Conference smurf::civil_war

IMHO, McClellan was a tremendously charismatic leader -- his men truly
adored him as their general, and there was serious concern that there
could be a mutiny over his removal.  His troops blocked the train that
was to take him away until he spoke to them, and there were calls to
march on Washington.

Before Lincoln ordered McClellan's removal, he said upon viewing the
troops form a hilltop (I don't recall the interlocutor's name):  "What
is that down there?"  The reply:  "Why, the Army of the Potomac, Sir!"
Lincoln's rejoinder:  "No, that is McClellan's bodyguard."

And that is the root of McClellan's failure.  Unfortunately, he was
afraid -- possibly for his personal survival, or possibly for his
political future (i.e., his aspirations for the Presidency) if he killed
zillions of his troops in a badly-planned or -executed battle.  In his
fear he was not alone, clearly.  So bash him if you will, but you'd also
have to bash Rosecrans and Burnside right along with him; they were both
as reticent about engaging the enemy as McClellan, and the truth is that
when McClellan *did* seriously commit to engagement, his troops did
better than those of almost every other major general.  Laugh at it if
you choose, but the withdrawal from Richmond was masterfully done.  Lee,
when asked after the war who was the best Union general, said without
hesitation, "McClellan."

-d

    
    I'm not tremendously versed in Civil War history, more in WWI.
    What was the name of the battle where if McClellan had attacked
    they say the war would have been cut much shorter?
    
    /prc

    I think it was Antietam, where he came upon a copy of Lee's orders.
    As pointed out earlier, his hesitancy cost him a decisive victory.
    Had he pursued Lee after this battle as Lincoln urged him to, and
    effectively crippled the Army of Northern Va., the war could have
    been shortened. Hindsight is perfect,however, and never underestimate
    the abilty of Lee to put fear in an opposing general.
    	In an earler campaign, he did masterfully withdraw from Richmond as
    stated. Can any of you clear something up for me. When Johnston was
    in charge of the Confederate Army in Va.and Lee was still on HQ staff.
    did McClellan's hesitancy make him miss an opportunity to crush
    Johnston and take Richmond from the south ( James and Pamunkey River
    area) ?  Was this the same campaign where he made his withdrawal from
    Richmond ? 
    
    Thanks,
    MikeL
     
    	

Andietam yes.  It was largely his refusal to pursue Lee after Antietam
that tipped the scales toward his removal.

One particularly interesting fact in mitigation of McClellan's hesitancy
is that his intelligence was being provided by Allan Pinkerton, who was
guilty of inaccurate reporting.  It was on Pinkerton's information that
McClellan based his estimate that the Confederates outnumbered him at
every point up to and including the Antietam debacle.

McClellan's army camped on the peninsula for a long time facing the
Richmond outworks, and Lee was given command of the Army of Northern
Virginia during that time.  So you could say that if McClellan had
attacked earlier and been victorious there might never have been a
Confederate army for Lee to command; it could have been all over.  Joe
Johnston was also a not-very-competent general, unlike Sidney Johnston,
who suffered the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune at the hands
of his detractors.

-d

    -d
    
    Sidney Johnston got his notoriey from the Mexican War,did he not?
    And was not he also a personal favorite of Jefferson Davis ? 
    Maybe his reputation as a great general and the worship that Davis 
    had for him actually overshadowed his actual ability. We'll never
    know as he bled to death at Shiloh.
    
    Good point about Pinkerton. Ironically, the end result of his 
    affiliation with McClellan was indirectly aiding the Rebs.
    Thanks.
    
    
    MikeL
    

    
    Sounds alot like Germany in WWI. The could of, but...
    
    Thanks for the clarification.
    
    On to more McClellan bashing...8-)

    
    Great title for a note!  One of the Civil War games I own; I believe
    it's "Antietam:  In their quiet fields", has a provision for the person
    playing the union side.  You are penalized if you manage to get 
    McClellan killed off.  There are some incompetency/indecision type
    rules built around the McClellan leader counter that drive you nuts.
    You really want to see him "offed" so you can make one of the corps
    commanders the army commander.
    
    Scott

    McClellen was a master planner but couldn't initiate the intricate
    plans he layed out. (A great candidate for DEC's NBS, huh?) From the
    time the Union was defeated at the Battle of First Bull Run until
    Lincoln replaced him after Antietam, his sluggishness and lack of
    conviction in his army's ability to fight caused the war to last much
    longer than it should have.
    
    Having said that, I will say that McClellen's forces did beat the heck
    out of the Confederates during the 7 Day's battles fought around
    Richmond in 1862. Joseph Johnston was Davis' choice for head of the
    army and, to his credit, he had done an outstanding job in setting up
    for Richmond's defense. It was Johnston's order to send Stuart on his
    famous recon ride around McClellen that spooked the Union commander to
    no end. 
    
    But, at Malvern Hill (I believe) during the 7 Days' Battle, Johnston
    was wounded and replaced with Lee by Davis. Lee, bold and brash,
    attacked McClellen's troops in several engagements. McClellen,
    figuring that only a superior sized force would attack, engineered an
    orderly retreat. In every encounter, Lee met with a vigorous foe and
    was beaten, technically, in every battle. Yet, Lee's objective was met.
    He forced McClellen to give into his fears and withdraw.
    
    Although Lee lost nearly 2-1 in lives, he won the campaign. For the
    Confederacy, this was the second successive defeat of the great Army of
    the Potomac. Spirits were buoyed no end and Europe was starting to take
    notice of the upstart nation..
    
    In hindsight, though, one must consider the thoughts of US Grant after
    Appomatox. Grant intimated that, had it not been for McClellen's
    superior organizational feats, he never would have had the foundation
    necessary to carry on his campaign in 1864-65.
    
    As far as Albert Sydney Johnston goes, he was, indeed, one of the
    South's great generals. He was an agressor who knew when to seize the
    moment unlike other incompetents like Braxton Bragg and, in my opinion,
    James Longstreet. Had Johnston survived Shiloh, I believe the campaignj
    in the west would have been much more difficult for the Union.
    
    Rich
    

    Hello Rich
    This is better than gedman bashing, right?
    
    I have my doubts about AS Johnston's abilities,twas some doubts about
    it from some quarters in the early campaigns out West. Unfortunately as
    you stated, because of Shiloh, we'll never know. JMHO
    
    I agree about Bragg. Do not consider Longstreet an incompetent, a
    steady, strategically defensive sound general. Maybe not as innovative
    as Lee or Jackson, but hardly an incompetent. Again JMHO
    
    MikeL
    

Re: 17.1

I suppose it will make this string livelier if someone takes McClellan's
side, but I can't believe someone would or could.

> the truth is that
>when McClellan *did* seriously commit to engagement, his troops did
>better than those of almost every other major general.

This is true, as he had trained them well, to the point that they believed
in themselves despite months and years of losses because of incompetent
leadership.  But McClellan's personal style at a battle was to be nearly
absent.  This was true at both the Seven Days' and Antietam.  He set the
pieces in motion, and then waited to see what would happen.  Even worse,
at Antietam he refused to send support once Burnside had finally forced a
crossing at the stone bridge.  Some fresh troops at that point (there was
an entire corps available) would have been decisive, both tactically and
strategically.

>   Lee,
when asked after the war who was the best Union general, said without
hesitation, "McClellan."

I find this hard to believe.  Where did you read this?  I would love to
see the context of this quote.  Lee knew McClellan's mind better than 
McClellan knew it.  I can't believe he had any respect for his ability as
a field commander.

Ben

    Re:  Lee's opinion of McClellan, here is the quotation, from page 757
    of Shelby Foote's first volume:
    
    	Five years after the guns had cooled and were parked in town
    	squares and on courthouse lawns...he received what was perhaps his
    	finest professional compliment, and received it from the man who
    	had occupied the best of all possible positions from which to
    	formulate a judgment.  Asked then who was the ablest Federal
    	general he had opposed throughout the war, Robert E. Lee replied
    	without hesitation, "McClellan, by all odds."

    -1, Lee's opinion of McClellan
    
    I think a key word is "ablest". Yes he had the ability, but do you
    think Lee was responding to ability rather than results. Kind of a
    tricky answer by Lee.
    
    MikeL
    

    If I were Lee, I would consider Grant the most effective general he
    faced and, perhaps, Burnside the most courageous. 
    
    Rich
    

> Note 13.18 by SMURF::CALIPH::binder 
    
> McClellan idolized Napoleon and deliberately patterned himself after
 the man.

    	I've seen a couple of pictures where he placed his hand inside
    	his coat, the same way Nappy did.
    
    	/prc

    McClellan wasn't the only one who stuck his hand inside his coat.  That
    was a common 19th-century stance, and I have photos of Generals Foster,
    Breckinridge, Rains, Kimball, Rosecrans, and others in that posture.
    
    -d

    re .8
    
    Actually, Malvern Hill was the last of the battles of the Seven Days.
    Johnston ws in charge up until the first battle (Fair Oaks?) where he
    was wounded.  At that point Lee took over command.  Nothing important,
    just thought that I'd clarify this point a little.
    
    Ziff

    re .16
    
    Right you are, Ziff. How careless of me to confuse the battle where
    Johnston was wounded.
    
    An interesting discussion which could arise from this would/could be
    conjecture on the war's progression had NOT Johnston been wounded in
    1862. Would Davis have left him in command of the Army of Northern
    Virginia? Where would Lee have ended up?
    
    Rich
    

    You're right, that would be a good one.  Personally, I believe that Lee
    would have remained a military advisor to Davis, and would remain
    disliked by the confederate soldiers.  After all the entrenching he 
    caused them to do in front of Richmond they were calling him "Granny"
    Lee (for his apparent unwillingness to leave the fortifications to
    fight) and the King of Spades.

    
    rer: .14
    
    Peter, He might have done better to emulate Wellington rather than
    Nappy... the British 'Line' defense broke the French 'Column' attack
    almost without exception.
    
    Aidan
    

    RE .16:
    
    To be entirely accurate, Seven Pines/Fair Oaks (where J.E. Johnston was
    wounded) was not part of The Seven Days at all.
    
    At the start of what is called the Penninsular Campaign (not to be
    confused with Wellington's...) in 1862, Johnston was in command of the
    Confederate Army of Virginia.  McClellan came down from Washington by
    water, and sat in front of a line of fortifications at Yorktown for
    several weeks preparing for a seige; he was being artfully bluffed by
    Magruder, the local Confederate commander, into thinking the works were
    far stronger than they were.  The day before the Union seige artillery
    was ready to flatten the defenses, the Confederates retreated.
    
    McClellan pursued slowly (bad roads had some effect here), with
    Johnston skirmishing in retreat, until there was no more room to fall
    back, and Johnston dug in outside Richmond.  McClellan spent time
    getting ready to attack these new lines.  At this point, the Union
    right was strong, while the left was weaker.  Johnston attacked the
    Union left at Seven Pines, fought a drawn battle, and was wounded.
    
    Side note: Lee got along well with Davis, Johnston did _not_. It is
    possible that Johnston would have been relieved even if he hadn't been
    wounded.
    
    As a result of Seven Pines, Little Mac brought most of his army over to
    his left, leaving his right exposed.  While McClellan was carefully
    getting his artillery in place to blast through the Confederate works,
    Lee took almost all of his Army of _Northern_ Virginia (Lee's name
    change) off to attack the exposed right, leaving the talented
    theatrical producer Magruder to convince two Union corps that they were
    under heavy attack on the left!  (He convinced McClellan, at least.) 
    The attack on the Union right was followed by six days of battle (The
    Seven Days), in which McClellan was driven back to a perimiter on the
    James River by the numerically inferior ANV.  The AoP fought well, some
    ANV staff work went badly, and Stonewall Jackson (for reasons unknown)
    turned in a rather poor performance, and so Lee narrowly missed
    shattering McClellan's army.  The last battle of the Seven Days was
    Malvern Hill, where the ANV attacked a very strong Union position in a
    frontal attack - poorly organized and supported - which was driven back
    with heavy loss.
    
    McClellan then sat, and recuperated, until the ANV marched off north to
    attack John Pope, at which point the AoP went _back_ up to the
    Washington area and Second Manassas (Bull Run).
    
    I don't know that I would call McClellan's withdrawal during the Seven
    Days "masterful".  He managed to pull back without giving Lee a major
    opening, but _Lee_ was the one who achieved his objective, which was
    getting the AoP away from Richmond.  The bottom line on the campaign is
    that a force with a _large_ superiority in numbers and equipment was
    deluded, delayed, and defeated by a smaller but more agressively
    handled opponent, assisted by some extremely faulty intelligence
    reports.
    
    Any military commander needs to master the fine dividing line between
    haste and speed; McClellan was _never_ hasty, but he lost many lives
    and prolonged the war because that meant he never moved quickly,
    either.
    
    MikeR

    Point well taken Mike.  I also remember reading that after Malvern Hill
    Mac gave a speech congratulating both himself and his men for
    succesfully completing a pre-arranged relocation of his supply base
    in the face of the enemy.  He praised it as a masterpiece in planning
    and execution.  I wonder how many actually bought it?

    
    Re: 17.1,.10,.11,.12
    
    	Ya'll peaked my interest when ya'll quoted Marse Robert about who
    was ablest of Union Generals. Well solving my own curiosity, I looked
    it up. And I quote from (without permission) "Memoirs of Robert E. Lee.
    by A.L. Long. His credentials are, "Formerly Military Secretary to Gen.
    Lee, afterward Brig.-Gen. and Chief of Artillery Second Corps, Army of
    Northern Virginia.
    
    	Pages 232-233:
    "A great diversity of opinion exists as to the military capacity of
    McClellan, and he has been both unduly praised and censured by his 
    friends and foes. That his slowness and caution were elements on which
    the opposing general might safely count must be admitted, but that he
    had a high degree of military ability cannot be denied. His skill in
    planning movements was certainly admirable, but their effect was in
    more than one instance lost by over-slowness in their execution.
    	In this connection it will be of interest to give General's Lee
    own opinion concerning McClellan's ability, as related by a relative
    of the general, who had it from her father, an old gentleman of
    eighty years:
    	"One thing I remember hearing him say. He asked General Lee which
    in his opinion was the ablest of the Union generals; to which the
    latter answered, bringing his hand down on the table with an emphatic
    energy,'McClellan, by all odds!'"
    	This opinion, however, could but have referred to his skill as a
    tactician, as it is unquestionable that Lee availed himself of
    McClellan's over-caution and essayed perilous movements which he could
    not have safely ventured in the presence of a more active opponent."
    
    Could have Marse Robert used a little sarcasm in his reply????.....
    
    I await your intellectual replies!
    
    Egad! Do I ever enjoy bashing Union General's !!!!!
    
    						The Alabama Slammer

    Slammer,
    Why IMO he rates right down there with Braxton Bragg!
    
    MikeL
    
    PS
    Sorry I haven't responded to your kind mail message earlier, suh!
    Will try to contact you next week if'n y'all are going to be around.
    Thanks.
    
    MikeL
    

           Re: .23
    I beg to differ, sah! I can't possibly conceive anyone placing 
    A.S. Johnston on the same plain as Braxton Bragg!???
    
    Although, A.S. Johnston was mortally wounded at Shiloh and we'll
    never know the full capabilities of such said great general, I do
    believe he caught old Sam Grant with his pants down? IMO he should
    have gone around the Hornet's Nest, mopping it up later, and pursued
    the demoralized Yankee's back to Pittsburg's Landing. Ah, but hindsight
    is wonderful, is it not?
    
    Now Braxton Bragg, he's another character all together. A courageous
    fighter undenied, but not to smart in overall wisdom, so to speak.
    Who else but Bragg would attack Sherman head on? Who else would offer
    to invade Tennessee, while Sherman is rampaging through Georgia?
    
    But enough about our Southern heroes! We're supposed to bashing little
    Mac!!! So I say on with the bashing!!!
    
    I await your letter, sah!
    
    					The Alabama Slammer 

.10>I suppose it will make this string livelier if someone takes McClellan's
.10>side, but I can't believe someone would or could.

	Here, sergeant!

.2>    What was the name of the battle where if McClellan had attacked
.2>    they say the war would have been cut much shorter?
    
.3>    I think it was Antietam, where he came upon a copy of Lee's orders.
.3>    As pointed out earlier, his hesitancy cost him a decisive victory.
.3>    Had he pursued Lee after this battle as Lincoln urged him to, and
.3>    effectively crippled the Army of Northern Va., the war could have

	I think that a good case can be made that Antietam was a far
	more decisive Union victory than Gettysburg. Lee was stopped
	just over the line in Maryland instead of way up in Pennsylvania,
	and it only took 1 day to turn him around instead of 3. But
	because McClellan was fired just afterward, people have a
	tendency to believe he must have failed, since you fire the
	loser not the winner.

.10>at Antietam he refused to send support once Burnside had finally forced a
.10>crossing at the stone bridge.  Some fresh troops at that point (there was
.10>an entire corps available) would have been decisive, both tactically and
.10>strategically.

18.6>  In defense of Burnside, and I'm sure that someone will correct me if
18.6>  I'm wrong, but I remember reading somewhere that he did not want com-
18.6>  mand of the AOP at all, not having faith in his ability at the level
18.6>  of army command.  
    
18.9> If memory serves, it was gfood ol' Fighting Joe Hooker who thought he
18.9> could do it better.  I believe Burnside was unsure of his ability to
18.9> assume command, and that his remarks led others to wonder how his men
18.9> could have confidence in him if he himself didn't.

	I find it amusing that Burnside got the command after McClellan,
	since I think that it was Burnside whose lack of aggressiveness
	bungled the battle. McClellan had sent him on a flanking movement
	with 10,000 troops, which would have left Lee in a very bad
	situation had it been successful, but Burnside could not cross a 
	bridge defended by only 600, or cross the river elsewhere when it 
	was only knee deep. I would not assign more troops to such a 
	general, or trust him to pursue a fleeing enemy without being 
	ambushed.

	I don't doubt that Grant would have tried to attack the retreating
	Confederates, but I am not sure how successful it would have been.
	Grant's grind-them-down tactics worked two years later when the
	Confederate States and their armies were about worn out and the
	worst Union generals had been purged, but in 1862 Lee could have
	sprung some nasty surprises on anyone whose pursuit was careless.

	You guys can't have it both ways! If Lee's army had really been
	effectively destroyed at Antietam, then it must have been a great 
	victory for McClellan; otherwise his decision not to pursue 
	rapidly is reasonable although debatable. Remember that Antietam
	featured the greatest casualties of any day of the war. Taking
	time to regroup before heading into enemy territory where your
	opponent will be adding forces at the same time yours will be
	stretching out sounds like what any military textbook would
	recommend.

	I will even go out on a limb and say that had McClellan been
	left in command in the East, the war would have ended at about
	the same time in the same way. He would have not have made the
	foolish mistakes that some of his successors were pushed into
	by Lincoln's insistence for a quick fix, but would instead have
	made a carefully-orchestrated push on Richmond every year. By
	1864, the Confederacy was so low on resources that his push
	would have been successful. Lee would have kept up the fight
	in rural Virginia until Grant's march to the sea was completed,
	then given it up as hopeless.

    RE .25:
    
    Skipping over a discussion of the Antietam campaign for a moment, could
    you enumerate the foolish mistakes that you claim some of Little Mac's
    successors were pushed into by Lincoln?  I agree entirely that Burnside
    and Hooker made some world-class blunders, but they were tactical
    mistakes, not strategic ones - and tactical mistakes which other
    generals present at the same time with the same information thought
    _were_ mistakes.
    
    MikeR
     

    Further Re: .25
    
    Little Mac would not have made carefully-orchestrated pushes on
    Richmond each year unless driven to it by constant bullying from
    behind.  He was IMHO categorically afraid to fight because, as you
    point out, he was unsure of himself at that level of command.  He would
    have orchestrated his campaigns to death rather than launching them; he
    would constantly have been asking for yet more men and materiel.  I
    believe the war would have dragged on for a decade or longer as he
    worked himself up to a fever pitch and then chickened out again and
    again.
    
    -dick

    Not being a scholar on a par with most others in this file, I hesitate
    to enter comments but in this case I shall risk it.
    
    Several things about McClellan bother me and as a result I'm not
    surprised that his performance was uneven at best.
    
    - he was very young and inexperienced
    - prior to the war he was a captain which aside from a time watching
      the Brits and French in the Crimea, didn't offer a lot of seasoning.
    - he was set to accept a commission from the Governor of PA (I think)
      but having stopped in Ohio decided to accept one from that Governor. 
      That didn't demonstrate a lot of loyalty or steadfastness.
    - the AOP intelligence estimates of the strength of the ANV were fairly
      accurate but he chose to accept the inflated figures offered by
      Pinkerton.  I can't believe a General, any General, would not have been
      skeptical and searched out additional information.
    - great planner but so are a lot of clerks.  Clerks do not necessarily
      make good generals.
    - he seemed to make decisions based on personal feelings.  Gen. Meade
      used daily Councils of War to get the impressions of his Corps
      commanders and make necessary shifts in positioning and strategy.
    
    The guy "won" one minor engagement with rebel forces in the mountains
    of western VA prior to taking command.  Hardly a 'history' of success. 
    Its not surprising that he wasn't what was needed.
    
    IMHO,
    
    
    Marv
    

.26>RE .25:
    
.26>Skipping over a discussion of the Antietam campaign for a moment, could
.26>you enumerate the foolish mistakes that you claim some of Little Mac's
.26>successors were pushed into by Lincoln?  I agree entirely that Burnside

	I am not talking about micro-managing the war, but just a feeling
	that if McClellan was dismissed after his great victory because he
	wouldn't attack soon enough, then the pressure was on you to attack
	quickly or the same might happen to you.

	An alternative explanation, which I never heard before, is given
	in "Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries and Letters of
	John Hay". (Hay was private secretary and emissary for Lincoln
	and later held several diplomatic posts.)

	In the diary entry for Sept. 25, 1864, Hay says that
	Lincoln told him that McClellan was dismissed because Lincoln
	thought he might be a traitor who was deliberately trying not
	to hurt the Confederates. Anyone else ever hear this?
    
	Am I forgetting something, or did Meade _never_ conduct a major
	offensive battle, and the Army of the Potomac sit for 10 months
	after Gettysburg, or well after Grant's arrival? Lincoln fired
	a number of generals after obvious losses, but who besides
	McClellan for not winning big enough?

.27>Further Re: .25
    
.27>Little Mac would not have made carefully-orchestrated pushes on
.27>Richmond each year unless driven to it by constant bullying from
.27>behind.  He was IMHO categorically afraid to fight because, as you
.27>point out, he was unsure of himself at that level of command.  He would

	Actually it was someone elses comment about Burnside you are
	quoting, and I think McClellan thought himself fully capable
	of the supreme command he held briefly, but just thought it wise
	not to attack until he had a greater advantage.

	In Hay's entry of May 22, 1864, he has told Lincoln that Gen.
	Butler is "the only man in the Army to whom power would be    
	dangerous. McClellan was too timid and vacillating to usurp.
	Grant was too sound and cool headed & too unselfish; Banks also.
	Fre'mont would be dangerous if he had more ability & energy."
	Lincoln apparently did not disagree.

	Hay called McC "little Napoleon" [when someone starts the
	NAPOLEONIC_WARS notes I will ask why generals always seem to
	try to emulate Napoleon instead of Wellington], but that may be
	because Bernard Montgomery wasn't born yet. I think the two had
	the same cautious attitude, but Monty was lucky to have an
	enemy who was getting weaker and a leader who didn't try to
	replace him with someone more aggressive. 

.27>have orchestrated his campaigns to death rather than launching them; he
.27>would constantly have been asking for yet more men and materiel.  I
.27>believe the war would have dragged on for a decade or longer as he

	I disagree. McClellan did in fact conduct his Peninsular campaign
	even though many of his potential troops were held back to protect
	Washington. I think that he would have attacked periodically,
	and eventually would have licked Lee due to sheer numbers.

.28> - he was very young and inexperienced
.28>- prior to the war he was a captain which aside from a time watching
.28>  the Brits and French in the Crimea, didn't offer a lot of seasoning.

.28>The guy "won" one minor engagement with rebel forces in the mountains
.28>of western VA prior to taking command.  Hardly a 'history' of success. 
.28>Its not surprising that he wasn't what was needed.
    
	At the beginning of the war, that's more than most generals!
    
.28>- the AOP intelligence estimates of the strength of the ANV were fairly
.28>  accurate but he chose to accept the inflated figures offered by
.28>  Pinkerton.  I can't believe a General, any General, would not have been
.28>  skeptical and searched out additional information.

	The cautious will accept the highest number. Lt. Col. Custer
	picked the lowest.

.28>- great planner but so are a lot of clerks.  Clerks do not necessarily
.28>  make good generals.

	I think that McClellan's best role would have been as #2 -
	responsible for training, logistics, etc. but with someone else
	to actually make the decision to attack right now.

.28>- he seemed to make decisions based on personal feelings.  Gen. Meade
.28>  used daily Councils of War to get the impressions of his Corps
.28>  commanders and make necessary shifts in positioning and strategy.

	Do you consider this a good idea? I thought it showed that Meade
	was even more indecisive than McC, and I thought that supposedly
	Gettysburg was run by one of the political generals who was able
	to talk the fastest (what do you expect from a politician?) at
	the councils.
	    

    Just one more comment about Councils of War.  Jackson only ever held
    but one: the night before the Battle of Kernstown, which he ended up
    losing due to one of his junior officer's taking too many liberties
    with his command due to what was discussed at that Council.  An
    enraged Jackson vowed to never again hold another one, and he stuck
    to this.  When Lee questioned him about this at one point with a bit
    of concern, Jackson quoted Wellington; saying something to the effect
    of: "If I thought my hair knew what I was thinking I would cut it off".
    Nothing really pertitnent, and it doesn't really belong here, but I
    thought it might be interesting.
    
    Ziff

    Re: .1

    I do not believe McC was afraid of his own personal survival, but 
    for some time prior to the WBTS, he had been a railroad boss, which
    is hardly a valid training ground for a commanding general. His
    greatest disadvantage seems to have been his charisma, which made his 
    men adore him. Everytime he rode out, his troops would raise lusty 
    cheers for Little Mac. The men put their faith in him and he appears 
    to have felt too close an affinity with the soldiers. From Bruce
    Catton's excellent works, where he quotes from McClellan's letters
    to his wife, it is clear that he felt an undue obligation to his
    men. The result was that McClellan always tried to fight to minimise
    casualties. How strange then that the highest casulauty list of the
    war for a single day should have occured under McC and Lee at the 
    battle of Sharpsburg/Antietam!

    As an interesting side-note, the AoP soldiers admired Grant, but 
    they did not like him. (I think this is from one of Catton's books 
    but I don't remember the source). This is the sort of relationship
    necessary for a general - he has to distance himself from his troops.


    Re: .20

    After Stuart's ride from the AoP, McC recognised that his base on
    the York was insecure and began to shift to the James river. It 
    was this shift which (in part) exposed the right flank of the 
    AoP.  The difference in numbers is considerably CLOSER than most
    people realise. On paper, the Union had around 150,000 soldiers,
    but this included those on furlough, guard duty, ill etc. Given 
    that McC was operating in HOSTILE territory, his EFFECTIVE 
    numbers were between 90,000 and 115,000. Lee on the other hand had 
    between 85,000 and 95,000. This is not a _large_ superiority.

    If you compare the numbers engaged, the CSA had MORE troops in 
    battle than the Union. This is a clear indication of Lee's 
    superior skill, but when you consider that Grant with a 2-1
    superiority during the Wilderness, Bloody Angle and Spotsylvannia
    battles couldn't manage to get local superiority against Lee either, 
    doesn't this just prove that Bobby Lee was the best on either side? 


    Re: .24

    Sidney Johnston does not come out of Shiloh with much credit. 
    Strategically, he caught the Grant and Sherman napping, but
    so did BRAXTON BRAGG catch Rosencrans and Thomas (my vote for
    the most underrated general of the war - did being a Virginian
    keep him out of higher comand?) napping at Chickamauga. Johnston's
    error was in using Corps waves - see diagram:


	Johnston's aproach:


	    ------- ------- -------    I Corps
             1 Div   2 Div   3 Div

	    ------- ------- -------    II Corps
             1 Div   2 Div   3 Div

	    ------- ------- -------    III Corps
             1 Div   2 Div   3 Div

	Alternative:

	    ------- ------- -------    
             1 Div   1 Div   1 Div

	    ------- ------- -------    
             2 Div   2 Div   2 Div

	    ------- ------- -------    
             3 Div   3 Div   3 Div

	    I Corps II Corp III Cor

    The advantage of the alternative approach is that the reserves are under
    the same commander as the first wave, and the command lines are reduced.

    Instead, the CSA communications broke down and they were unable to capitalise
    on the gains made - the result was that Buell arrived during the night and
    in the morning, the Union counterattacked and won the battle of Shiloh or
    Pittsburg Landing.

    RE .31:
    
    There isn't conclusive evidence historically for a correlation between
    how much troops like a general (or how much he cares about them) and
    how good the general is.  I'm not sure what you meant by "distance" on
    the part of a general, but from the context of your remark about the
    AoP's feeling towards Grant, I assume you mean that this "distance"
    means the soldiers should not "like" their general, as the AoP "liked"
    McClellan.
    
    Wellington, arguably one of the most successful generals around, was
    never seen to speak to or notice a private soldier; however, he did
    insist on good administration, which meant that his soldiers were
    reasonably well-equipped and well fed.  Bradley in WWII was definitely
    liked by his troops (he was called "the soldiers' general"), and did
    not "distance" himself from them, and yet he was highly successful.  In
    the ACW, John Sedgewick was well-liked by his corps, and that was no
    handicap to his performance in battle.
    
    McClellan's problem was more complex than a simple over-identification
    with his troops.  I think the clearest instance of what was wrong with
    his generalship is in the Antietam campaign with the finding of the
    "lost order".  Very seldom in history has a commander been handed his
    opponents battle plan, and McClellan had the added advantage of proof
    of its authenticity - he had no fear that it was a hoax.  And yet, with
    his own estimation that the order would enable him to beat Lee (and the
    unknown fact that Lee's army was actually _more_ scattered than the
    order said it should be at that point), McClellan wasted several hours
    by not starting his troops towards South Mountain until morning - when
    a night march would have caught the ANV in an impossible situation.
    
    It is this lack of agressiveness, of urgency, that ruined every one of
    McClellan's campaigns.  (Incidentally, it also led to a lot of grief
    for the AoP long after he was gone, because later commanders had great
    trouble getting the army to respond quickly to _anything_.)  The line
    between rashness and timidity is difficult to walk, and of course it is
    always easier to see mistakes by hindsight, but McClellan was never
    even _close_ to being rash - and that was absolutely fatal when faced
    by an opponent like Lee.
    
    MikeR

    RE .31:
    
    Are you sure your numbers for the Seven Days are apples-to-apples?  The
    ANV strength numbers seem high, if you are just trying to count
    "present for duty, equipped" troops in both armies.  What was your
    source?
    
    True, Lee got local superiority on the Union right at the start of the
    battle, but he did so by leaving his left almost bare - relying on the
    theatrical ability of Magruder and McClellan's caution to keep the AoP
    from punching through to Richmond.  Remember, too, that the AoP was
    _defending_ throughout the Seven Days, and it takes fewer troops to
    defend than it does to attack (in an even fight, the odds slightly
    favor the defense), so that tends to make it even more remarkable that
    the weaker army drove back the stronger.
    
    As to Grant, he had similar detachment, guard, etc. drains on numbers
    (as did Lee).  And he _did_ get "local superiority" at Bloody Angle -
    that was part of the problem!  There were too many Union troops on too
    small a front for effective deployment, and the attack bogged down.  In
    general, the Wilderness was not a place where numerical superiority
    meant much - unless you could pull off a brilliant flanking action like
    Jackson's at Chancellorsville.  It was hard enough to _see_ the
    opposing line of battle, and in a head-on ACW fight it was hard to make
    weight of numbers matter in such terrain - men can only stand so close
    together, and reserves don't do too much good if you can't figure out
    where to put them.
    
    (Remember that at Chickamauga, the Confederates accidentally hit a gap
    in the Union line that was hidden by wooded terrain, and nearly won the
    battle.  Grant had little room to manuever tactically in the
    Wilderness, and it would have been luck as much as generalship to hit a
    weak spot in Lee's lines.)
    
    It is true that up through Cold Harbor Grant did not display strategic
    brilliance - but his _objective_ was to pin the ANV down and wear it
    out while other armies took key objectives.  When that strategy failed
    (because of some less-than-able commanders), Grant made a masterful
    move across the James towards Petersburg and got a definite "local
    superiority" that was wasted by the front-line generals.
    
    MikeR

    
    I haven't seen anybody mention McC's relationship with Lincoln as a
    contributing factor to McC's dismissal.
    
    I believe they originally were quite friendly.  McC got a big head
    thinking how the entire Union rested on his shoulders and that he could
    become dictator had he wanted (think I remember that from Foote's
    book).  Anyway, McC took a condescending attitude towards Lincoln. 
    Eventually, Lincoln was kept waiting for several hours to see McC (yup,
    the president went to see McC) and was finally told that McC had
    retired (McC didn't even acknowledge the pres).  Lincoln never again
    attempted dealings in a friendly atmosphere.  McC also didn't last much
    longer.
    
    Otto

    RE .34:
    
    	Actually, McClellan's relationship with Lincoln had no direct
    bearing on his dismissal.  Lincoln even said he would hold the
    general's horse, if that would help McClellan win!  McC was finally
    fired because he couldn't beat the ANV; the immediate cause, after
    Antietam, was allowing Lee to get between him and Richmond after some
    maneuvering in northern Virginia.  Lincoln had said if that happened,
    he would remove him.
    
    	In fact, Washington was very cautious.  The officer sent with the
    order was told to first see Burnside, and get his acceptance of command
    of the AoP.  If Burnside refused, the officer was to return without
    seeing McClellan!
    
    	The bad relationship indirectly caused trouble because McC could
    not understand the message Lincoln kept trying to send him about the
    need for prompt action, and victory.  McC just tuned Lincoln out, and
    possibly never did understand that he was fired for not winning.
    
    MikeR
    

    RE:34,35 et al
    
    My 2 cents,
    	We need to also factor in here the political side of things.
    Remember now that Mac was courting the Democrats (and suceeding
    in that courtship) to be their Presidential Candidate in 1864 as
    a Peace Candidate. Here was Lincoln with his top General planning
    on knocking him off at the polls and in control of a vast army of
    soldiers who loved him and could very well have swung the election 
    with a furious letter writing campaign to all their relatives
    (voters) back home.  It was kind of like if Nixon had been stuck 
    with McGovern in charge in Vietnam. Lincoln's decision was probably
    IMHO more POLITICAL than War related.
    
    MRO1 Bill Manter

    Re .36
    
    I doubt it was politics.  As has been pointed out, Lincoln said he'd
    even hold McClellan,s horse if that would help beat the Confederacy. 
    Lincoln and his Administration believed, and IMHO rightly so, that an
    AoP properly generaled could defeat the Confederacy before the 1864
    elections rolled around; thus, he was more interested in seeing some
    action than in protecting his backside.
    
    -dick

    RE .36:
    
    	McClellan was removed in late 1862 - the '64 presidential race was
    still on the distant horizon.  Further, the best _political_ place for
    a popular general was in the army, where he could _not_ be a candidate. 
    The biggest worry - documented by letters, etc. - about removing McC
    was whether or not the AoP would refuse to _let_ him be relieved.  Note
    that Ben Butler, an important "War Democrat" with excellent political
    connections, was kept in the army until _after_ the '64 elections
    despite having no noticeable military talent _precisely_ because of
    "political reasons".
    
    	From a political point of view, removing McC made little sense, and
    was even potentially dangerous.  He had become, however, too great a
    risk from a _military_ point of view; he could not win even with
    everything in his favor.
    
    	It is also worth remembering that the AoP went solidly for Lincoln
    in '64.  McClellan still had the affection of the veterans, but some of
    the more articulate wrote that if Grant had commanded the AoP in '62,
    the war would have been won, while if McC had commanded in '64, the
    Confederacy would have won.
    
    MikeR
    

    
.38>    From a political point of view, removing McC made little sense, and
   > was even potentially dangerous.  He had become, however, too great a
   > risk from a _military_ point of view; he could not win even with
   > everything in his favor.
    
        Don't you call Antietam a victory ?  Note that after Gettysburg
        which he mostly just let happen, Meade never attacked Lee but just
        sat and waited for months until finally superseded by Grant, yet
        Gettysburg is seen as a great victory and a turning point of the
        war. Antietam could have been the crux if followed by victories.
        What McClellan really needed was to be replaced by Grant in '63,
        then historians might have said that Mac was the real winner and
        Grant just followed it up.

.38>    It is also worth remembering that the AoP went solidly for Lincoln
   > in '64.  McClellan still had the affection of the veterans, but some of
   > the more articulate wrote that if Grant had commanded the AoP in '62,
   > the war would have been won,...
  
        Wasn't it :-)  Oh, you mean in '62. Perhaps, although that early
        in the war the North's greater resources hadn't really come into play.
        Even if Grant's 1862 Peninsular Campaign had resulted in the capture 
        of Richmond, most of the Confederacy was still intact and the
        government would probably have relocated to Columbia or Montgomery
        rather than surrender. It would probably have taken at least 
        another year (maybe till early '64) to gain control of enough key
        territory to make the Confederacy give up.

.38> ... while if McC had commanded in '64, the Confederacy would have won.

        Highly doubtful. (This doesn't indicate whether he is assumed to
        have bumbled through '63 or have been called back, but it is
        doubtful that he would have done worse than Burnside, Hooker, et al.)
        By '64, the South was worn out and could not have decisively
        defeated the Army of the Potomac, particularly with cautious
        McClellan in charge. Of course, he might have hemmed and hawed for
        a year until Sherman captured Richmond from the rear :-)

        In short, while McClellan wasn't the military genius that he thought
        he was, he had average talent and probably would have won by sheer
        force of numbers if given enough time. [Rathole alert: I liken him
        to Montgomery in WW II, who was fortunate to assume top command
        only after Germany was becoming overextended.]

    RE .39:
    
    Average?  Might depend on what population you use... ;^)  McClellan had
    some significant strengths - as in organizing - and some significant
    weaknesses, the most serious being an inappropriate level of caution. 
    Almost _any_ general can win if he is allowed do do things exactly as
    he wants, with no tiresome interference from the enemy.  The thing
    Little Mac could _never_ do was make the other side follow his lead; he
    always ended up following _theirs_.
    
    I would even put Antietam in this category.  It was a "victory" only in
    a narrow strategic sense - Lee went away.  It was good enough, barely,
    to let Lincoln issue the Emancipation Proclamation, since the AoP had
    at least not _lost_ the battle.  However, McClellan had it in his power
    to largely (and maybe totally) destroy the ANV by virtue of finding
    Lee's lost order.  McClellan frittered it away - he started too slowly,
    failed to press hard after he broke through the screen of South
    Mountain, waited a whole day at Sharpsburg to let more of the ANV get
    there, and then allowed his corps commanders to make a series of
    uncoordinated attacks, fought the ANV to exhaustion, and held back an
    entire fresh corps which even at the end of the battle could have
    smashed Lee.  From a purely military perspective, Antietam (or
    Sharpsburg, if one prefers ;^} ) was a tactical draw.  As commanders of
    the AoP went, McClellan probably _was_ average, but that ain't saying
    much.
    
    Concerning 1862, you might be right about the Confederate gov't moving
    South when Grant captured Richmond.  It might have taken another year
    to end the war - "what if" is always a tricky game.  However, a couple
    of points seem significant to me.  First, the CSA could not afford to
    lose Richmond in 1862 because of the Tredegar Iron Works - the one
    factory in the South equipped to cast cannon.  Second, the loss of
    Richmond would have had an immense morale impact, in the South, in the
    North, and in England.  The South might well have been willing to make
    peace in mid-1862 just to keep slavery intact.
    
    Your idea about comparing Little Mac and Monty is highly intriguing!  I
    can see there might be many points of similarity - but that's for a
    different note.
    
    MikeR
    

	Speculating on Grant taking Richmond at the conclusion of a 
	Pennisular-type campaign;  I agree that he would have taken 
	Richmond AGAINST Johnston but not against Lee.  Grant *never*
	proved the equal to Lee in strategic nor tactical manouvers.  
	
	Given that Grant could've taken Richmond in late '62 I would think
	that an option that was not open to the Confederacy in '65 would
	be taken up and would've perhaps led to a much more prolonged war
	with even a GREATER chance of the Confederacy gaining some measure
	of independance.  That option was Guerrilla (spi) warfare.  By late
	1864 early 1865 the Confederacy was not able to sustain any kind of
	war at all !  Lee recognized this at the conclusion of the Peters-
	burg/Richmond Campaign.

	Chuck

    
    	In defense of Little Mac, I don't think anyone other than he could
    have engineered the massive and unprescidented combined Naval and Army
    movements that was the Pennisula Campaign.  The constantly lengthening
    lines of communication and supply lines frittered away Macs troop 
    strength as more and more units were needed to be detached to protect
    and occupy towns, crossings, fords along the way. Roadbuilding and the
    constant need to keep them in repair against mud sucked off his vast
    numerical advantage. Being a cautious engineer, Mac felt overextended
    within the sights of Richmond's steeples!  The perfect combination 
    would have been Grant at Mac's side as his Stonewall Jackson.  Mac 
    got them there, but Grant's resolve could have won by his nerve to
    send troops out on do or die maneuvers as when he took his army into
    the swamps across from Vicksburg to flank the defending Confederates
    and encircle and beseige the city.  
    	In 1862, I think the South would have definitely carried on the
    fight, but the symbolic loss of Richmond would not have been nearly
    as bad as the tactical loss of the Tredegor Iron Works, the only
    major casting foundry in the Confederacy that was capable of producing
    artillery to resupply the army's losses in quantity.
    	Just as Mac's troops were bogged down in guarding lines of supply
    on the Pennisula, as an army of "occupation", the AOP would have been
    vastly drained of troops billeted to occupy Richmond and Petersburg
    and trying to simutaneously keep the fragile and easily raided rail
    links to Washington intact and operating.
        It is an interesting speculation. Texas and Arkansas cut off with
    the severing of the Mississippi.  Most of Virginia occupied and under
    Marshall Law. It would have probably settled into a lot more raiding
    and skirmishing with Bobbie Lee sent to defend Atlanta against Sherman.
    Lee, with lots of intact ANV units could have probably held Sherman
    in Tennessee.
    BillM

    RE .41:
    
    	I don't know that you can say Grant never proved to be Lee's equal
    in strategic or tactical maneuvers.  A hard-to-compare example is the
    Vicksburg campaign, which was excellent on both strategic and tactical
    levels - but was it "as good as" Second Manassas, or Chancellorsville? 
    Hard to say.
    
    	The easy one, though, happened in 1864.  After Cold Harbor, Grant
    marched the AOP away from Lee, crossed the James, and was closing in on
    Petersburg before Lee knew where he was headed.  If it had not been for
    the total ineptitude of the leading commanders, the AOP would have
    taken Petersburg, which would almost certainly have forced Lee's
    retreat from Richmond.  There is no doubt in this case that Grant
    out-foxed Lee, and the move itself was a brilliant piece of strategy.
    
    MikeR
    

    Antietam was not a Union victory.  At best, it was a draw.  In the long
    run, IMHO, it served no military value whatsoever.

    
    	errrr, turning Lee's ANV so that he couldn't invade Maryland
    and bring waivering Dems onto the Copperheads side, wasn't a victory?
    Sure, troop loss wise, it was a draw, but the Union could afford to
    lose 2 to 1 with men and guns. If the Army Of the Potomac had been
    routed, Lee could have beseiged Washington while J.E.B. Stuart
    could have ridden into Baltimore to give newspaper interviews!
    Or did I miss something about that potential river crossing?   BillM

.42>    In 1862, I think the South would have definitely carried on the
   > fight, but the symbolic loss of Richmond would not have been nearly
   > as bad as the tactical loss of the Tredegor Iron Works, the only
   > major casting foundry in the Confederacy that was capable of producing
   > artillery to resupply the army's losses in quantity.
    
      A shortage of cannon would have made Confederate troops less effective,
      but it would have also made them more mobile, and unlikely to be
      trapped by Union troops.

      Presumably, the skilled craftsmen would have escaped, and been able
      to set up shop elsewhere. I don't know enough about cannon making to
      know whether key equipment could have been evacuated by rail. (Of
      course, by the time Petersburg was actually captured, there was
      nowhere to move it to.)

.42> It is an interesting speculation. Texas and Arkansas cut off with
   > the severing of the Mississippi.  Most of Virginia occupied and under
   > Marshall Law. It would have probably settled into a lot more raiding
   > and skirmishing with Bobbie Lee sent to defend Atlanta against Sherman.

      Remember that Vicksburg wasn't captured until July 1863, and without
      Grant to march around it might have held out much longer. Also
      remember that the original C.S.A. didn't include Virginia, presumably
      the other states were prepared to survive without. Since most of the
      C.S.A. was still in Confederate hands, I have little doubt that they
      would have fought on.

      Suppose that after First Bull Run, Confederate troops had chased the
      routed Union forces, and the Washington garrison had fled in panic,
      leading to a Confederate capture of Washington. Does anybody think
      that this would have caused Lincoln to give up, any more than we
      surrendered to the British when Washington was captured in the
      War of 1812?

.44>Antietam was not a Union victory.  At best, it was a draw.  In the long
   >run, IMHO, it served no military value whatsoever.

      By your logic, the same is true of Gettysburg. Agreed?

    
    	-1.	Comparing Antietam to Gettysburg is like comparing 
    	Volkswagons to Mercedez.  They have a few things alike but
    	they're not in the same class.
    		Antietam saw a vastly larger union army just barely
    	cause Lee's ANV to veer south and abandon the immediate 
    	attempt to outflank the AoP and drive for Washington in the
    	fairly neutral area of central Maryland.  Even with Lee's
    	entire plans in Mac's hands he failed to destroy Lee when
    	the ANV was spread out  from Harper's Ferry all the way up 
    	past vulnerable mt gaps.  Casualty wise, the battle, the
    	single most bloody day for America's butcher's bill, left
    	both army's in disarray, but with several of Mac's Corps
    	that had fought in the Wheatfield, virtually decimated to
    	the point that they couldn't have persued if ordered to.
    		Gettysburg, saw an already invading army with a
    	cavalry corps that was threatening the Penn capitol and
    	sending panic throughout Penn all the way to Philly get
    	stopped cold by a union army that fell into aggresive
    	battle while both armies were still dispersed rather than
    	lay back along a good defensive position in N. Maryland
    	and serve as a blocking defense for Washington, D.C.  At
    	the end of the 3rd day, the north held the field, Pickett's
    	entire corp was virtually decimated and left with no
    	effective chain of command down to the ranks.  Lee's army
    	had to flee for its life so as not to lose its entire baggage
    	train and artillery units in a dicey crossing of the Potomac.
    	Northern panic turned to Yankee pride in 3 days and only the
    	horrific toll of casualties, the exhaustion of 3 days of forced
    	marching and fighting in July heat and Meade's general caution
    	and penchant to command by "consensus" kept Lee's ANV from 
    	getting trapped in a pocket north of the Potomac. 
    		Antietam proved that Bobbie Lee wasn't invincible.
        Gettysburg, proved that that the AoP had the mettle to hold
    	the enemy, repel his flanking, frontal, and even his cavalry
    	sweeps and demonstrated that it could converge quickly, had
    	able officers with the flexibility of orders to use troops
    	creatively (Buford), could willingly sacrifice troops to
    	delay the enemy from seizing good ground (Hancock?).   BillM