Conference noted::sf

Strategic Defensive Initiative is not a protection scheme which might be 75
percent effective, or 100 percent, or zero percent.  It is a research project.


				-- edp

     I had never heard of SDI (by that name) before I read the article in the
'Science Fiction Chronicle' (I guess I should watch the nightly news every
now and then). The article indicated that SDI & the "STAR WARS" system were the
same thing. The quote from A. C. Clarke (which is exactly as it was printed in
the article) also indicated to me that they were the same things. 
     So as not to confuse the issue, the questions on should we, acceptable
affectivness and what methods are refering to a "STAR WARS" defense system.
                                                
                                                  KEN COBB

Re .2:

"Star Wars" is another name for Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).  If Arthur
C. Clarke says there is no way to protect a country with SDI, I must agree --
certainly waving the designs and theories at incoming missiles will not do much
good.

However, the fact that research will not stop missiles is obviously no reason
to abandon research.  What Clarke should say is that the research will not
produce a design for a system that is capable of effectively defending a
country.  However, this statement is insupportable -- how recently would it
have been impossible for research to produce today's computers, vehicles
capable of traveling to the moon, methods for transmitting motion pictures
around the planet in seconds, techniques for taking three-dimensional pictures,
and similar wonders? 

As for what effectiveness is acceptable in a defense system, such a system must
be very nearly one hundred percent effective.  It must be effective enough to
stop all but a very few attacks and be capable of being improved at much less
cost than an opposing force growing in size and capability. 


				-- edp 

I have to agree with Eric that there will be NO impenetrable defense 
system.  At least not so long as this country maintains reasonably open 
borders.  Any of the "Nuclear Club" countries (or those that are at that 
level but haven't officially joined by testing) could place one or more 
nuclear devices in every US city with a population of 100,000 or greater 
and several within a mile or two of every major US military base without 
much fear of detection.  It would take a couple of years of production 
output plus six to twelve months to smuggle them in and place them.  
Once in place, they could be exploded by timing devices simultaneously.  
The aggressor then would only have to defend against that portion of the 
air defense that was aloft and the SLBMs.  I would assume that a few 
land-based silos would be able to resond as well.  Of course, we'd 
(those of us left that is) would still be trying to figure out who the 
aggressor was.

Another form of the MAD strategy of defense through offensive deterrence 
would entail the elimination of ICBMs and other delivery systems.  
Simply place the entire stockpile of warheads (many times overkill, 
supposedly) in one location (separated by enough distance so that all 
could be detonated without mutual interference), surround with 
sufficient quantities of elements that will vaporize with deadly 
isotopes (Cobalt would do for starters) and then spend all our defense 
dollars on early warning systems.  This strategy of course assumes that 
you have no intention of fighting a "limited" nuclear war.  I for one 
don't believe such a thing is possible (socialogically, not 
technologically).

"Star Wars" is indeed a research project.  I don't think it will ever 
defend us against an attack, but I don't think it would ever provoke one 
either.  It may even prevent one by raising the foe's uncertainty factor 
high enough to prevent him from pushing the button.  If the government 
is going to spend big bucks on defense, I say let 'em spend it where 
we'll get good technological spinoffs.

	 [} Mike {] 

Star Wars is the hottest issue in arms control these days.  Reagan wants
to spend $26 billion dollars over the next five years on just research for
it.  He's trying to convince the Europeans to buy in, and convince the Russians
that it should not be an issue in the present talks in Geneva.  There was
a cover story on it in Newsweek a couple of months ago, and all the science
magazines have articles on it frequently.  The scientific community is generally
skeptical of the idea.  I have my own opinions on the topic, but it's not
really a subject for an SF notes file.
/jlr

I agree this isn't really SF, but...

See yesterday's VNS edition for a copy of David Parnas's open letter on
why he believes the computing side of SDI cannot be made to work.
(Yesterday was 31 July 1985).

Re Arthur C. Clarke on the SDI, I find it ironic to hear him say it's
impossible.   Wasn't it Clarke who said something to the effect of "any
time an older scientist (eminence grise, if you'll pardon my French) says
something's impossible, he's almost certainly wrong"?

len.

The research behind SDI has been going on for many years.  I think Reagan
made a great blunder by calling attention to it and putting it all under
the SDI umbrella.  This give opponents an easy target and worse, lets it
be placed on the arms control agenda.

We should go ahead with research, but SDI is not really a research project.
It is a feasibility study and the most telling argument against it is this:

The man who can project lead a $26 billion feasibility study, and at the end
of it report that the idea is not feasible, has not yet been born.

JP

Re .6:

What is VNS?

Re .7:

> The man who can project lead a $26 billion feasibility study, and at the end
> of it report that the idea is not feasible, has not yet been born.

This is appealing but untrue.  Even if the project is led by one person, what
is that person going to do if subordinates report the various ideas are
infeasible?  Even if the researchers are ordered to keep working until they
arrive at something the leader is willing to accept, what will happen when that
(supposedly infeasible) result is given to the country?  People will attack it.
If it is not shown to be feasible (and we are not about to implement any
scheme without significant testing), it is unlikely to be accepted. 


				-- edp

Re: .8

VNS is the VOGON News Service.  You can subscribe by sending mail to
MAGIC::VNS or access it through VTX with:

$ DEFINE/USER VTX$SERVER FERRET::"""43="""
$ R SYS$SYSTEM:VTXPAD


>If it is not shown to be feasible (and we are not about to implement any
>scheme without significant testing), it is unlikely to be accepted. 

I wish you were right but I can think of four counterexamples off the
top of my head.  They are the Maverick air-to-ground missile, the Sgt.
York DIVAD division air defense system, the FB111 (which began life
as a tactical fighter for both the Air Force and Navy but ended up as
a B-52 replacement -- sort of), and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle.

JP

Surely it would not be impossible to develop such a system, but certainly
it would be unwise, unsound, foolish, prodigal,...

There would be profound technological spin-off, but a lunar-base or a
Mars-base certainly would have precisely the same effects:  we must not
justify scientific efforts by counting on beneficial/accidental side
effects.

As much as I abhor MADD, it is somewhat self-limiting (once we get to
a midget-man in everyone's backyard) and that is a plus.  If SDI were
in place, and we franchised it to the USSR (as promised), wouldn't we
then have to go to 1+n midget-men/backyard.  In this respect, SDI is
mainly a way to spend a whole lot of money on defense.

In the meantime, we would be conducting a serious form of technological
and economic warfare with the USSR, as they will presumably be struggling
to counter SDI with more SOI stuff.  

One reason we used "the bomb" was that we spent sooooo much money on it,
we had to find out if it would really work.

Very, very unwise to implement this program.  TECHNOPORN, indeed!

Re:.9 

	John, add the $90 Billion AEGIS program to your list.

Mark

Re .10:

> Surely it would not be impossible to develop such a system, but certainly
> it would be unwise, unsound, foolish, prodigal,...

It might be unwise to implement an inefficient system, but not a system with
the characteristics I described previously.

> As much as I abhor MADD, it is somewhat self-limiting (once we get to
> a midget-man in everyone's backyard) and that is a plus.

Saying MAD is self-limiting is similar to saying the slope of a hyperbola
is limited.  You are looking at the wrong thing.  Measuring the number of
missiles is not the way to evaluate MAD -- how many people will it kill?
Wiping out the human race has a value of negative infinity, as far as I am
concerned.

Re .6:

> See yesterday's VNS edition for a copy of David Parnas's open letter on
> why he believes the computing side of SDI cannot be made to work.

To be precise, Parnas expresses the opinion the necessary software cannot be
developed the way the military develops things.  He seems very particular in
saying this; he may think it would be possible for somebody else to develop the
needed software.


				-- edp

By the way, this is a science fiction notes files; could we stick to technical
issues, such as whether or not various aspects of defense are possible, whether
they will work, and so on?  If nobody else enters something about other topics,
such as psychology, I won't either.


				-- edp

An sf notes file should not be discussing engineering feasibility anyhow;
we ought to be talking about what it would REALLY take to have a good defense
against nuclear weapons.  All that anyone talks about these days are lasers
and particle beams, and to us sf fans that's fairly old hat.  Sure, if you
spend enough money you can put up a super orbital fortress that'll probably be
able to get some missiles as they go by.  But that won't do anything for
cruise missiles or Libyans with suitcase bombs.  

Now in the stories I've read, there are two forms of true defense: force
fields and fission-defusers.  Fission-defusers work by somehow changing
the intra-nucleus forces so that fission can no longer occur.  This sounds
pretty traumatic, but it might not be a big deal.  After all, fission plays
no part in any natural process except perhaps to heat the core of the earth.
If we could somehow turn off fission, no one would miss it except the
nuclear power plant operators.  Of course, fusion better not be affected,
or else we'll freeze in the dark.

Theoretical physicists are closing in a theory that unites electromagnetism
and the strong and weak nuclear forces.  EM and the weak force are already
fairly well tied together.  The next step after knowledge is control.  If
EM and the nuclear forces are all aspects of the same thing, then perhaps
EM can be used to manipulate forces among nuclear particles.  That's a guess
with absolutely no data behind it, but sf needs only the thinnest veneer
of plausibility.

/jlr

Re .14:

> If we could somehow turn off fission, no one would miss it except the
> nuclear power plant operators.

Before you throw that switch, I'd like to see some figures on how much is
contributed to the support of the Earth by any fission going on at its center.
It might not be much, but if the slight heat created is enough to keep some
materials from shrinking, I really do not want the fission turned off.  It
might make our ride around the sun a little bumpy.

(I can see it now:

		_Environmental Impact Statement_

	Massive Earthquakes.  Storms.  Restructuring of the planet.
	Destruction of civilization.  Eradication of life on this
	planet.  Computations show the environment will be restored
	to its original state in approximately four billion years.


		_Environmental Protection Agency Recommendation_

	The proposed project is within acceptable limits.)

Incidentally, fission is caused because energy is released when the bonds
that hold nuclei together are broken.  If you turn off fission, what are you
going to hold atoms together with?


				-- edp

Re: .12

>It might be unwise to implement an inefficient system, but not a system with
>the characteristics I described previously.

It would be technically unwise to implement an SDI that was not 100% eff-
icient.   I believe it would be politically unwise to implement any kind of
SDI, because of it's unavoidable military/political destabilizing effects.


>Saying MAD is self-limiting is similar to saying the slope of a hyperbola
>is limited.  You are looking at the wrong thing.  Measuring the number of
>missiles is not the way to evaluate MAD -- how many people will it kill?
>Wiping out the human race has a value of negative infinity, as far as I am
>concerned.

MAD is self-limiting to the extent that governments (ours at least) seem to
have some trouble funding more strategic offensive weaponry (e.g., MX).
The main validity to MAD is that we & they dare not use the weapons.  There
are many citizens who believe that beyond some number (already reached) of
weapons, saturation is achieved.  Now when "they" have SDI in the works, it's
pretty obvious that we will have to react with MX, MY, MZ,...  This is how
things get hyperbolic.

Re: .13

>By the way, this is a science fiction notes files; could we stick to technical
>issues, such as whether or not various aspects of defense are possible, whether
>they will work, and so on?  If nobody else enters something about other topics,
>such as psychology, I won't either.

If Arthur Clarke can discuss the implications of SDI, I think we can.  S/F
readers are better equipped than most to discuss SDI seriously, and S/F is
certainly not limited to technical issues.  The future is just about here,
and we ought to be talking about it, even guiding it.  It may even be more
useful to do this than to discuss how weak nuclear forces might be turned
off.

Flame off, as they say.  Vernor Vinge does an interesting rendition of life
in (something like) the post-SDI world in _The Peace War_, using the tech-
nical device of what used to be called stasis fields ("bobbles") generated
by folks at Livermore to enclose ANYTHING "nasty".

- Harry

Re .16:

> I believe it would be politically unwise to implement any kind of SDI, because
> of it's unavoidable military/political destabilizing effects.

Supposing, for the sake of argument, we had a 100%, absolutely perfect defense
scheme.  How could this lead to any sort of destabilizing effects?  Maybe the
Russians would become scared and build up their offensive arsenal.  So what?
Let them.

> Vernor Vinge does an interesting rendition of life in (something like) the
> post-SDI world in _The Peace War_, . . . .

What is the point here?


				-- edp

Back to the original subject...

Have any of you ever seen a program of greater than 50,000 lines of code
run correctly the first time it was used????? 

The SDI software can only be tested fully if we are under a full nuclear 
attack...and we know that it won't work correctly the first time. 
Therefore, SDI is impossible (at least as a 100% effective defense).

Actually, the AEGIS system tries to do the same thing on a much smaller 
scale. It didn't work properly the first time in use. Do we learn from 
our mistakes?....NO!!!!


MartyJ

Re .18:

> The SDI software can only be tested fully if we are under a full nuclear
> attack...and we know that it won't work correctly the first time.

It could also be tested by getting the Russians to cooperate and launch dummy
missiles at us (:-)).  Or we could launch a bunch of our own.

> Have any of you ever seen a program of greater than 50,000 lines of code
> run correctly the first time it was used?

Yes.

Defense is not the only situation in which code must work the first time.  One
obvious example is automated spaceships and satellites.  If they do not work,
it is very difficult to fix them.

Of course, some do have bugs, but I am sure there are many which have not
shown significant defects.  All we have do to is make sure our defense system
is one of the latter.  You've heard of simulation, haven't you?


				-- edp

If any of you are interested in reading about Star Wars and how it could
work, you may be interested in Robert Jastrow's book, "How to Make Nuclear
Weapons Obsolete", published by Little, Brown and Company.  From the title
you can guess Dr. Jastrow's viewpoint.  The book is well written and points
out serious flaws in some of the arguments made by Star Wars opponents.

Does anyone know of a good anti Star Wars book?  

                                               August G. Reinig

One of the best anti-Star Wars arguments is displayed in the latest issue
of "High Technology" magazine.  Most of the magazine is about Japan.  They
go into detail on their goals in the major high-tech areas: computers,
materials, bioengineering, etc. .  The other article in the magazine is about
beam weapon developments.  The US is already putting enormous amounts of
money and talent into a technology of dubious military value and almost no
industrial application.  Meanwhile the Japanese take over industry after
industry.
     Civilian R and D in the US amounts to about 50 billion dollars a year.
That includes everything: all basic science, all industrial research, all
industrial advanced product development, all medical work.  Star Wars will
spend about five billion a year, mainly on research.  That's ten percent
of all civilian R and D, and in certain areas like computers and aerospace,
the fraction will be far higher.  There are only so many people to work on
advanced projects, and a good fraction of them will be channeled into Star
Wars.
      This is a monstrous diversion of resources.  If the Russians really
wanted to do long-term damage to the US, this would be a great method.
Star Wars will cream off the best of our technical talent into a program
that almost certainly won't stop the arm race, probably won't even slow it
down, and might not work at all.
At a time when almost every American industry is losing its
technological edge, it is close to criminal.  People, we are LOSING the
important race, the economic race.  This is the race that puts bread on your
table and gas in your car.  Factories are closing and people are going on
the streets, even in high-tech Massachusetts.   Instead of addressing the
real problems of industrial competitiveness, Reagan is running another round
of the arms race.  The arms race came to a draw twenty years ago, as soon
as each side had enough missiles to take out the other's major cities.
We are becoming a military giant and an industrial midget, much like the
Soviet Union.  Star Wars will hurt us even if it works.

/jlr
    

--Ahem --

Arthur C. Clarke did indeed say that when an elderly and dstinguished scien-
tist says something won't work he's almost certain to be proved wrong.

On SDI: one of the key tenets of warfare is to inflict damage to the enemy
without receiving unaccwptable damage to your own side.  If the U.S. has
developed an SDI that looks even reasonably good, the Soviets will have to
assume (for the sake of their own skins) that it's 100 percent effective,
otherwise, should they launch an attack on the supposition it's only 75 percent
effective, they could be in for a nasty surprise.  You have to expect the worst
of your enemy's capabilities.

Also, frequently those who "prove" the infeasibility of an engineering project
do so on the basis of incomplete data.  It was aerodynamically proven that
bumblebees couldn't fly, yet they do *because the "proof" was based on the
idea that bumblebees were fixed-wing aircraft*: they can't glide, but by flapping
their wings, they can get by.  It was "proven" that aircraft couldn't work,
that computers/helicopters/spacecraft were either impossible or so impractical
as to be not worth doing.

Research is research.  The spinoffs from an SDI research program cannot be
predicted in advance.  As a survivor of the Apollo Project (I worked in Hunts-
ville), I hear strange echoes in the arguments against SDI that I heard against
a lunar landing -- and the space program in general -- back in the mid-to-
late 1960s.  What percentage of the critics of the space program ever dreamed
that the manned lunar landing would necessitate development of advanced medi-
cal instrumentation?

Unfortunately, SDI isn't a technological issue, it's a political one.  The
USSR's been working quietly on primitive SDI technology for more than a dec-
ade now, mostly in plasma physics.  It was when we demonstrated a primitive
proto-SDI missile killer that the Soviets decided to return to the arms ne-
gotiation tables.  If they are so convinced about the unfeasibility of SDI,
why are they waging an intense campaign with our European allies to get us
to shelve  the idea, and why is there so much propoganda against it being
fed the public in Europe and elsewhere?

Frankly, SDI is as technologically feasible as the fission bomb was in 1939.
Whether we go ahead with it in some fashion is a political decision, and 
most arguments against it are political ones.

Saturation attacks of satchel-bomb nuclear weapons is theoretically possible,
but should take enough time for even the most inept intelligence service to
get wind of it.  Terrain-following cruise-type missiles would produce a prob-
lem, but as subsonic vehicles (or even supersonic) they would be more a men-
ace to coastal than inland regions; more important, thet take *time* to reach
their targets, and time is what ICBMs don't give us much of.  Anything that
can slow down deliveries makes it that much less pressure for all of us.

I concur with several previous respondents that this isn't the best forum
for a serious discussion of SDI; however, if one is to be made, please do
so from a standpoint of strategic and tactical military considerations, too,
as well as more humoral (not humorous) arguments.

Steve Kallis, Jr.

re .18
	Great ! After 'we' degug AEGIS (which is fairly niffty, only
	needing some engineering) let's launch a whole bucket (or
	sckads of shuttles) of AEGIS'. SDI's in 'discrete' packets.

	Heck, that alone assures higher 'system' reliability through
	'system' redundency...  

One of the best expositions on the entire arms debate I've ever read was
a series of three articles by Freeman Dyson in the New Yorker (late 1983,
I think).  He puts Star Wars (though he doesn't address that specific program)
in the 'technical follies' catagory.  He is interested in a non-nuclear low-tech
type of defense system designed not to replace arms control but to support
it.  That is, building a system proof against 1000 missiles may be hard,
but building a system proof against 10 is easy; and if you know ten missiles
won't hurt you, its easier to verify an arms-control agreement within the
limits of safety.

RE .19:  On the subject of software reliability, remember why the Columbia
didn't go up the first time?  Something to do with the failure of 
doubly-redundent software running on quadruply-redundant hardware, as 
I recall.

RE 'just suppose we can make a system 100% effective': why don't we talk
about turning off fission, it's just as possible.  Every system being discussed
takes out missiles one at a time; this means every time the attacking force
doubles the defensive force has to double to keep the same level of
effectiveness.  (And if it's not space-based you have to measure the attacking
force by *warheads* not by launchers.)  The Soviet defensive system is based
on 'counterforce' which is Russian for 'no matter what you do to us, we'll
survive well enough to make you wish you'd never been born.'  Their obvious
reaction to SDI will be to increase the number of warheads and launchers
to the point where the SDI system's effectiveness has been reduced to acceptable
(for them) levels.  That is why SDI without arms control is destablizing.
That is also why the Soviets are not going to agree to reductions in offensive
arms while SDI is still in the offing.

In sum, the ability to dream is a charming quality.  But it's a lousy basis
for national policy.

	HRB

Re .24:
>One of the best expositions on the entire arms debate I've ever read was a 
>series of three articles by Freeman Dyson in the New Yorker (late 1983, I 
>think).  He puts Star Wars (though he doesn't address that specific program) 
>in the 'technical follies' catagory.  

Indeed?  Like calling it "Technoporn," does that categorization have anything 
to do with the efficacy or lack thereof of the technology?  It's interesting 
that in the early 1950s, an expedition to the moon was categorized the same 
way.

>He is interested in a non-nuclear low-tech type of defense system designed 
>not to replace arms control but to support it.  

Friend, that's a stolen base.  *Hypothecating legitimate arms control* (i.e., 
mutually verifiable with on-site inspection after an agreed-upon arms 
*reduction*, "arms control" has some meaning; otherwise, it's just another 
case of working some sort of treaty with every historical precedent that the 
USSR will cheat, or unilaterally "controlling" (i.e., freezing) arms 
production in hoped that the moral pressure involved will force the Soviets to 
go along with it.  Like they've done in the past.

>... That is, building a system proof against 1000 missiles may be hard, but 
>building a system proof against 10 is easy; and if you know ten missiles 
>won't hurt you, its easier to verify an arms-control agreement within the 
>limits of safety.

"Safety"?

>RE .19:  On the subject of software reliability, remember why the Columbia 
>didn't go up the first time?  Something to do with the failure of doubly-
>redundant software running on quadruply-redundant hardware, as I recall.

But the planners in the USSR would be foolish indeed to launch an attack on 
the *hopes* or *expectations* of software glitches.  Recall, in launching an 
attack, the aggressor has to do so expecting worst-case contingencies.

>RE 'just suppose we can make a system 100% effective': why don't we talk 
>about turning off fission, it's just as possible.  

True.  Why not expose incoming warheads to a flux of thermal neutrons?  If 
they use fission triggers, they'll react sufficiently and mlt in part do that 
they won't be able to function after reentry.  Thanks for iterating an 
effective ways to have a first-phase SDI defense.  You don't have to hit the 
incoming warhead with a missile; a close encounter would be enough to slag the 
triggering mechanisms.

>Every system being discussed takes out missiles one at a time; 

Says who?

>... this means every time the attacking force doubles the defensive force has 
>to double to keep the same level of effectiveness.  (And if it's not 
>space-based you have to measure the attacking force by *warheads* not by 
>launchers.)  

A sine qua non of SDI is that it will be space-based.

>... The Soviet defensive system is based on 'counterforce' which is Russian 
for 'no matter what you do to us, we'll survive well enough to make you wish 
you'd never been born.'  

This includes some serious SDI research,, which they've been working on for 
some time.  See back issues of _Aviation Week and Space Technology_ on some of 
their efforts.

>... Their obvious reaction to SDI will be to increase the number of warheads 
>and launchers to the point where the SDI system's effectiveness has been 
>reduced to acceptable (for them) levels.  That is why SDI without arms 
>control is destablizing. 

Aha!  Is this, then, a pitch for arms control?  The problem isn't us; it's the 
USSR.  During "Detente," we stopped building ("morally," under Jimmy Carter, 
who told us that we "... now can put to rest our inordinate fear of 
Communism,") and the USSR accelerated its weapons-building program like mad.  
Also, why would it be destabalizing for US to do it and not for THEM to do it? 
(JFK on negotiations with the USSR:  "The Russians say `What's mine's mine; 
what's yours is negotiable.'")

>... That is also why the Soviets are not going to agree to reductions in 
>offensive arms while SDI is still in the offing.

And if it's not in the offing, without the impetus, they won't agree to 
either.  Why should they? 

>In sum, the ability to dream is a charming quality.  But it's a lousy basis 
>for national policy.

I vouldn't agree more.  That's why we *need* an SDI rather than relying on 
political pipedreams.  Please note as I've observed before, the technology is 
there to the extent the technology for fission bombs was around in 1939.  If 
we choose not to do it, it will be a political decision.

Steve Kallis, Jr.

re .25 - Freeman Dyson's article (I think it's been published as a book
called "Weapons and Hope") is MUST reading interested in the arms race.
It is very evenhanded.  He admits that his use of terms like "victims"
and "warriors" as well as "technolgical follies" are deliberate caricatures.
Don't write off this article because of the terminology.

This note isn't science fiction any more, and that's good.

The current plans and perceptions of SDI may be that it is technologically,
politically, or economically unsound (and it may be), but the focus 
of the matter should be to consider alternatives to Mutual Assured Destruction.
Consider the metaphors and cliches used to describe MAD:  children
in a pool of gasoline with boxes of matches at hand, duelists with cocked
pistols at each others' heads, and others.  These are all apt and true.
A suicide pact is no defense.

Consider the goals of nuclear arms reductions.  I believe that neither
side can accept an arms reduction proposal that with reduce the weapons
count to below levels needed to conduct MAD until some alternative
defensive strategy is achieveable.  So we reduce our overkill
capability from 1000 to 100 or even 10.  Will you sleep better nights?
(Probably - such a reduction WILL reduce the likelihood of an accidental
nuclear exchange by some significant factor, maybe enough to last your
natural lifetime, but maybe not your kids'.)  Note too that certain
nuclear winter scenarios lead to worldwide famine at exchanges of only 
100-1000 warheads - far fewer than 10% of the current stockpile.

The best defense must be a defense, not a mutually annihilating offense.
THAT must be the mind set in evaluating a Strategic Defense posture.
Even if Star Wars won't work, we must continue research to find
a stable DEFENSE posture that will.  The future of the race, if not
the planet, depends on it.

- tom powers]

Re .26:

>Freeman Dyson's article (I think it's been published as a book called 
>"Weapons and Hope") is MUST reading interested in the arms race. It is 
>very evenhanded.  He admits that his use of terms like "victims" and 
>"warriors" as well as "technolgical follies" are deliberate caricatures.  
>Don't write off this article because of the terminology.

I'm sorry, but anybody who "caricatures" *cannot* be "evenhanded": the 
very nature of a caricature is to stress those features of interest to 
the caricaturist.  

I am always irritated when someone speaks of "follies."  "Follies" 
generally means something with which the speaker has an active dislike of 
or prejudice against.  Various follies have included:

The purchase of Alaska
The Panama Canal
The electric light bulb
The airplane
The safety razor
Spaceflight and space exploration
The steam-powered railroad
The telephone

Anyone with a technological bent could add more.

I cannot take seriously an argument that says that a U.S. initiative on 
SDI *research* is "destablizing" and/or "dangerous" when a similar 
program by the U.S.S.R. isn't.  The problem is grossly political.

<enable miniflame> I am getting increasingly irritated by those with 
sufficient political myopia so that they cannot see any danger in any 
Soviet act but world-class danger in any U.S. act *for defense.*  When 
the ABM treaty was signed some years ago, the politicians on our side 
agreed to a condition where the U.S. would have one active ABM system and 
the U.S.S.R. was allowed _two_; yet this was called "a step towards 
peace."  From a geopolitical standpoint, this tells the Soviets and 
3rd-party countries that in any arms negotiation with the U.S., the 
U.S.S.R. is entitled to or will get an advantage.  And nobody's finding 
anything strange in that.  Pleae note that the U.S.S.R is the *only* 
country in the United Nations that has more than one seat (various of the 
"republics" comprising the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have 
individual seats; this would be like Texas and Alska having seats in the 
U.N. as well as the U.S. having one), and nobody sees anything -- 
peculiar -- about that.  This is a matter of politics alone.

Normally, the last thing I'd inject into a discussion is personal 
history, but this is sufficiently relevant:  When I was four years old, I 
survived the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  Whether one wishes to 
subscribe to the Admiral Kimmel theory that the situation was set up by 
F.D.R. to drag us into the war or not (I don't), one should be able to 
review what happens when we let our *defenses* slip.  I don't want to 
have to be on the receiving end of an attack on American soil some half-
a-century later, and the talk of no *research* on defense is ominously 
analogous to the situation where prior to World War II when soldiers had 
to train with broomsticks because there weren't enough rifles to go 
around....  I could just say, "I was there, Charlie; where were you?" 
(and yes, even at age 4 I remember details), but that's practically 
namecalling: rather, I'd wish that foolish good intentions don't lead up 
to a situation where you folk have to go through a many-orders-of-
magnitude-greater equivalent of what I experienced.  <disable miniflame>

I cannot and do not fault those who sincerely believe that there may be a 
Better Way to lessen the Arms Race than by building sufficient of a 
defense so that any potential adversary (almost certainly the Soviets) 
would think twice before launching an attack.  But to say "Follo," 
"technoporn," "foolishness," and the like before a research program has 
even gotten off the ground is to be on the same plane as the little old 
lady who is supposed to have said "If Man were meant to fly, God would 
have given us wings."

I'd certainly choose research towards a nonagressive defense than 
continue the MAD approach.  What a delightfully appropriate acronym!

And anybody who trusts the Soviwts to keep any treaty without powrrful 
outside constraints is blind to history.

Steve Kallis, Jr.

I wish you'd read the article before attacking it on theoretical grounds.
Dyson does not say technoporn, and he does not say foolishness.  I think
you are seriously misreading his intentionsd.  And when I say he's even-
handed, dammit, he's even-handed.  This is one of those articles that
will rile BOTH sides because each it's so evenhanded that everybody thinks
he's taking the other side's position.

Incidentally, I agree with most of what you say.  You still ought to read
article.

len.

My my my.  What a lot of excitement.  It was clearly a mistake to include
anything out of Dyson's article in my reply; it apparently doesn't make much
sense out of context.  I will meet you in FORUM or SOAPBOX if you want to
talk about trustworthyness of the Russians, but I would like to retrieve
Dyson's reputation with a little explanation here:

When he starts talking about possible responses to the current nuclear
situation, Dyson gives his scenarios the simplest possible names.  This is
because names have to be translated into Russian; 'deterrance', for example,
translates into 'intimidation', which doesn't help negotiations at all. 
Most of the names Dyson uses are slightly silly and slightly toungue-in-cheek.
The one I say applies to SDI he doesn't apply to any real program; in fact,
I think his articles predate SDI.  The observation that the ideas he put
in the "technical follies" catagory look a lot like SDI is mine.

One of the main thrusts of the article addresses your principle concern: given
an arms control treaty, how do we verify it?  Dyson's point is that it's
impossible to verify any treaty with absolute certainty.  Even if the USSR
allowed surprise on-site inspection of any site, we couldn't be sure they
weren't building bombs in the Moscow subway system or something.  But it is not
particularly difficult to be sure they are not building many bombs; you simply
can't hide a major effort in missile production.  It would not be hard to build
a defensive system that had to handle no more than the number of missiles that
could be built without our knowing about it, and Dyson suggests that we should
do so. (That's what I meant by "safety".) 

Some responses to your specific points (this is me, not what I recall Dyson
to have said):

>But the planners in the USSR would be foolish indeed to launch an attack on 
>the *hopes* or *expectations* of software glitches.  

If we are merely building a system that the USSR cannot be 100% sure will
not protect us, I can propose something much simpler than SDI.  Like maybe
a tenth of the warheads we've got protecting us now.  
 
> True.  Why not expose incoming warheads to a flux of thermal neutrons?  

I have no objections to research investigating this possibility.  I do have
objections to research investigating the feasability of implementing systems
that are fantastically complex, are based in space, or attack incoming missiles
over Russian territory.  Complex systems are too prone to failure and cannot
be adequately tested.  Space based weapons (are complex and) are amazingly
tempting targets; its easier to knock them out than to build them.  (This
is not true of missiles, notice - it's easier to build a missile than knock
it out.)  Systems that attack missiles over Russian territory don't give
us enough warning to make intelligent decisions.  How many times did we start
procedures for nuking Russia last year due to false alarms, three?  Each
one was only stopped after some human decided it was a false alarm.  And
you want to put this decision in software?

>A sine qua non of SDI is that it will be space-based.

Not according to Ronnie.  It's just a research program, no decisions have
been made, right?

>Aha!  Is this, then, a pitch for arms control?  

You betcha.  On both sides.  

>The problem isn't us; it's the USSR.

And naturally it's the USSR's fault that we turned down their proposal to
ban underground testing.  (Yes I know the arguments.  Please consider that
remark an invitation to take the discussion to FORUM where it belongs.)

In sum, I can support an effort to design a simple defensive system that can
defend against a small attack.  This would be helpful in arms control.  I cannot
support spending millions on research into grandiose, expensive, vulnurable
defensive systems that would be destabilizing if set up and keep us from
real progress on the arms problem now.

	HRB

re .29:

I didn't attack the _article_; I atttacked concepts voiced in several note
responses, including those mentioning Dyson.  I still maintain that from
your description of his words, he apparently spoke of caricatures, which
*are* biases.  I was trying to separate ideas from a specific articles ("tech-
noporn," as "noted" earlier, was said by Arthur C. Clarke).  Reading any
one work may be instructive; commenting on an angst is something else.  Please
reread my note replies and see whether you feel I'm attacking his article or
descriptions of it.

I think we'd *all* like to help solve problems and not be parts of them
  
Steve Kallis, Jr.

re .27, .29, .30 and a few of my replies:

Okay, rhetoric aside, here seem to be the positions:

1) SDI shouldn't be considered because it's unworkable/foolish.

or

2) SDI should be researched.

or

3) SDI can act as a deterrent

or

4) There are less expensive alternatives to SDI.

there seems to be a mutuality of agreement that something should be done
to reduce the liklihood of nuclear war; the disagreement is the best way
to go about it.

I suspect that any further discussions in this note would be less productive
than in notes like Soapbox.

Steve Kallis, Jr.

(Should anyone care, there is now a note on SDI in HUMAN::FORUM.  It's note
#52.)

	HRB

    re .3:
    
    <flame on>
    	I am sick and tired of hering someone argue that something must
    be possible because so many experts say it is impossible. What the
    **** kind of logic is that?
    <flame off...well down to a simmer>
    	The best arguements against SDI are not the "it is impossible
    to provide 100% effectiveness" type of arguments, but the economic
    costs of putting a major portion of our scientific and engineering
    talent on a project such as this, and on the cost-benefit analysis.
    countermeasures can be very cheap compared to the cost of the
    components of SDI. Yes, you probably could design a system that
    could shoot down anynumber of missiles, assuming no countermeasures
    were taken by the enemy. the point is that the counter-measures
    are orders-of-magnitude cheaper to implement than the SDI shield,
    and
    thus render the SDI a waste of money,talent,and energy.
    
    sm

RE .34

>    	I am sick and tired of hering someone argue that something must
>    be possible because so many experts say it is impossible. What the
>    **** kind of logic is that?

Several people have noted that one of the best clues that something can be
done is the list of "experts" that claim it can't. Airplanes, radio, polio
vaccine, even computers have been "proven" not to be possible by lists of 
experts.

>                              the point is that the counter-measures
>    are orders-of-magnitude cheaper to implement than the SDI shield,
>    and
>    thus render the SDI a waste of money,talent,and energy.

1)SDI is a research program. Most proposals will die as (pick one or more):
  a)they will not work.
  b)they would cost more than countermeasures.
  c)they are not made in (...)'s district (fill in name to taste).

2)Read what "experts" said about airplanes sinking battleships in the 1930's.
  Do we have better "experts" now?

3)An ICBM is an expensive, complex, fragile piece of machinery that is designed
  to put an expensive, complex, fragile bomb on your house. Why not try to
  find the weak link in the above process?


Phil

    Re .35
    
    The mathematical experts are unanimous in their opinion that you
    can't trisect and angle with compass and straightedge.  Does that
    mean it's a dead cert to be possible?
    
    I believe the point of .34 was that, though expert opinion may not
    prove something is impossible, it certainly can NOT be taken as
    evidence that it IS possible.  Citing experts who have been wrong
    in the past changes nothing, especially if the other side can cite
    even more experts who have been right.
    
    Earl Wajenberg

re .36
    
>    The mathematical experts are unanimous in their opinion that you
>    can't trisect and angle with compass and straightedge.  Does that
>    mean it's a dead cert to be possible?

No not at all. I do have problems with believing experts that look at something
so large and complex (like SDI) and state flat out that it is impossible. There
is at least room for doubt. There is not room for doubt in the case stated
above.


>    I believe the point of .34 was that, though expert opinion may not
>    prove something is impossible, it certainly can NOT be taken as
>    evidence that it IS possible.  Citing experts who have been wrong
>    in the past changes nothing, especially if the other side can cite
>    even more experts who have been right.

It can be taken as evidence that it is possible when an "expert" is stating
his OPINION as a FACT, when it is clear that there is lots of room for DOUBT.
This indicates that:
1)He is unsure.
2)He wants you to believe otherwise.
3)He wants to avoid any facts that might call his opinion into doubt.
The above is evidence that the reverse of the "expert" opinion at least needs 
looking at. It is not proof of the reverse. It is evidence that supports the
reverse of the opinion expressed. There is proof that something is possible
when it is done. Proving something is impossible is much harder!

Phil

    Try to keep in mind the 'Star Wars' System gave the press some good
    copy, *and* it may help the Russians prove they're worth their SALT, II.
    

VNS TECHNOLOGY WATCH:                           [Mike Taylor, VNS Correspondent]
=====================                           [Nashua, NH, USA               ]

       Pentagon (TRW) Tests Powerful Laser as Antimissile Weapon

    A powerful laser flashed to life in the first major antimissile
    weapons test of the Bush Administration, Pentagon officials said
    yesterday. The laser's beam of concentrated light is to produce
    2.2 million watts of energy, making it the nation's most powerful
    military laser, experts outside the government said. DoD officials, 
    who hailed the test as an important step, would not disclose the 
    power of the beam.

    The secretive, high-power test of the $250 million laser, known as
    "Alpha," was conducted early Friday in a secluded valley near San
    Juan Capistrano, Calif., at a plant of TRW, Inc., which built the
    laser. The test, the first in which the laser produced a powerful
    beam had been delayed for more than two weeks by minor technical
    problems. The laser produced a burst of power for one-fifth of a
    second and was designed to operate for several seconds. If deployed 
    in space, such a laser would have to fire for minutes to destroy 
    a series of enemy missiles in flight.

      Test Called 'a Major Advance'

    "We have achieved a major advance in the laser's development,"
    said Neil Griff, head of space-based lasers for the Pentagon's
    SDIO, adding that it would greatly increase "our confidence in
    being able to build directed energy weapons."

    The laser, scheduled to be launched into space in 1994 as part of
    a $1.5 billion experiment, is one of the most disputed parts of the
    Pentagon's antimissile program, with experts clashing over whether
    its operation in space would violate the 1972 Antiballistic Missile 
    Treaty. At issue is whether the laser could operate as a space weapon.

    {The New York Times National Ed., Tuesday, April 11, 1989 pg. A8} 
    {Summary of article Contributed by Chuck Coope}

  <><><><><><><>   VNS Edition : 1806    Thursday 27-Apr-1989   <><><><><><><>

    The DEC consultant called us for some help writing some programs for
    this project.  Guess what they are using...
    
    		Good Old RT-11!
    
    jsb

    
    
    Mr Klaes,
    
    	You've bugged my curiousity for long enough :-), what does
    
    		N = R*fgfpneflfifaL   mean???
    
    Thanks,
    
    Charlie

       The following formula, affectionately known as the Drake Equation,
   as it was created by Frank Drake in the 1960s, is set up thusly:

          N - The number of advanced technological civilizations in the 
              Milky Way Galaxy.

         R* - The mean birth rate of stars in the Milky Way Galaxy.

         fg - The fraction of stars resembling the Sun which are not 
              members of binary or multiple star systems.

         fp - The fraction of such stars with planetary systems.

         ne - The number of Earth-like planets in each system orbiting
              within the life-supporting zones of their stars.

         fl - The fraction of these planets where life has arisen.

         fi - The fraction of life-bearing planets on which life has 
              developed intelligence.

         fa - The fraction of intelligent civilizations which have 
              developed an advanced technology.

          L - The average lifetime of civilizations with advanced 
              technology. 

       Needless to say, this formula is comprised mostly of currently 
   unknown factors; depending on various estimates, there may be as many 
   as one million or as few as ten advanced civilizations in our galaxy.  
   This equation also does not take into account intelligent races which 
   may have developed in environments other than Earth-like worlds and do 
   not possess and/or use technologies recognizable to humans.

       Larry

    
    
    
    I'm surprized that there was a number as high as ten.
    
    

    I have a question:
    
    Can your formula N = R * sakfjlasjflksjfk (whatever) be made to
    show that no intelligent life at all exists in the universe. 
    
    8^)

Article: 13071
From: clarinews@clarinet.com (UPI)
Newsgroups: clari.news.military,clari.news.gov.usa
Subject: Report Weinberger approved faked SDI missile tests
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 5:11:46 PDT
 
	WASHINGTON (UPI) -- Former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger
approved a scheme that involved rigging a test of the ``Star Wars''
missile defense system that misled the Soviet Union and Congress about
the validity of the questionable project, it was reported Wednesday.

	Four officials who served with Weinberger in the administration of
President Ronald Reagan said the deceptive missile intercept test in
1984 was ordered to convince the Soviets that the Strategic Defense
Initiative was a realistic threat.

	The unidentified officials told The New York Times that the Kremlin,
fearful of a commanding American advantage, had to divert billions of
dollars to counter the unproven missile shield.

	However, the newspaper said the false test data directed at Moscow
also was used in congressional briefings and helped persuade lawmakers
to spend more development money on SDI.

	Weinberger would not confirm or deny the report.

	``You always work on deception,'' the Times quoted Weinberger as
saying. ``You are obviously trying to mislead your opponents and to make
sure that they don't know the actual facts.''

	The rigged test involved placing a transmitter on the target missile,
and a receiver on the intercept missile, thus locking in a collision,
the report said. Three previous tests had failed, and it was feared
another failure would severely curtail development money.

    
    Was that the one where the intercepting missile deployed a kind of
    "umbrella" or "spiderweb" to increase the chances of a hit?
    
    
      >``You are obviously trying to mislead your opponents and to make
      >sure that they don't know the actual facts.''
    
    Also obvious is that old Cap counted the Congress among the opponents.
    
    JP

Article: 13079
From: clarinews@clarinet.com (CHARLES DOE)
Newsgroups: clari.news.military,clari.news.gov.usa
Subject: General denies Star Wars missile test was faked
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 12:48:05 PDT
 
	WASHINGTON (UPI) -- Former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger
approved a scheme to rig a test of the ``Star Wars'' missile intercept
system to mislead the Soviet Union into squandering resources, and the
deception ultimately included Congress, it was reported Wednesday.

	Weinberger declined direct comment on the New York Times
report, but said it is always beneficial for the United States to
deceive its adversaries. 

	An Army general who helped oversee the missile defense program
at the time of of the disputed 1984 test rejected the allegation in an
interview with United Press International. 

	``I would deny that we did anything to rig the test,'' retired
Maj. Gen. Eugene Fox, former deputy manager of the Army's Ballistic
Missile Defense Program, said of the report. 

	The Times reported four former officials in the administration
of President Ronald Reagan said the test warhead interception was
faked in order to mislead Moscow into spending vast resources to
counter the perceived threat. 

	The newspaper said the same faked data was used in private
congressional briefings to convince lawmakers to maintain financial
support of the Strategic Defense Initiative program to counter
nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. 

	``Star Wars'' was proposed by Reagan in 1983 as a shield
against nuclear devastation, but the program was criticized by
opponents as a worthless and expensive folly. The Soviet Union later
disintegrated under economic and political forces, ending the
thermonuclear threat. SDI was canceled this year by Defense Secretary
Les Aspin, although some related aspects of the project continue to be
funded. 

	Senator David Pryor, Democrat of Arkansas, has asked the
General Accounting Office, the congressional investigative agency,
about possible deception on missile testing. 

	On Wednesday, Pryor asked Aspin to investigate whether the
Pentagon deceived Congress in an attempt to mislead the Soviets and
whether former Reagan aides, including the president himself, misled
Congress. He also asked that the inquiry determine if military
contractors working on the program were ``aware of the disinformation
campaign.'' 

	The New York Times did not identify the four former officials.
Weinberger declined to confirm or deny the report, but said there is
nothing wrong in deceiving opponents. 

	``You always work on deception,'' the Times quoted Weinberger
as saying. ``You are obviously trying to mislead your opponents and to
make sure that they don't know the actual facts.'' 

	There was nothing passive about the reaction from Fox.

	``The article obviously called me a liar,'' he said. ``I
obviously got very angry.'' 

	Three previous SDI tests had failed, and proponents feared
another missed intercept would lead skeptics in Congress to severely
curtail the epxnediture of millions of dollars in development money. 

	The Times article alleged that in the 1984 test, a beacon
onboard the warhead that was intercepted was used to guide the
missile-launched interceptor to it. 

	In fact, Fox said, the beacon was merely used to launch the
huge Minuteman intercontinental missile that lofted the interceptor
into space. 

	It had nothing to do with the test, which was designed to
prove the intercept vehicle and the onboard guidance that led it to
its target, he said. 

	``Once the sensor opened its eyes,'' Fox said, ``it was on its
own.'' The launch missile had dropped away earlier and was gone. 

	The interceptor was guided by infrared optics designed to
detect the heat of the incoming missile warhead against the black
coldness of surrounding space. 

	The guidance system made continual corrections in the
intercept vehicle's flight to keep it on a collision course with the
warhead, Fox said. 

	Just before impact, the interceptor sprung open a 15-foot
metal frame that resembled a huge umbrella.  It smashed the warhead
into a shower of metal fragments. 

	``The intercept,'' the Defense Department announced in 1984, ``was 
a first for the United States and, as far as is known, for the world.'' 

Article: 13384
From: clarinews@clarinet.com (CHARLES DOE)
Newsgroups: clari.news.gov.usa,clari.news.military
Subject: Aspin defends ``Star Wars'' missile test but reveals deception plan
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 19:48:08 PDT
 
	WASHINGTON (UPI) -- U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin denied published
reports Thursday that a critical 1984 ``Star Wars'' missile warhead
interception test had been faked, but he revealed that such a deception
of the Soviet Union had at least been tried.

	``To sum up,'' Aspin said, ``the experiment was not rigged and
deception did not take place, although a program to practice deception
existed.''

	``There was a deception program aimed at the Soviet Union associated
with the experiments,'' he said, ``but it deceived no one because it was
not used.''

	Aspin said the deception program was part of that category of highly
secret activities called special access programs, which consisted of an
explosive charge aboard the target vehicle.

	``The plan was to detonate the charge in order to give a near miss
the appearance of a direct hit, to give Moscow (the impression) our
efforts were more successful than they were.''

	The first three target warheads fired in the test series carried such
explosive charges, Aspin said, but the interceptors fired at them never
got close enough to make a detonation convincing.

	In late 1983, the deception plan was abandoned and there was no such
explosive charge aboard the fourth target warhead. It was smashed to
bits in a collision with a successful interceptor in June 1984.

	Aspin was reporting on the results of an investigation that he
ordered three weeks ago after the New York Times published a story
alleging that the historic interception -- believed to be the first of
its kind -- had actually been faked to fool the Soviet Union.

	Quoting unidentified Reagan administration sources, the Times article
said the false test data was then passed to Congress where it was used
to justify funding for the controversial ``Star Wars'' antimissile
defense program.

	The original Times article had claimed that the target warhead had
carried a beacon which guided the interceptor on its collision course.

	Aspin said Thursday that the target warhead did indeed carry a beacon
but it was used for purposes other than guiding the interceptor, which
could not receive the beacon's signals.

	Other subsequent articles had claimed that the target warhead was
heated before launch to make it more visible to the interceptor's heat-
seeking infrared guidance system.

	Aspin confirmed that the warhead was warmed, but he argued that it
did not violate the test objectives, which were precisely to determine
whether a heat seeking guidance system would work.

	Another defense official, who spoke under condition of anonymity,
noted that in an earlier test the infrared interceptor had been
distracted by heat generated by its own passage through the atmosphere.
He said the target had been heated to compensate for that. Others have
said that an actual warhead entering the atmosphere would have been much
warmer than the test target was.

	Far from keeping Congress in the dark about the beacon aboard the
warhead and the fact that it was heated, the Pentagon reported both and
the artificially heated warhead was discussed in a seperate report
sponsored by Congress.

	Aspin said there was a communications link between the ground and 
the interceptor that could have been used to guide the interceptor to its
target, but he maintained that this was not done.

	Aspin also said that the target warhead was loaded with a small
amount of illuminating powder like that in flash bulbs. The purpose was
to make the impact of the warhead and interceptor more visible to
cameras monitoring the test. The flash would only occur if the
interceptor scored a direct hit, which it did.

	``Overall,'' Aspin said, ``our conclusion on the experiment is this:
It was not rigged by the inclusion of a radar beacon on the target, nor
by any other means. The experiment demonstrated that the final guidance
of the interceptor to a direct hit was done by the on-board heat seeker.''

Article: 3862
From: clarinews@clarinet.com (Reuters)
Newsgroups: clari.world.europe.western,clari.tw.space,clari.tw.defense
Subject: ``Star Wars'' Optics May Help Find New Planets
Date: Wed, 16 Mar 94 9:10:28 PST
 
	 LONDON (Reuter) - Advanced optics developed for the U.S.
``Star Wars'' space defense program can be used to help search for
planets outside Earth's solar system, a U.S. astronomer reported
Wednesday. 

	 The atmosphere distorts images taken of stars from the
ground, making it hard for scientists to tell if there are planets
circling other stars, and thus whether there is extraterrestrial life.

	 Roger Angel at the University of Arizona modified a military
``adaptive optics'' system to correct the distorting effects of the
Earth's atmosphere.  He said it could be used to look for planets from
an Earth-based telescope. 

	 Adaptive optics systems include advanced electronics, image
sensors, a segmented, movable mirror and a computer. 

	 ``It seems likely that by the end of the decade ground-based
observations will either have found planets around nearby
main-sequence stars, or have shown conclusively that planets of the
size of Jupiter are rare,'' Angel wrote in the science journal Nature.

	 Angel said no telescope exists now that could find a planet.
The Hubble space telescope, which is orbiting the Earth and taking
pictures of objects in deep space, cannot detect extraterrestrial
life, he said. 

	 ``Unfortunately the Hubble telescope will probably lack the
sensitivity for optical detection of an extrasolar planet, even of the
size and orbital radius of Jupiter...,'' he said. 

	 San Diego-based ThermoTrex Corp makes adaptive optics systems
for the U.S. military and also supplied a system to the University of
Arizona.