamberlain who gave the Confederates the
    ultimate gesture of respect. Gordon stated it was " a measure of
    salute from Americans to other Americans " I paraphrase.
    
    Re- Gettysburg
    
    Was not the Charge supposed to be done in concert with an attack on
    the Union right flank by Ewell on Culp's Hill ? I believe Lee was
    trying to draw off support from the Union center to the right with this
    attack. I believe that Stuart was supposed to also harass the Union
    rear as to divert some more attention from Seminary Ridge. However, I
    may be all wet. ( Have to drag out my Gettysburg books ). Can anyone
    corroborate ?  Thanks.
    
    
    MikeL
    
    

    As far as I can tell, you're right Mike.  I remember reading the same
    battle plan which you just presented.  
    
    Slammer, I for one would be very interested in seeing that sonnet by
    Chamberlain.  Please forward it to me if you can find it.
    
    Ziff

    
    "On they come, with the old swinging route step and swaying battle
    flags. In the van, the proud Confederate ensign... Before us in proud
    humiliation stood the embodiment of manhood; men whom neither toils and
    sufferings, nor the fact of death... could bend from their resolve;
    standing before us now, thin, worn, and famished, but erect, and with
    eyes looking level into ours, waking memories that bound us together
    as no other bond; was not such manhood to be welcomed back into the
    Union so tested and assured?... On our part not a sound of trumpet
    more, nor roll of drum; not a cheer, nor word, nor whisper or vain
    glorying, nor motion of man... but an awed stillness rather, and breath
    holding, as if it were the passing of the dead!
    
    					Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain

    
    Re: .11
    
    	You are correct, Ewell was supposed to attack the right flank at
    the same time of Pickett's charge to draw support from the Union
    center. But, the previous day, an late afternoon attack by Ewell's
    divisions was bogged down on the slopes of Culp's Hill. Some of the
    troops were entrenched on the slopes and the following morning, the
    fighting started just after dawn and the Confederates were driven 
    from the slopes.
    
    	The fighting that occurred that morning was not according to 
    Lee's plan. It effectively negated any support or the drawing of
    Union reserves from the center. In all actuality it did nothing to
    support Pickett's frontal assault. Thus leaving Pickett's troops so
    to speak "hung out to dry"!
    
    	The cannonade that proceeded the charge was the biggest such
    affair in the war so far, but, in all actuality did little or no
    damage to the positions it was supposed to affect. Most of the 
    damage done was to rear echelon areas. As the fire was directed to
    high and thus missing the front line troops, leaving them ready to
    recieve the attack. With the Union artillery ceasing fire to draw the
    infantry out, the Confederates attacked. The rest is history.
    
    	As far as Stuart is concerned, to little to late. He tried to
    correct his mistake (or glory ride?)by attacking the Union rear. But 
    the action of Gen. Custer voided any support or harassment by Stuart.
    Thus he lost face so to speak two times in one campaign. Not a good
    day for J.E.B. Stuart.
    
    					The Alabama Slammer
    

    re .13
    
    Thanks Slammer.  It was nice.  Kind of reminiscent of "The Conquered
    Banner", or have you ever read that one?  A little bit more gushy than
    Chamberlain's, but very moving nonetheless.  I'll send it if you'd
    like to see it.
    
    Ziff

    Most of the reading I've done about Lee's assault on the center (I
    prefer not to call it Pickett's Charge, as there two other divisions
    involved also), leads me to believe that Lee simply believed that
    the ANV could do ANYTHING.  Prior to this day they had never failed
    him!  He was wrong.  Longstreet actually was the Commander given the
    job of ordering the assault when he felt the massive artillery
    barrage had been effective.  He was literally sick, as he had been
    arguing against the attack since first conceived by Lee, and he
    let Lee know he was strongly against it in no uncertain terms, several
    times.  After the attach he said something to the effect that "That old
    man has killed off my army".  Their relationship was never the same
    again.

Er, uhm, as it turns out, Longstreet felt so bad about the prospects of
the charge's success that he tried his damnedest to abdicate resonsibil-
ity for ordering it.  He required E.P. Alexander, the I Corps Colonel of
Artillery, to make the actual notification to Pickett that it was time
to advance.  This notification was supposed to be given after Alexander
felt that the Confederate artillery barrage had sufficiently demoralized
or driven back the Federals; if, in Alexander's judgment, the advance
would not have a good probability of success, Alexander was to deliver
no message, thereby preventing the advance.  Alexander demurred, arguing
that he didn't think the artillery could possibly do enough, and
Longstreet insisted.

Longstreet's action, in my opinion, amounted to dereliction of duty.

Alexander finally passed word to Pickett when the Federals stopped their
counterbattery fire as a ruse; he saw the Rhode islanders near the clump
of trees, whom Hancock had told to withdraw, as they moved to the rear,
and in his mind that three-gun retrograde motion grew into a general
retreat of the Federal artillery.  The ruse having worked, he said go.

Pickett was *eager* for glory -- he wanted that attack so badly he could
taste it, as a way to prove himself.

Lee took no part in the tactical officering.  His position, as he laid
it out for a Prussian observer three days after the battle, was to get
the troops into position and dispose them as best he could.  Once the
battle started, it was in the hands, he said, of the Almighty.

-d

    I remember now reading Alexander's account of the battle.  As I 
    recall it, he actually felt he had the go-nogo decision...and he
    probably did if he could have gutted it out.  Kind of like being
    the only one to vote against a DEC engineering phase exit...you
    don't want to stand out as the bad guy.  As Lee said "Too bad, Oh
    Too bad".

    
    	There is a legend that Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg was twice
    enacted, the final scene contributing a fearful, if lesser, carnage
    to the traditions of that great battle.
    	During a Blue and Gray reunion on the field, so some have it, aging
    Confederates fell into ranks and walked across the broad terrain where
    Pickett's men had charged on July 3rd, 1863.
    	The watching ancients in blue could not long remain bystanders,
    and as the feeble ranks moved up the slope toward the spot where once
    the angled stone wall had run, and where a clump of trees stood on
    Cemetery Ridge, there were Yankee yells:
    	"Come on, boys! By God, they never made it then - and they'll not
    do it now."
    	Upon which the old boys of the Grand Army of the Republic are
    alleged to have run into position along the ridge, and when the
    Confederate veterans hobbled up, to have sprung upon them tooth and
    nail, the whole mass tangling in a fierce scrap until officials
    managed to part them.
    
    					The Alabama Slammer

    I read that somewhere too.  Might have been during the big 1938
    reunion.  Also, Union troops watching the advance kept chanting
    "Fredericksburg, Fredericksburg...." to the greybacks.  Must have
    sent a shiver up their spines.

    
    	The deaths of generals in battle created a spate of folk tales,
    some of them with the ring of truth, but now beyond the reach of the
    historian's tests. Typical is the story of General John F. Reynolds,
    USA, the gifted corps commander who fell at Gettysburg.
    	On the first day of fighting, Reynolds directed the attack of the
    Iron Brigade which eventually drove General Archer's men from 
    McPherson's Woods, captured Archer and many of his troops, (but not
    the 5th Alabama Batt.) and drove the force across Willoughby Run.
    Just as the success of the thrust became apparent, Reynolds was felled
    by a sharpshooter.
    	The bullet struck him in the neck, and Reynolds shouted a last
    order to his men to hurry forward, then fell into the arms of an aide,
    a Captain Wilcox. "Good God, Wilcox, I am killed," were his last words.
    	Some years after the war, when Pennsylvania was building a large
    granite monument to her dead, a state official visited the quarry at
    Mount Airy, North Carolina, where the work was being done. The monument
    included a number of white columns, with statuary to be mounted
    outside.
    	The Pennsylvanian instantly recognized one figure. "That's General
    Reynolds," he said.
    	"Yes", said his Tar Heel guide, "and there's the man who killed
    him." He pointed to a workman in a nearby shed.
    	The workman was Frank Wood, who told the visitor: "I went up to
    Gettysburg with our army, and the first day we got separated from our
    company - Private Cox and I. We got into a railroad cut, and then
    climbed out under a rail fence. There was fighting all around."
    	"In front of us, a few hundred yards away, we saw a Yankee officer
    on a big horse, with lots of gold braid about him. He was standing in
    his stirrups and yelling to his boys: 'Give 'em hell, boys. Give 'em
    grape.'"
    	"Cox asked if I could hit him, and I said I thought I might. I 
    raised the sights on my musket and fired, and knocked him off the
    horse. I didn't know who he was at first. They told us afterward."
    	Wood had returned to the North Carolina hills after the war,
    to make and sharpen tools used in working stone in the quarry.
    	It was in the quarry that he made the tools which fashioned the
    white granite Pennsylvania monument, upon which stood the figure of
    the general he had killed.
    
    					The Alabama Slammer
     

    One of the things about Pickett's charge that may have dimished its
    effectiveness was well-described by Union soldiers observing it:
    
    "My Gawd, they're dressing their lines!" - or words to that effect.
    
    In other words, at least once during the charge, the Confederates
    STOPPED, under fire, and 'closed up' their ranks. Presumably the reason
    for compacting their mass (and thus presenting a better target without
    the gaps that had already been torn in their midst) was to hit
    the union lines with a more compact and effective mass.
    
    My own opinion is that it caused more Confederate casualities (more
    time exposed to Union fire, a better target).
    
    Ken

    The Confederates did stop at least once to dress their lines, just
    for the reason you mentioned.  Not only did it give them more
    concentrated firepower, it gave them MORE firepower.  The lines
    had become so badly disorganized that companys were virtually out
    of control.  The first line of the assault was, at some points in
    the attack, 10 to 12 ranks keep.  Only the first two or three ranks
    could shoot, which greatly diminshed their outgoing fire.
    
    Of far greater consquence was the fact that the second wave of the
    assault was more than 400 yards to the rear.  The first wave broke
    the Federal line and inflicted serious casualties.  Had the second
    wave been near enough to exploit that, we might be speaking Southern
    today.  (Well, *SOME* of us might be.  ;-)  )  The way it worked
    out, by the time the second wave was within range to threaten the
    Federal line, the damage had been repaired and reinforcements had
    been brought forward.
    
    The repulse of Pickett's first wave and the reorganization of the
    Federal line was one of several instances at Gettysburg when the
    margin of victory was, literally, a matter of seconds - the length
    of time required for a man to run 200 yards.  Pickett's Charge came
    far closer to shattering the Army of the Potomac than most modern
    sources are willing to acknowledge.
    
    Wess

    My reference is Shelby Foote, and I don't recollect the 400 yds thing.
    I may have missed it, because the 'line-dressage' made such a powerful
    impression. It also powerfully impressed the Union soldiers, being
    I guess such a courageous, steady thing to do.
    
    As far as the 400 yds, I would assume this interval was maintained from
    the start of the assault, so the second wave paused while the first was
    'dressing their line', etc.?
    
    Is this interval more than was usual for such an infantry assault?
    Who ordered it?
    
    Ken

    You are right about the impression made by the Rebs' dressing their
    line under fire.  The Federals were shaken with awe, anyway, just
    watching a line of infantry almost a half-mile across coming straight
    at them.  Like I said, Pickett's Charge was a very near thing; it
    came within a few seconds of wrecking the AOP, and those Yanks on
    the ridge were fully aware of what such a group of Confederate infantry
    could do.  Not only did it take unbelievably steady nerve, which
    would be intimidating as hell to watch, it also showed that these
    Rebs were not going to turn into a mob that could be whipped piecemeal.
    The concentration of their fire left a lot of empty bunks in the
    AOP that night.
    
    The second wave started 'way too late.  At one point, I think they
    were closer to 600 yards behind the first wave.  I'm not sure that
    anyone ordered such an interval.  It would have had to have been
    Pickett, if anyone.  I believe it was the fault of the officer who
    was directing the second line, and I'm sorry, but I can't recall
    who that was.
    
    The standard interval would have been closer to 50 yards - never
    more than 100 yards.  A line of men moving at the standard infantry
    pace - 110 steps per minute - would cover 256 feet in a minute.
    That would give the defenders time to fire two or three shots, which
    could be devastating.  The idea was to hit them before they could
    recover from the shock of the first wave.  The pace could be picked
    up to 165 steps per minute, but that pace, especially over a cultivated
    field, is murderous.  The men would have been too exhausted to fight
    after more than a few minutes at that pace.  (Hardee says a regiment
    can move so many thousands of yards in one hour at the double quick,
    but the pace should be slowed every hour to avoid fatiguing the
    men!  I have seen some fairly athletic young bucks staggering and
    gasping after travelling 200 yards at double quick.)
    
    For the record, there were five paces commonly used:  Common time,
    used only in training, was 90 steps/min., 28"/step.  Quick time,
    by FAR the most generally used, was 110 steps/min., 28"/step.  Double
    quick time was not a run, but a WALK, at 165 steps/min., 30"/step. 
    Under extreme circumstances, and only for short periods of time,
    double quick could be stretched to 185 steps/min., [I think] 32"/step.
    The final and fastest pace was the run, which had no set rate. 
    Personally, I would far rather run that double quick.  Try it sometime,
    with no load and on good, smooth ground.
    
    Wess

    Pardon my ignorance of usch matters, but a question occured to me while
    reading the last reply.  Would 50 yards between infantry lines be
    sufficient distance to ensure that cannon fire directed at the front
    line wouldn't penetrate the rear line? Perhaps this consideration may
    have entered the calculation of distancing the advancing lines?  Or
    then again, thinking back to the discussion of the inertia of the
    cannonballs skipping along the ground, maybe even 600 yards wouldn't
    render any surety of survival to the second line. In any case, if the
    cannons could only be brought to bear on one line at a time, an astute
    officer might try to judge which threat to defend against; rifle fire
    (take account of position, number of defenders, training, length of
    field to be crossed, etc) or cannon fire (size of battery, training,
    loads being used, supply train, natural obstacles to aim, infantry 
    defending the arty, etc). 
    Any comments?
     

    RE .26:
    
    The type of defending fire would not have influenced the interval
    between lines.  There are two parts to answering your question:
    
    	As Wes mentioned, support troops were positioned to take advantage
    of the disruption in a defending line caused by the first line.  So
    they had to be close enough (i.e. about 50 yards) to get into the fight
    before the defenders had a chance to recover.  If this was important
    for musket fire at 2-3 shots per man per minute, it was doubly so when
    attacking artillery firing double charges of cannister!  Don't forget,
    the front line is only two men deep - it won't stop some fire from
    hitting the second line, but it _is_ the immediate target, so it gets
    shot at the most.
    
    	Artillery fired a variety of stuff.  At longer range, they would
    probably try to burst shell in or above an attacking force, and they
    weren't really precise enough for the first line to "protect" the
    support line from getting hit.  Solid shot might be used as the range
    decreased (but there are cases on record of batteries firing at
    attacking infantry with shell at close range, using fuses so short that
    the shell exploded at the gun's muzzle), but a couple of people 50
    yards in front are not much protection against a cannon ball.  The real
    killer for close-in artillery fire was cannister.  It made a smoothbore
    into a giant shotgun.  Artillery were know to substitute nails, scrap
    iron, pieces of railroad rail, etc.
    
    MikeR
    

The 50  yard  interval  was  more  likely chosen as a distance far enough to
avoid the danger zone from musketry aimed at the front unit rather than 
artillery. The trajectory for the individual cannister projectiles may
well have been close enough to small arms that it would also be far enough
that cannister fired at the forward unit would mostly fail to reach the 
rear  unit.   This  would  certainly  not  be  true  for solid shot fired on
relatively level ground and 50 yards is probably substantially farther than
the burst radius for ACW period explosive shells.

Also, the distance was probably an acceptable compromise between close
enough to support the front unit while maintaining enough separation to
allow the two formations to be controlled and maneuvered individually.

						Rod Burr

    The second wave would, indeed, take some casualties, but as .28
    stated, the main concern was for musketry.
    
    A 12 pound gun cannister was a 1 1/2" iron ball.  It had a LOT of
    inertia and penetration.
    
    Wess

I took a week off towards the end of October and on a Monday took my
ten-speed up to Gettysburg and did the auto tour on my bike.  Being a
Monday and "off" season, I practically had the place to myself.
Probably one of the better things I've done for historical recreation
all summer and fall.  The feelings evoked standing by the Virginia 
memorial while staring across the field to the "copse of trees" on a
breezy fall day...well, I could go on and on.  At any rate, in the 
visitor center they were selling a magazine, The GETTYSBURG Magazine,
Historical Articles of Lasting Interest.  It comes out twice a year and
is devoted to just the Gettysburg campaign and related events.  I've now
read two of the five issues I purchased and I highly recommend it.
The quality is much better than Civil War Times and the articles are
well documented; the maps are simply excellent.  To give you a little
"flavor", here's the table of contents from July 1, 1991, issue number
five.

Introduction:  "Gettysburg:  Articles of Lasting Interest"
by Edwin C. Bearss   (wasn't this guy a talking head in Ken Burns' Civil
War?  I think he's a National Park historian)

"A. P. Hill's Advance to Gettysburg"
by Douglas Craig Haines

"The Death of Iverson's Brigade"
by Gerard A. Patterson

"The Deadly Embrace:  The Meeting of the Twenty-fourth Regiment, Michigan
Infantry and the Twenty-sixth Regiment of North Carolina Troops at
McPherson's Woods, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, July 1, 1863"
by R. Lee Hadden

"Kershaw's Brigade at Gettysburg"
by Mac Wyckoff

"Baptism of Fire:  The Ninth Massachusetts Battery at Gettysburg, July 2,
1863"
by Eric Campbell

"The First Minnesota at Gettysburg"
by Robert W. Meinhard

"Posey's Brigade at Gettysburg, Part 2"
by Terrence J. Winschel

"Pickett's Charge:  The Reason Why"
by Henry J. Greenberg

"The Death and Burials of General Richard Brooke Garnett"
by Stephen Davis

"The Effects of Artillery Fire on Infantry at Gettysburg"
by Thomas L. Elmore

"Reunion at Gettysburg"
by Elizabeth Lewis


Sound good or what?  The next one is due out January, 1992.

Gettysburg Magazine
260 Oak Street
Dayton, Ohio   45410
1-800-648-9710

Enjoy.


Scott

    re: .30
    
    Ed Bearss (pronounced "BARSS") was the chief historian for the
    NPS.  I've talked with him on the phone a few times and he seems
    like a very decent fellow.  He  did a great deal of work in and
    around Vicksburg.  He has written books on Champion's Hill and 
    Wilson's Creek, that I know of.  It was Bearss who found the sunken
    Federal ironclad USS Cairo at the mouth of the Yazoo River.  He
    was literaly trolling for it with a magnet on a piece of cord!
    
    HIs book on the Cairo, "Hardluck Ironclad" seems to be the definitive
    work on the subject.  If you ever have a chance, I HIGHLY recommend
    the Vicksburg battlefield and the Cairo monument.
    
    FWIW, around Vicksburg they pronounce the name of the ship the same
    as the syrup:  "Kay-ro."
    
    
    Wess

    
    re .30
    
    The story of the Ninth Mass. Battery alone is worth the price of
    admission. I don't recall the exact details but I believe they were
    green troops told to hold back a strong rebel advance with little or no
    infantry support. They beat back repeated charges by firing grape and
    cannister timed to explode the instant it left the gun's barrels. They
    fought hand to hand with some gunners swinging the poles they used to
    tamp down the charges like they were pugil sticks. I don't think they
    ever broke but finally retired in order (possibly leaving the guns?)
    Crazy war.
    
    TD 
              

    This is probably beating a dead horse, but I figured that it should be
    entered in the interest of fairness.  I've already put my thoughts on
    the subject somewhere in here (too lazy to find out exactly where), but
    this particular quote from somebody much more qualified than any of us
    seems to refute most of us.
    
    Sometime after the war, in some discussion with somebody, Lee said in
    a tone more emphatically than usual: "If I had had Jackson at
    Gettysburg I should have one the battle, and a complete victory there
    would have established Southern independence."
    
    This comes from someone who knew the situation better than any of us
    ever will, and came from a reflection of a few years of stable thought.
    It's hard for me to change my opinion on this subject, but "Marse
    Robert" does give me pause to consider...
    
    Ziff

    RE .33:
    
    I wonder if Lee was thinking of the "responsiveness" of Jackson.  At
    the end of the first day, and at the start of the second day, Lee
    ordered attacks which were either not made or greatly delayed by his
    corps commanders.  At least after The Seven Days, Jackson was the one
    corps commander who Lee could count on to hit as fast and hard as
    possible.  The question of what was "possible", and what the result
    might have been, is one where we might have better information than
    Lee.
    
    But, it wasn't "possible" for Lee to stand and fight successfully along
    Antietam Creek, either - the ANV should, by all analysis and logic,
    have been destroyed.  It was the generals on both sides who made the
    "impossible" happen, so it is hard to _know_ what Jackson might have
    achieved at Gettysburg, just as it is hard to know what might have
    happened if he had not been wounded that night at Chancellorsville - if
    the AoP had been cut off from the fords, would Hooker have surrendered?
    
    It's fun to discuss though!  (And wargame...)
    
    MikeR
    

It was more than Lee's being able to count on Jackson, it was Jackson's
seemingly instinctive understanding of Lee's intent without Lee's having
to issue explicit nuts-and-bolts orders.  The mis-executed orders at
Gettysburg were ambiguously worded, each and every one of them, and that
ambiguity was not understood by the commanders to whom the orders were
addressed.  The "if yout hink an attack feasible" to Ewell on the first
day, for example, woudl certainly have elicited an advance from Jackson
because he would ahve understood that Lee really meant "do it, but use
your judgemnt as to how it should be done."

This premise is amply demonstrated by Lee's actions after the battle -
he wrote out the most comprehensive and detail-fiilled orders he ever
issued, all just for the withdrawal from Gettysburg.  He had learned
the hard way that he must leave nothing to his lieutenants' wits but
must rather spell it out.  Think also of what he said at the Seven
Days:  "I cannot have my orders obeyed!"

-dick

I heard on the radio Monday morning that "the last soldier to die of a 
Civil War wound died on this date in 19***" or something like that.  
Seems that it was none other than Joshua Chamberlain.  He was wounded, 
and later had a glass tube or something inserted into his belly to 
drain it or whatever.  It got infected or stopped working, so he died. 
Anyway, he is attributed to be the last man who died as a result of a 
wound inflicted in battle in the CW.  I know it was him because the DJ 
referenced the fact that he gave the order for the Union troups to 
salute the CSA troups at Gettysburg, that he was later the governor of 
Maine, etc.

Any corroborations?

Scott

    
    Hmmm... Joshua Chamberlain?  I heard it was someone that was a drummer
    boy.  Probably looked older than he was and snuck through the
    enlistment procedure at maybe age 14 or 15.  I want to say his death
    occured in the late 50's, maybe early 60's.  Wasn't Chamberlain about
    28 when Gettysburg occured?  That would make him about 125-130 years
    old when he died?  
    
    It would be interesting to find out the name, rank, and age of the
    last ACW veteran.
    
    Scott
    

    While I don't have a current edition, I recall that the Guiness
    Book of World Records has an Oldest Veteran category.  An old
    rebel took the prize and, you guessed it, a drummer boy who died
    in 195?.  
    
     2
    r

    Greetings,
    
      My family and I visited Gettysburg the past summer.  It was a
    tremendous experience.  It exposed my wife and son to a significant
    part of America's history that they knew nothing about and it gave me
    the chance to visit the terrain of a battle I had read so much about.
    
      We took our bikes and made a day of it.  Highly recommended.
    
    .38 was refering to the last person to die as a result of wounds
    received during the war.  The drummer boy was probably the last person
    to die that "served" in the war.
    
    Marv                                                          
    

    Re: .38
    
    	Also in a back issue of "Civil War Times Illustrated" they had
    an article of the last surviving CW Veteran. It seemed there was sort
    of a contest between one Northerner and one Southerner about who would
    last the longest. And as I recall the Southerner won!
    	I'll see if I got the article at home. It might be a few days
    before I can post it, I'll be in school for a few days, so I'll post
    it as soon as I can.
    
    					The Alabama Slammer 

    I recall reading somewhere not long ago that the last CW veteran died
    in 1959.  I think his name was Walter Williams and he was on the gray
    team.

    
    	Walter Williams was his name, of Houston, Texas. On May 10, 1959,
    Williams was the subject of a feature in the NEWS and COURIER entitled
    "The Last Rebel" and datelined Houston, Texas. He was then 116.
    	Williams had evidently caused a bit of controversy when at the age
    of 110 in July 1953 he was examined at the Veterans' Administration
    Hospital in Houston. The chief medical officer said at the time that
    there had been some question about the legality of examining a former
    Confederate in the VA clinic, but he explained (as reported in the
    Mobile PRESS), they would put him through the tests for "humanitarian
    reasons."
    	The former quatermaster who had served in General John B. Hood's
    Texas Brigade, Company C., 5th Cavalry, lost his eyesight at 112 but
    lived to be 117 years old.
    	He often told of the time he and a group of soldiers ambushed some
    Yankees, killing about 100 of them, and always swore: "We didn't get
    beat. We was starved out."
    
    	The final obituary notice of the Grand Army of the Republic was 
    a former drummer boy who had put on his uniform October 4, 1864, at the
    age of 17 as a volunteer private with Company C of the Minnesota Heavy
    Artillery Regiment, died at 109 on August 2, 1956.
    
    					The Alabama Slammer
    

RE last few...

Thanks for the info.  I think they said, though, that he had the 
distinction of being the last man to die as a result of being 
*wounded* in battle as opposed to the last one to die who *served* 
either side in battle.  As for the year, I'll go to the Library at 
lunch and see what I find on him...

Scott

    
    A high school history teacher (also my cross country coach) once
    told me something about the preservation of the battlefield that sticks
    in my memory.  We worked out on the trails at the Kennesaw Mountain and
    Cheatham Hill Battlefield Parks.  He metioned that the trees had taken
    over Kennesaw so that you could not get a real feel for the view that
    the combatants had.  The trenches had saplings in them and dissappeared
    in a thicket.  People are discouraged from walking on the remains of
    the earthworks.
    
    However, he said Gettysburg is maintains the trees etc. in a way that
    preserves the appearance of the battle field.  Although, I have never
    visited Gettysburg, I am familiar with the layout because of a report
    that I did many years ago that included a piece on G.G. Meade.
    
    Are the graves on the battlefield, between the high ground, or removed
    from the area entirely?  The graves of the Kennesaw casualties are at
    a National Cemetery in Marietta, five or six miles away from Cheatham
    Hill.  Probably because much of the Kennesaw Battle took place on
    private farmland...  
    
    

    Is anyone out there familiar with a cavalry regiment from Vermont
    who fought under General Wells at Gettysburg? I can think of only 
    two instances where cavalry were engaged; Custer vs. Stewart in the 
    east and a division of Buford's (?) on the first day on Seminary 
    Ridge. I'm tracing down some family trees.
    Thanks.
    
    Glenn

    RE .47:
    
    Well, there was a 1st Vermont Cavalry regiment in Farnsworth's brigade
    of Kilpatrick's division (Custer had Kilpatrick's other brigade).  I
    don't know when, or if, they were engaged at Gettysburg, though I still
    have some possible sources.
    
    The first day's action under Buford on Seminary Ridge involved Gamble's
    and Devins' brigades, so the 1st Vt. wasn't there.
    
    Was Wells a general at the time?  The name doesn't register, and if he
    was commanding the _regiment_, then he was almost certainly a colonel. 
    But he might have made general later in the war.
    
    I'll see if I can find out any more...
    
    MikeR
    

    
    re: .47
    
    	"In one of the more outstanding cases of advancemnt during the
    Civil War William Wells rose from private to brevet major general.
    The Vermont merchant had enlisted in the state's only mounted
    regiment early in the war. His assignments included: private,
    1st vermont Cavalry (September 9, 1861); first lieutenant, 1st
    Vermont Cavalry (October 14, 1861); captain, 1st Vermont Cavalry
    (November 19, 1861); major, 1st Vermont Cavalry (December 30, 1862);
    colonel, 1st vermont Cavalry (July 2, 1864); commanding 2nd Brigade,
    3rd Division, Cavalry Corps, Army of the Shenandoah (September 19 -
    October 22, 1864 and November 10, 1864 - March 25, 1865); commanding
    2nd Brigade, 3rd Division, Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac (March
    25 - May 22, 1865); brigadier general, USV (May 19, 1865); commanding
    the division (May 22 - June 1, 1865); commanding the corps (June 1 -
    24, 1865); and commanding 1st Separate Brigade, 22nd Corps, Department
    of Washington (June 22 - July 7, 1865). His company fought in the
    Shenandoah and at 2nd Bull Run. After duty in the Washington area
    Wells fought as a major at Gettysburg on the far southern flank of
    the Union army. His regiment took part in the Bristoe and Mine Run
    operations and the Kilpatrick-Dahlgren raid. In the course of the
    Overland Campaign he became the regiment's colonel and, in the
    Shenandoah Valley, took command of the brigade at Fisher's Hill.
    In this position he fought at Cedar Creek and back near Petersburg
    at Five Forks and then Appomattox. Breveted major general for his
    war service, he was in temporary command of the corps after hostilities
    had ended and then held a command at Washington. Mustered out on
    January 15, 1866, he was state adjutant general, a tax official,
    and a state senator."
    
    			from WHO WAS WHO IN THE UNION by Stewart Sifakis
    
    I'll also check my Gettysburg sources for more info on the 1st VT Cav.
    
    Tom