| T.R | Title | User | Personal
Name | Date | Lines |
|---|
| 157.1 | | DUCK::NASHD | | Fri Mar 15 1991 19:50 | 20 |
| Kevin,
I know of no UK reserve unit being involved in the Gulf ( Ian - can
you say if 21, 23 or 63 Squadron SAS were there?) in a combat role
though there were 2 RAF Squadrons in support roles. From what I've read
they passed the test, I don't know how well though.
Since the conflict there has been an intensive ( > 1 advert in the
newspapers each week ) campaign to attract more people in to the reserves.
I guess from that the UK want to increase the number of reserves.
I think the reserves in general will never be as good as there regular
counterparts; though there will be a few exceptional reserves. The
reserves seem to be good value for money as well.
So for the moment, the reserves seem to be considered quite highly, in
my opinion.
Dave
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| 157.2 | Reserves do meet expectations | DPDMAI::HYDE | | Sat Mar 16 1991 22:13 | 49 |
| The Reserves are meant to be a pool of manpower (or womanpower) that
rise to the occasion with a minimum of training. I can speak from
experience regarding the Air Force Reserve. When I was in C141's at
McGuire AFB, NJ, many of our passengers were surprised to learn that
they were being flown back & forth across the pond (Atlantic Ocean) by
USAF Reserve crews. We did this on weekdays as well as weekends.
Approximately 85% of our pilots were also airline pilots. Our mission
was primarily very much like airlines and I honestly believe we were
just a bit better than our active duty counterparts at this part of our
mission because 1) We had Navigators and 2) We were more experienced.
The one area in C141's where our active duty counterparts had a leg up
on us was in Airdrops. Most of the Reserve crews in C141's were not
airdrop qualified, but those who were airdrop qualified were about as
good at it as the actives.
When I was in C130's we were just as good as our active duty
counterparts at hauling cargo from one airpatch to another. We had the
edge in experience in terms of flying time and maturity and the actives
had an edge in being a bit more up to date in special operations.
Reserve crews (myself included) were flying in & out of El Salvador
during times of hostilities in the area. Give a slight edge to actives
for their extra exposure to special operations.
When I was a Communications Operations Officer, we went on a two-week
annuual tour at a full-time installation. The full-timers expected us
to fare poorly due to our outmoded equipment at Westover AFB. They
were surprised by our ability to handle their older equipment and our
ability (Give credit to our enlisted folks) to handle their newest
equipment. You see, many of our enlisted people worked with the latest
& greatest equipment in their civilian jobs. It appears to me that the
full-timers had planned a statistics-based comparison and were unhappy
with the results. They embarassed themselves by fooling with the
numbers (Comparing our weekly error rates to the their monthly error
rates, I believe) and our Commander handled that by dealing with the
political issues via AFRes HQ.
The only area where the actives have it head and shoulders over the
Reserves in the Air Force is with the active duty units that have the
most modern planes. But let's face it, that's expected.
I would hope that no US public official would make disparaging remarks
about our Reserve forces. The Reserves are a cost-effective pool of
manpower. My fear is that our CFR (Council on Foreign Relations) laden
bureaucracy in Washington, DC will once again resume disarmament and
such remarks could indicate that disarmament is on a number of peoples'
hidden agendas.
Kurt
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| 157.3 | | ALLVAX::BRET | Crazy Hawaiian DTN 287-3201 | Sun Mar 17 1991 06:30 | 10 |
| During this last conflict, the aerial port operation at Westover AFB
(strictly reserve) had a better on time departure rate than Dover,
Torrejon and Rhein Main. All of the other bases mentioned were manned
by active duty personnel. At least in the air cargo field, the
reserves are well trained and able to step right in an pick up the
load.
B. Bretschneider, TSG
42 APS
Westover AFB MA
|
| 157.4 | The Reserves? They done (and are doing) GOOD! | CLOSUS::J_BUTLER | L'audace, toujour l'audace! | Tue Mar 19 1991 17:00 | 38 |
| I think most of the criticism is directed at the perceived problems
the "roundout" brigades had preparing for combat. The "roundout"
units were never thought of as a good idea by the active duty forces
when I was on active duty. Obviously, they do not train with their
parent divisions regularly, nor for any significant amount of time.
They do not get the latest information on SOPs or Division regulations,
despite the efforts of the G3 shops! (I know...I used to work in
one.)
BUT, that doesn't mean the RC (Reserve Components) are not "good."
They certainly are, and, when allowed to train as a unit and to
develop their own plans and SOPs, they deliver excellent performance...
largely due to their cohesion and (relative) stability. Remember,
AD (Active Duty) forces experience a "turnover" of personnel amounting
to 25 to 30 percent per year!
The Air Force RC folks are every bit as good as their AD counterparts!
Remember, too, the important Combat Support and Combat Service
Support roles played by the RC units. ALL our PSYOPS units are RC.
That's the guys who prepare the leaflets "distributed" to the enemy,
as well as most of the scripts for broadcast, and several other
things best left unsaid! Logistics...Marine Terminal Management...
Transportation...Ammunition Storage and Maintenance...MUCH of this
work is done by DoD civilians in the AD forces. The bulk of the
SOLDIERS trained to do these jobs are in the RC. I haven't heard
ANYBODY criticizing THEIR "readiness."
No, my recommendation is to cancel the "roundout" program and
put the AD divisions back to full strength. Then, form RC divisions
from the old "roundout" and other RC units.
You might even be able to reduce (effectively, this time) the number
of AD divisions required, AND be able to more efficiently plan their
deployments COMBAT_READY to RDF-A (Rapid Deployment Force - Army)
missions.
John B.
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| 157.5 | IMHO | KYOA::SCHWARTZR | | Tue Mar 19 1991 23:02 | 27 |
|
IMHO
WE (the army guard/reserve) HAVE BEEN HAD!
Everything I've read about the 48th at the NTC has been bad.
It seems they had to practice the attack a number of times before
they got it right, and they had people who weren't mos qualified
among other things.
Well in over 10 years of being a guard officer I've spoken to
quite a few active Infantry commmanders. EVERYONE of them told me
that the NTC was a great idea that was abused by "higher". A typical
story was that battalion commanders were so driven by the NTC that
when a company was sent there they would take all the "duds" out of a
unit and replace them with good troops, not to mention, the best
equipment. Granted this might not have happened in all units, but
how many. I believe the active army was holding the 48TH up to a
different standard, knowing that if the guardd/reserve looked too
good they would lose $ and slots. But again only time will tell.
Randy Schwartz
CPT INF NJARNG
|
| 157.6 | NTC | CLOSUS::J_BUTLER | L'audace, toujour l'audace! | Wed Mar 20 1991 21:09 | 54 |
| Randy,
When I was on active duty at Ft Sill, I was the Field Artillery
School's representative for the development of the National Training
Center.
One of the greatest concerns we, and most all of the general officers
we briefed had was exactly what you mentioned. As far back as 1978
we recognized several things:
1-The NTC was NOT to be a "test," because to MAKE it a test was
to set units (and their junior officers) up for failure.
2-The OPFOR were to be selected from many of the best units, and
would draw heavily from Cav and Scout folks. They would QUICKLY
become intimate with the terrain and scenarios. Learning how to
use Soviet-style tactics was going to be a harder task, since
the most likely OPFOR selectees would already be well-trained in
US tactics/doctrine.
3-The NTC was NOT to be used for RC training. The priority was to
be given to AC "heavy" divisions whose schedules would quickly fill
the limited support capacity of the NTC. Post-mobilization training
was to be conducted at the mobilization stations. (I understand
WHY they chose to change this decision (terrain similarities, etc).)
FYI -- The greatest resistance to the NTC concepts we and CATRADA
(Combined Arms Training and Doctrine Activity) met was from the
O-5s and O-6s (LTCs and COLs)! The O-7s (BG) and up thought it was
a fantastic design/plan.
A few years back, after some RC units got limited approval to use
the NTC, one of the greatest ever "defeats" was handed to the OPFOR,
by an RC unit! It was just NOT a maneuver unit, but a well-executed
plan by a PSYOPS Company supporting a maneuver unit!!! I am not
associated with the PSYOPS folks (nor have I been _directly_),
and I can't get into details, but the embarrassment to the
very-proud OPFOR was considerable. It has been said to me
that many OPFOR officers and NTC staff held a grudge against
the RC folks after that. The incident occurred about 5 years
ago, so I should hope most of the "bruised egos" would have
transferred out by now, but you never can tell.
I second your observations cited re: the AC folks only taking their
"best" to NTC. CQs, and equipment guards are left behind (much
heavy equipment is drawn from stocks pre-positioned at Ft Irwin).
They chose the ones they want to stay behind carefully. RC units
going to NTC take virtually everybody, since much of their heavy
stuff is stored in MAITS (or similar) facilities.
John B.
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